Military History and Warfare

NEWS UPDATE

2012-01-05T13:33:00.000-08:00

Apologies for the lengthy delay since my last post. The good news is that this blog will be moving to my new website which can be reached by clicking on any of the underlined links in this blog post.

The new site will be designed to cater for my wider interests in general history and politics and will be updated regularly.

Let me know what you think of the new site by contacting me with your comments.

Hope to see you at the new website!

Military History and Warfare: The purchase of Commissions in the British army

2009-12-15T15:17:00.000-08:00

Up until the ‘Cardwell reforms’ of 1871, it was common practice for officers in the British army to buy and sell their commissions. The origins of this system are uncertain. However, throughout Europe during the late medieval/early modern period mercenaries were raised on the expectation of profit (rather than wages). Therefore it was expected that those involved should purchase a share in the undertaking guaranteeing them a portion of the booty. Since profits were shared out according to rank, it became customary to charge different amounts depending on the seniority of the rank. Hence the term mercenary ‘company’.

Although the buying and selling of commissions was common practice throughout most European armies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was during the restoration of Charles II to the throne of England that began the widespread practice in the British army. After the experience of the English Civil War, the idea of maintaining a standing army was considered to be dangerous to the liberty of the country. Given that the King was dependent upon Parliament for funds, he had great difficulties maintaining a sizeable force. By offering commissions to those willing to pay, the monarch was able to maintain a standing army without recourse to the public purse. Since Colonels were expected to clothe and fed their regiment, a peacetime army was relatively inexpensive. It is during wartime in the supply and maintenance of a campaigning force that armies become expensive (although Gustavus Adolphus tried to solve this problem by ensuring that his forces attacked and sustained themselves from enemy territory).

The system remained relatively informal in the early part of the eighteenth century. However, in 1719 King George I issued a royal warrant establishing a fixed tariff of prices for each regiment. Further regulations from the Crown in 1720 formally acknowledged purchase as a viable means of promotion within the army, but ensured that the sale and collection of monies remained firmly with the Crown.

As the system continued to develop in the British army, aspiring officers were able to purchase an annuity which would be redeemed upon retirement. If the officer wished for a higher rank, he had merely to pay the difference between his current rank and the rank he wished to attain. As a result, officers frequently moved regiments when vacancies became available in more senior positions. The system also meant that only the very rich could aspire to key positions of command within a regiment. Having a successful military career and being an effective commander were therefore not always synonymous. For less financially well-off junior officers, promotion could only come through active service. If an officer died whilst on active service, their commission would automatically be forfeit to the Crown. However, to enable the army to continue to function on campaign, the next most senior officer was promoted in his place without having to pay money. This would then result in another vacancy emerging lower down the ranks until all had been promoted on the basis of seniority.

Like any system of trading, agents were required to carry out the business of trading. Many of the purchases of ranks were carried out by agents based in London who acted as middlemen between the Crown (who sold the commissions) and the officers who bought them. Unlike the lower officer ranks, Generals could not purchase their positions. They were appointed personally by the Crown. This probably started out as a means by which the monarch could ensure the loyalty of the most senior commanders in his army.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, there was growing criticism of the buying and selling of commissions. Although the system had enabled highly successful commanders like the Duke of Wellington to emerge, he cast a long shadow across the nineteenth century. Defenders of the system (of which the Duke was one) pointed out that the British army had been hugely successful as an institution. However, Wellington’s success disguised the face that many considerably less successful commanders owed their position entirely to personal wealth rather than talent for war. The poor handling of the Crimean War exposed many of these failings in the British army.

In 1856, a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate the ‘System of Purchase and Sale of Commissions in the Army’. Unfortunately few of the recommendations of the Commission were taken up and the debate over the merits of the system continued during the 1860s. House of Lords opposition to the banning of the practice resulted in a Royal Warrant 1871, heralding the Cardwell reforms and a new era of army officer.

Military History and Warfare: The American Civil War: Could the South have survived the war with the North?

2009-10-13T16:13:00.000-07:00

In a previous article, I outlined the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the US civil war. In this article, I shall consider whether the South, despite its inherent economic, manpower and political weaknesses could have stayed off defeat in 1865 and held out for longer against the North. Throughout history there are examples of nations or peoples, after having lost command of the open battlefield, continuing to fight long drawn out campaigns, which gradually sapped the strength and will of an apparently superior enemy. Modern examples include Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the growth of partisan movements against the German occupiers of Yugoslavia, Greece and the western provinces of the USSR during the Second World War.

The leaders of the Confederacy would have had the successful example of the American Revolution, some eighty years earlier to drawn upon. The British army, despite having won the majority of conventional pitched battles against the American rebels, was unable to end the insurgency and defeat the revolutionaries. The American armies under Washington continued to retreat and avoid destruction. Eventually, foreign powers came to the aid of the Americans and defeated the British.

To some extent, this had been the strategy of the Confederacy from the start of the war. The leaders of the Confederacy were convinced that the industrialised nations of Europe (Britain and France) who relied upon cotton imports would be forced to recognize the South and intervene on the side of the Confederacy. Had Britain intervened in the war, the North could have found itself fighting a two front war, with British troops poised to strike from Canada, just as they had done in the war of 1812.
Intervention from Britain and France would also have nullified the North’s strong industrial and financial advantages against the South. The Federal government recognised the dangers of European involvement. Nevertheless, the South had overestimated the importance of its cotton exports. There were other sources of cotton available in the world. Whilst importing cotton from India was probably less commercially advantageous than the simpler Atlantic route with America, the Union naval blockade of the South had helped to push up the price of cotton. The decline of the South’s cotton trade therefore helped to fuel the growth of imported cotton from British India. Ultimately, Britain and France did not consider it to be advantageous enough for them to intervene and help the Confederacy.

Without the aid of foreign powers, the Confederacy was progressively weakened materially through the stranglehold of the Union blockade. The South’s limited industrial base made it necessary to import rifles, guns and many other essential materials of war. The South’s lack of a sizeable navy allowed the Union to land troops and take possession of many of the South’s ports and coastal waters. By April 1862, the whole Atlantic coast of the Confederacy was under Union control, with the exceptions of Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah. The early seizure of the South’s largest port, New Orleans in 1861 and General Grant’s western campaign of 1863, effectively turned the Mississippi into a Union river cutting the Confederacy in half.
With the defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederate armies were unable to launch further large-scale offensives against the North.

Despite the progressive decapitation of the South between 1864-1865, the armies of the Confederacy continued to check and inflict reverses upon the Union armies. Notably at Cold Harbour in July 1864, where 50,000 Union troops took part in the largest frontal assault of the war, suffering 7,000 casualties within half an hour. The key point is that whilst the Union could invade and destroy the economy and infrastructure of the South, as long as the Confederate armies could exist, the Confederacy could exist. If they could hold out long enough and force the North into a degree of war weariness the North might just sue for peace. Equally, Grant and other military leaders in the Union army realised that in order to defeat the Confederacy they could not just rely upon slow economic strangulation. They would need to launch an all out invasion of the South and its people. In the final phase of the war, this is precisely what the Union armies did. The objective of the Union campaign now was to destroy the fighting force of the South and its fighting will. General Sherman’s famous march through Georgia in November-December 1864 is remembered as being particularly brutal on the civilian population. Thousands of slaves were freed and plantations and homes looted and burnt. It was this kind of warfare that ground down the social fabric of the South whilst its armies fought on against ever increasing odds.

After Richmond fell on 5th April 1865, Robert E Lee’s army escaped. Apart from his own, there were two remaining Confederate armies, both in full retreat in the face of superior Union numbers. At Appomattox Lee was cut off. There now emerged a dangerous mixture of no supplies, desertion, and the almost incalculable oversupply of the Union forces now roaming the South. He was grossly outnumbered and finally had to send a note to Grant requesting terms of surrender. With Union armies now under effective control over much of the deep South and the principal formations of the Confederate army having either been defeated or surrendered, the Confederacy had ceased to exist as a sovereign political state (or rather a collection of states). This is perhaps why the South did not and could not continue the war as an insurgency. Tens of thousands of Southern boys had been killed or maimed, the slaves had been freed and the economy was in ruins. The war did not continue as an insurgency because it had always been an insurgency. Albeit, one of a larger scale than we might commonly associate with an uprising. The political questions of 1860-1 had been decided by force of arms and thus the war ended.

Military History and Warfare: World War I: The French Mutinies of 1917

2009-10-06T13:41:00.000-07:00

The archives relating to the French army mutinies of 1917 will remain closed until 2017. At the time secrecy was maintained for fear of the adverse effects news of the mutiny might have had on both the domestic front and the British forces serving in France. Worn down by the failed Nivelle offensives of April 1917 on the Aisne and Champagne, the morale of the French army was at an all time low. The mutinies began on 17 April 1917 with peaks in late May and early June. A total of sixty-eight divisions were affected in some way, ranging from serious to minor disturbances.

Although there were reports of red flags appearing amongst certain mutineering units, a study carried out by the French military historian Guy Pedroncini has shown that the majority of mutineers were simply protesting against being used as cannon fodder. Better conditions were demanded with increased food, rest periods and regular leave. Angry demonstrations were mounted in the rear lines of the French army. Frequently, these protests were carried out by resting units which had been ordered back into the frontline for an attack. However, there are few, if any reported cases of discipline breaking down in the front lines themselves. It is clear that whatever the French infantrymen thought of their commanders, they remained willing to defend France against German attacks. Interestingly, the vast majority of mutineers were in the infantry. There were few reports of artillerymen joining the protests and no reports of cavalrymen. This is perhaps an indication of the varying degrees of comfort experienced (or suffered) by the different branches of the French army. Typically, the infantry bore the brunt of the casualties and deprivations associated with trench warfare. Consequently, it was they who were the most likely to complain about their conditions when the mutinies erupted in 1917.

Although the catalyst for the mutinies had been the failed Aisne offensive, the symptoms of declining morale could be seen earlier. In the last months of 1916, the average monthly desertion rate had been in the region of 470. Between the new year of 1917 and the start of the Aisne offensive, the rate had increased to 618. However, in May this figure rose rapidly to 1,291 eventually peaking at 1,619 in June. The reaction of senior officers varied significantly. Some took a hard line and laid the blame on the dissemination of pacifist or communist ideas from Paris or Russia. In some cases regimental commanders ordered men to fire on mutineers or arranged for court-martials and executions of ringleaders. In most cases, officers played a mediating role. The new commander in chief, Philippe Petain ordered that the mutinies be dealt with firmly but with moderation. Of those arrested and convicted by court-martial between 16 April 1917 and 31 January 1918, 499 men were sentences to death. However, only twenty-seven were actually shot. The remainder received a presidential clemency. 179 others received sentences of forced labour ranging from three years to life. 1438 were sentences to communal public labour for periods ranging between one year and two years. Others received prison sentences.

By June, discipline had been largely restored within the French army. They had not been entirely in vain. Petain engaged in a widely-felt public relations campaign amongst his troops. He visited ninety divisions, spoke to soldiers of all ranks and made it clear that there would be no more large-scale offensives until the Americans arrived. He initiated reforms to improve conditions for front-line troops. Barracks were refurbished and fresh green vegetables were brought into field kitchens. Small things in civilian life, but crucial for soldiers in the trenches. Soldiers were given the regular leave for seven to ten days every four months, with a right of appeal should it be refused. Better clean-up facilities were provided. Petain even went so far as to organise an appeal to the American Red Cross for families of soldiers rendered impoverished by the war. These measures, taken as a whole were crucial to restoring and maintaining army confidence in the leadership of its command staff. Crucially, the episode demonstrated to French high command, the importance of factoring in morale in future attacks.

The protests and mutiny of the French army in 1917 can be contrasted with that of the German forces in 1918. Whereas the French army suffered from sporadic outbursts from individual units or groups of soldiers, the German case was much more serious. In France morale in the towns and cities had held up for much of the war. This is perhaps why the French government were so keen to keep the mutinies secret, for fear of shattering a fragile domestic front. By contrast, in the German army of 1918 the failure of the Ludendorff offensives, the success of the Allies counterattack in the summer and autumn of 1918, and the growing realisation that the war was unwillable lead to a rapid collapse in confidence that spread throughout Germany. The mutiny episodes in both armies demonstrate how much the First World War became a war of not only physical attrition, but spiritual.

Military History and Warfare: World War II: A few thoughts on the co-operation of the minor Axis powers with Germany

2009-09-25T14:45:00.000-07:00

Introduction

Students (and incidentally participants) of the Second World War will remember that Germany did not fight the Second World War alone. Famously, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed a 10-year pact in 1940. This would later result in Germany declaring war upon the United States shortly after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbour. Given the geographical distances between their territories, more practical day-to-day co-operation between Germany and Japan was extremely difficult, if not impossible. This was obviously not the case with Germany and Italy. German forces under Rommel were sent into North Africa to prop up the failing Italian army. German and Italian troops occupied parts of Greece together and a military expedition of 200,000 (with the rather grandiose designation as the Italian 8th army) was sent by Mussolini to join German forces in Russia.

Whilst Germany, Italy and Japan were the major partners of the Axis, it is also important to remember the manpower and material contributions of the minor Axis powers. These included Finland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia. However, unlike the Western Allies, the Axis powers failed to achieve the same degree of co-operation, often with disastrous results.

Finland

Finland had been fighting Soviet Russia since before Operation Barbarossa. During the Winter War of 1939-40, Finland had fought bravely against superior Russian forces. Despite tactically outmanoeuvring the Russians, Finland had eventually been forced to capitulate under the sheer weight of numbers of the forces arrayed against them. An alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941 was necessary in order for Finland to recover its lost territories and prevent future Russian aggression.

Finnish-German co-operation took many forms. The Finnish army was well trained and had proved its fighting capabilities during the Winter War. In September 1941, the German High Command approached the Finnish military with the proposal of the establishment of creating a school to instruct German officers in winter warfare. The proposal was readily accepted with the first classes beginning in December of that year. In the summer of 1942, the Finns continued to instruct the Germans in fighting techniques for heavily forested areas. The school was considered to be a success by both parties.

During the invasion of Russia, Finnish forces pushed southeast helping to secure the cordon around Leningrad, allowing the Germans to place the city under siege. All in all, Finland’s forces were considered to be reliable and perhaps the equal of the Wehrmacht. This was certainly not the attitude of the Germans towards their other Eastern front allies. Despite this relatively high degree of co-operation, after the winter of 1941 the Germans failed to gain very much more from their Finnish allies. Once the old borders of Finland had been secured in August 1941, Finnish forces stood down from the majority of active operations. The Finnish government clearly saw the Russian war as a war of containment rather than the anti-Bolshevik crusade that Hitler had envisaged.

Romania

The Romanian contribution to the Axis effort has received a great deal of bad press from military historians. Much of this is due to the collapse of the Romanian forces on the steppe outside of Stalingrad during ‘Operation Uranus’. It is argued that the failure of the Romanian army to stand its ground resulted in the encirclement and eventual destruction of the German Sixth Army. Whilst there are elements of truth in this account, the reality is more complicated. Crucial to the Romanian (and Italian) failure outside of Stalingrad was the shortage of antitank weaponry. In October 1942, the Romanian Third Army had to defend a front of 75 miles with a total of only sixty anti-tank guns of 50mm calibre or higher. Recognising the crucial shortages of such weapons amongst their allies, the Germans had promised to assist them with additional supplies of modern anti-tank guns. However, with the German war industry now under constant air attack, the Germans were by now facing difficulties keeping their own forces adequately equipped. Consequently, many of these weapon deliveries fell far short of what had initially been promised.

This widespread lack of equipment was not helped by the often contemptuous attitude of many German officers towards their allies. During the difficult latter part of 1942, Romanian horses were supplied with 1 kg of fodder a day compared the Germans 5 or even 6 kg. Subsequently the Romanians were left with fewer horses for transport. Wounded Romanian soldiers complained of being given less rations than their counterparts in German hospitals. All of this was significant because it was usually the Germans who decided where supplies were allocated.

Another major problem with Axis alliance was the political relationship between the smaller powers. Romania and Hungary were in dispute over several regions within their own borders. Each looked to German to favour one over the other. Subsequently, Antonescu of Romania and Admiral Horthy of Hungary were both willing to escalate their troop commitments to the eastern front. However, German commanders had be careful not to place these ‘allied’ units adjacent to each other on the battlefield, for fear that they might start fighting each other. Even as late as 1944, American diplomats claimed that the only army the Hungarians really wanted to fight was the Romanian.

Conclusion

It is interesting to note that of all the Axis armies deployed on the eastern front, only the Germans had a strong ideological component to their training. Subsequently, German forces were much more highly motivated when compared to the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies. German reports from the period are filled with stories illustrating the widespread lack of enthusiasm for the war amongst their allies.

Added to this was the widespread problem of lack of modern equipment and transport, which immediately put the minor Axis, powers forces at a major disadvantage in a war that was becoming increasingly technologically sophisticated. For example, much of the artillery of the Hungarian army were World War I remnants from the old Austria-Hungarian army. Germany tried to elevate these problems by supplying captured enemy tanks and equipment. However, this solution could never be more than a stopgap.

It is also important not to underestimate the importance of language barriers as a practical obstacle that could often lead to hostility and misunderstanding.

Military History and Warfare: Alamo Village, Brackettville: Texan War of Independence

2009-02-03T13:39:00.000-08:00

I apologise for not adding new material to this site for over a month. However, the good news is that having been away travelling over December and January, I have now accumulated lots of new material for 2009.

This week we will be having a look at the Alamo Village, located some 130 miles from the site of the real Alamo in San Antonio. Somewhat 'off the beaten track', the Alamo village was originally constructed for the 1960 John Wayne epic 'The Alamo'. The village consists of the full-scale film set used for the film, including a full-scale replica of both San Antonio and the Alamo compound circa. 1836. The village is unique in that its building have no false fronts. All are fully functional, thus allowing Brackettville to boast Texas' first permanant outdoor movie set. Since 1960, the set has been in some 200 different productions.

For the military historian, the Alamo village also presents the opportunity to look at (and run around in) a recreation of one of the most famous battles in history. Of course, the value of any such exercise is entirely dependent upon the accuracy of the recreation. Whilst it is impossible to judge with any certainty as the accuracy of the set it can be said that the carpenters and set designers were working from a map which is widely believed to accurately represent the true state of affairs at the mission in 1836. At the very least, the set gives us an appreciation of some of the challenges facing the Texian defenders as well as their Mexican attackers.

The Alamo garrison had access to at least eighteen pieces of artillery (and possibly twenty-one according to some sources). In order to equip each one with a full firing team, half of the garrison would have to have been deployed manning cannons. Assuming that each gun team was therefore under strength, this still leaves very few men for protecting the compound perimeter. The complex itself sprawled over 3 acres with almost 1,320 feet of perimeter to defend. With fewer than two-hundred men, the Alamo desperately needed reinforcements.

The final Mexican assault occured on March 6 and consisted of four columns. Despite their advantage in numbers, the advancing Mexicans were extremely vulnerable to cannon shot. Only the first few ranks of soldiers were able to fire without hitting the men in front. The cannons of the defenders were therefore able to tear holes through the tightly packed columns of attacking infantry. However, once over the wall, the Mexicans were able to use their weight in numbers to overwhelm individual groups of defenders. As the photos demonstrate, once the walls had been breached, the inner compound was simply too large to prevent the defenders from being overwhelmed.

Section of the wall defended by Crockett.

Front gate

Cross section of the southern defences.

Military History and Warfare: 19th Military History Blog Carnival

2008-12-14T09:38:00.000-08:00

Hello and welcome to the 19th Military History Blog Carnival!

This month we have a variety of interesting submissions.

First up we have an interesting article from Ross Mahoney's Thoughts on Military History blog which examines some of the economic and operational issues that faced the Royal Air Force during the inter-war years. By explaining these problems Ross shows the role of the RAF in helping to develop Combined Operations doctrine.

Mark Grimsley at War Historian presents an excellent article examining the possible consequences for prolonging the Pacific war had a Japanese military coup against the Emperor been successful just days before the surrender.

Penny Richards' brings us the story of World War II vetern Bob Metcalf. Penny reflects on Mr. Metcalf's time in the seventy-sixth infantry division and later civilian life.

On a similar theme of personal histories, we a have a new blog from Rich Landers entitled Soldier's Mail. The blog features the writings home of Sgt. Samuel Avery during the time of the First World War from 1916-1919 while first serving with the 8th Mass. Infantry during the Mexican Border Campaign (1916) and then with the 103rd U.S. Infantry (26th Division) in France as part of the American Expeditionary Force (1917-1919).

This World War I blog is publishing the letters of William Lamin exactly 90 years after they were written. Read each posting week by week to follow his life.

Not so much a blog but an archive, Kimberley Linder's The Flight Officer brings us the life of Joseph H Noyes. Joseph participated in the aerial campaign against Germany before being shot down and killed at the age of 22. His story and personal history provides a window into World War II.

This month Airminded brings us an interesting discussion (and map) of Britain's air defence network during the First World War when Zepplins and Gotha Bombers pounded London.

Terry Tucker draws on his own experiences in the field of counterinsurgency bringing us a fascinating article on the Lessons of History

For something a little different, we have a review of the the film Passchendale. The writer is pleasantly surprised that a big screen epic featuring the story of Canadian soldiers has finally made it to cinemas! You might also like to look at a trailer for the film on the official site.

History is Elementary examines the film 1968 film 'Beach Red' and tells the story of the battle for the island of Tarawa when US marines took heavy casualties attempting to dislodge the Japanese. The article looks at the number of dead and recent efforts to locate their remains.

From me, we have an article on the American Civil War. I've tried to explore the various strengths and weaknesses of the Union and Confederacy at the outbreak of the war.

Lastly, we have an article looking at the Welsh castle of Aberystwyth. There are some great pictures as well as interesting facts!

Unfortunately, this is it for submissions for December.

We are also looking for a host for January's blog. Please contact Gavin Robinson (saber'at'4-lom.com)

I hope you have enjoyed this month's carnival. Please continue to support the carnival by writing and submitting your articles. Until January, have a good Christmas and New Year.

Alex

Military History and Warfare: Notices: Upcoming Military History Blog Carnival

2008-12-03T01:03:00.000-08:00

As Christmas approaches, I'm pleased to announce that 'Military History and Warfare' will be hosting the 19th Military History Blog Carnival.

If you would like to submit an article, please e-mail me at alexanderclark999'at'gmail.com. Alternatively, use this handy tool to submit your article.

I have decided to leave the carnival theme open to all submissions. However, given that we have just marked the 90th Anniversary of the end of World War I, it would be good to see some articles on the subject.

The Carnival will be up and running on Sunday 14th December. Join the blog mailing list (box on the right hand side of this page) to ensure that you don't miss this edition!

Military History and Warfare: American Civil War: Logistics, Railroads and Strategy

2008-11-13T01:26:00.000-08:00

Commanders throughout history have grappled with the problems of integrating logistics and strategy. A witty little military logistician dictum known to particularly rile those in the combat branches goes: “If logistics’ was easy it would be called tactics”. With all of our modern technology, scalable processes, and mass transportation it is easy to forget the difficulty with which armies of the past had to struggle in order to provide the right amount of men and material at precisely the right time.

Let us consider the following. Up until about 1830, armies either marched on foot or rode on horses and wagons. Every weapon, round of ammunition, pound of food and sack of oats was carried by man, beast, or both. Roughly, half of the supplies carried were used to sustain the horses themselves. For much of the nineteenth century, North America remained largely wild, undeveloped, and lacking in infrastructure. However by 1861 important developments had been made with the advent of railroad.

For comparison, a six mule team drawing a wagon of 1.5 tons of food could travel approximately 500 miles on that 1.5 ton of food; a locomotive carrying a ton of fuel could only travel about 30 or 35 miles but could carry a payload of 150 tons.

Soldiers traveling by train could arrive at their destination in better shape physically and materially. Logistical difficulties were now reduced to maneuvering this quantity of men and material any distance from the railhead. The improved speed of movement allowed supplies to arrive in better, condition.

By surveying a map of the United States the sheer scale of the battles and campaigns of the Civil War becomes fully apparent:

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/AtlasesTableOfContents.html

As an example, Sherman’s 1864 Atlanta Campaign essentially followed a logistical life line of 473 miles of rail line from Louisville, Nashville, Chattanooga and then Atlanta. The campaign included approximately 100,000 men and 35,000 animals. Sherman estimated that the rail line did the work of approximately 36,000 wagons and 220,000 mules; the use of the railroad not only expanded the scale of warfare it is also hotly debated that it may also have contributed to prolonging the war as well.

One of the foremost Napoleonic concepts of war, modeled by the Commanders of the Civil War, was the concept of “Interior Lines”; simply meaning that, a group of units or armies cooperating on the inside of a curved front could mass and maneuver more quickly than there opponents on the outside, or “Exterior Lines” of the curve because they had less far to travel.

As an example, in 1863 at the Battle Chickamauga, LTG Longstreet moved 12,000 men, 800 miles in 12 days from Virginia to Tennessee to reinforce Braxton Bragg. Two weeks later the Union XI and XII Corp’s moved 25,000 men, 1200 Miles in 12 days, from Virginia to Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. Union forces moved twice as many troops in the same number of days using exterior lines of communication. Seemingly, the concept of Interior lines had been nullified and railroads seem to make geographical disposition a lot less relevant.

In 1863, fighting revolved mainly around the Culpepper Court House and Fredericksburg primarily because those were the two main Union Army Railheads; the union was averaging approximately 800 tons of material supplies a day to the Falmouth Railhead opposite Fredericksburg.

In essence railroad technology would drive the strategic considerations of war planning, and, intrusions and interdictions of rail lines would impact operations. The railroad expanded the scale of warfare materially and geographically. But most clearly, the railroad logistics shaped the strategies of Civil War Commanders and became a vital element of Military Science; some scholars have argued that railroad science was no longer an element of strategy; it had become the strategy and would thus change the face of war.

- Terry Tucker

The American Civil War: The Military Balance sheet of 1861: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Union and Confederacy

2008-11-03T04:56:00.000-08:00

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it seems almost impossible to think that the Confederacy could have won the war against the Union. By surveying the balance sheet of both sides, it is possible to assess how far the Confederacy lagged behind the Union in both resources and economic development.

In terms of population, for every inhabitant of the Confederate States there were more than two Americans who lived in the Union. In addition, the Confederacy had more than three and half million slaves and 130,000 freed blacks. Slave labour also allowed white men to serve in the Confederate army, allowing for more than 80% of the military age population to be mobilised.

Economically, the North surpassed the South in almost every measure. Prior to the war, the South had relied upon the northern states and Britain for the iron and steel imports necessary for railroad construction. The North possessed 110,000 some factories and workshops of various sizes. By comparison, the South possessed barely a tenth of that number. Statistics for industrial workers further demonstrate that the American industrial basin was clearly concentrated in the Northern states. 1,300,000 workers in the North were employed in industry. By comparison, the south had only 110,000 workers. The predominance of manufacturing in the northern states gave the Union a huge advantage. In 1860, the North produced fifteen times the level of iron manufactured in the South. The arms industry was also concentrated in the North with 97% of all firearms produced north of the Mason-Dixie line.

Despite these massive material advantages, the war would be won by the side that could best concentrate their resources overwhelmingly against the enemy. Total war is only possible with the support of a banking and credit system to support the costs of war. It was in this field that the North excelled over the Confederacy. With 85% of all capital and 80% of all bank deposits, the North had a banking and credit system vastly more developed than anything in the South. The Federal government was therefore able to draw upon loans from private financiers in quantities which was simply impossible for the Confederacy.

Although many Southern politicians believed they had a predominance in agriculture (especially cotton, which they attempted to leverage to gain diplomatic recognition from Britain and France), the reality was that here too, the North had a clear advantage. The failure of Missouri and Kentucky to secede had deprived the Confederacy of another important agricultural basin that could have supplied the Confederate army. The South had also hoped to use cotton exports to obtain credit on the European markets. However, New Orleans, the largest port in the Confederacy fell into Union hands early in the war. The remaining important cities of Charleston, Galveston, Mobile and Wilmington were all vulnerable to naval and land attack.

Despite these inherent disadvantages, the South possessed strengths that they hoped would ultimately win them the war. In order to conquer the South, Federal armies would have to subdue an area the size of Western Europe. In 1860, the Federal army was only 14,000 strong. Those few troops were scattered across various parts of the continental United States. Both North and South would therefore have to start from scratch in raising the large armies that would ultimately be required to fight the war. It was hoped that the Confederacy would therefore have sufficient time to make allies and involve international powers such as Britain to turn the tide against the Union. Furthermore, Federal troops advancing into the South would have to deal with the problems of over-extended lines of communication and the estimated thirty or so supply wagons required for every thousand troops. Countryside and enemy strongholds would need to be pacified, drawing yet more troops away from the front. If the Confederacy could drag out the fighting for long enough, they hoped to be able to tire out the Union, just as the American colonists had tired out a militarily superior British force ninety years before. Although the North had a larger population, one in five (four million people) were foreign immigrants. Such a large diverse population might be more difficult to keep together in comparison to the more homogeneous Southern population.

Given the weaknesses of the South, the historian must ask how the Confederates could have rationally believed that they could make and win a war against the Union?
The answer lies perhaps in the fact that many of the technologies and tactics of Total War later seen in the US Civil War were not immediately apparent to commanders on both sides. The potential of railway to change the nature of battlefield logistics had yet be discovered. It is important to remember that many of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides were only fully realised later in the war.

Adam I.P. Smith, ‘The American Civil War’, (New York, 2007)

Mark E. Neely, ‘Was the Civil War a Total War?’, Civil War History 37 (1991)

Ronald N. Current, ‘God and the Strongest Battalions’ in David Hubere Donald, ed, ‘Why the North won the Civil War’ (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1960)

James M. McPherson, ‘Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction’ (New York 1982)

James Huston, ‘Calculating the value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights and the Economic Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003)

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Lessons of History

2008-10-24T07:04:00.000-07:00

Counter-insurgency: How Do We Choose Which Lessons of History are Applicable?

This brief essay attempts to address the problems of identifying relevant historical lessons to countering an insurgency.

The illustrations most often used to describe success in counterinsurgency are the British experience in Malaya and the American experience in the Philippines. Conversely, the French experiences in Vietnam and Algeria, aside from some tactical innovations, are considered to be cautionary tales in how not to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

When one reads the myriad of news reports and analysis, it is easy to get the impression that by making (what we believe to be) correct historical similarities, we can therefore correctly identify and isolate both the components of the insurgency and the correct methodology for countering it (as opposed to “combating” it).

The British example in Malaya is clear example of precision labeling in identifying the “kind of war” that one is fighting (notice the inference to Clausewitz?). The British used the term “Emergency” to mobilize the desired government agencies, police and military organizations to prosecute the counterinsurgency effort. ‘Prosecute’ appears to be the best description of events because of the British emphasis on the rule of law and the heavy use and primacy of police in all its operations and engagement strategies. This is not to say that the military was not used, on the contrary, they were; however, they played a secondary role and were subordinate in many cases to other agencies and departments.

The American experience in the Philippines can primarily be attributed to Magsaysay through his effective leadership, military and governmental reforms. Military operations were subordinate to the goal of winning the support of the people, not only in tactics, but in behavior. A detail often overlooked by US analysts, is the fact that the Philippine Army had not been created entirely in the image of the US Army. Thus it was not indoctrinated with conventional US solutions, tactical doctrine and organizations. All of these “force multipliers” were never fully understood by US Commanders that believed in large full scale military operations that depended heavily on the use of superior firepower and felt that the best model for success was the historical examples of WW II.

What does this mean for those that intend to use the historical lessons learned? The first question that must be asked is what is unique about the kind of insurgency being faced? What kind of insurgency is this? Where is the “white noise” that seemingly distracts one’s ability to root out and identify the root cause? Once both the kind of war that being fought and the factors that make the particular counterinsurgency unique have been identified, questions can be asked of what lessons are transferable from previous experiences to this new situation.

In essence, some general lessons of success from the Malayan Experience and the Philippine experience can be articulated as follows:

· Military operations are subordinate to and dominated by political objectives; this includes behavior and tactics

· Solid intelligence from the civilian sources that is vetted and validated by multiple sources drives military operations if those operations support political objectives

· Small unit tactics reign supreme; small unit night patrols, ambushes, long range reconnaissance and commando squads, combined with a careful targeting of psychological warfare and information operations based on solid intelligence.

· Live with and mingle with the population; leaders must constantly review the element of risk to the force. “Going Native” early and quickly will mitigate that risk.

· Avoid the pitfalls’ of “do-goodism”; throwing resources and “largess” at a problem without participation and support of the people/government/population in the entire decision making process creates no confidence or support in the reforms or programs.

Lastly, remember that these are general historical lessons and estimates. How and if these lessons can be applied to say Iraq or Afghanistan needs to be carefully weighed against the questions we posed earlier: What is unique about this new and particular situation? What experience and lessons can be transferred? How do we adapt the appropriate general lessons to a unique situation?

Terry Tucker

The Bone Yard. Old Afghan Army equipment. There are many such bone yards like this throughout the country. Left center in this picture is a BM-21, 122mm Rocket launcher and just to the right of it is a piece of towed artillery.

For comparison; the two tanks in the middle are cold war era soviet tanks. The tank facing you on the right is a Soviet T54/55 series tank. The bore evacuator is at the end of the gun tube. The tank on the left is a soviet T-62. There are many variants of both vehicles and sometimes the location of the bore evacuator is not a good indication that you have correctly identified the tank. Other considerations include road wheel spacing, machine gun type mounted on the turret, location of infra-red lights, search lights and other equipment fixed on the hull or turret

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Urban Operations

2008-10-17T01:29:00.001-07:00

Counterinsurgency, Urban Operations and Lessons Learned

Urban operations are an increasing aspect of modern day conflicts. Urban operations are also essential because of the many considerations that result in the decision to conduct an urban operation, for instance; Political considerations, Psychological considerations, Operational Considerations, Potential Center of gravity. The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict reflects at least two of the above considerations, as does the decision of US Forces to seize Kabul and Kandahar early in the Afghan war.

If one assumes that doctrine is the key element of training and that this training is the key to a unit's ability to execute an operation, and successful execution in turn results in a succession of operational successes, and even perhaps a decisive strategic success, then there are two predominate themes that are linked.

First the basic tactic’s techniques and procedures (TTP’s) remain unchanged: these are to Suppress, Breach, Attack/Assault and Defend. Second, a defender and attacker make critical assumptions about the population when they make the decision to conduct urban operations. This decision and the size of the force to use are directly dependent on the commander’s mission analysis. The operation is then conducted by a number of units; the key factor being each squad, platoon and company and how well trained they are to conduct urban operations; the training is derived from an understanding of doctrine and an emphasis placed on that doctrine.
Three key failures across the spectrum of urban operations include:

· Complacency
· A lack of specialization of units and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures or (Drills)
· Refugee’s and Internally Displaced Persons.

Cities are resilient and infrastructure generally continues to operate despite conflict. The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli conflict demonstrates that urban combat is still crucial and will be a center of gravity that will disrupt operations and affect political and operational considerations. An analysis of urban operations between WW II and 1998 for urban operations in Stalingrad, Aachen, Manilla, Hue, Singapore, Beirut, Mogadishu, Grozny and Sarajevo, reveals a number of themes and lessons learned. These themes and lessons that are recurrent include:
[i]

· Complacency of your enemies resolve – Stalingrad, Mogadishu, Grozny (Iraq)
· Overestimating your ability
· No contingency planning –Stalingrad, Grozny
· Destruction/turning the city into rubble - Stalingrad, Aachen, Grozny
· Coalition soldiers operationally weak - Stalingrad, Hue, Mogadishu (Iraq and Afghanistan)
· Casualty rates high
· Misuse of armor- Stalingrad, Grozny,
· Chicanery/Deception/Ruses (Tactical) Seek to devise tactics and methods that put your opponent at a disadvantage
· AdHoc Task Organization (Small mobile teams work best) (3 x 25 man teams) squad composition is also changed NO COMPOSITE UNITS
· Improvisation of weapons and tactics (hugging techniques, weapon for multiple uses, ie RPG’s or Recoiless Rifles)
· Infantry team re-organizations
· Specialized urban training and specialized training to work with armor.
· Published doctrine is of little help except for pointers on defense
· Methodical and firepower intensive operations
· Battlefield is not linear and clean
· Snipers, mines and communications are your most important assets
· Urban structure and architecture is important
· ROE/ROI (Rules of Engagement/ Rules of Interaction
· Units do not plan or implement security measures
· No logistics plan
· Information/Psyops war: Discrepancies between Official sources and News Media (Public Opinion is extremely important; prepare provocations to destabilize along ethnic lines) Grozny, Israeli-Hezbollah, Iraq, Afghanistan
· Extensive use of Electronic Counter Measures and satellite blocking
· Assaults uncoordinated; Lack of coordination between units, agencies and police.
· Technology is ineffective when the soldier or user is untrained, confused and afraid to use it.
· The capacity of clans, culture and social traditions goes far beyond surface discipline
· Force ratios not adhered to
· The decision to fight in successive cities (this is a critical failure in decision making)
· Preparation for urban combat has to begin in peacetime

Increasingly, urban operations are a requirement of counterinsurgency. Generally speaking the area known as the Middle East is comprised of 18 Nations; is 4.3 million square miles, had a population of 326 million in 2002and 57% of this population resides in urban areas. For comparison, 25% of the population was urban in 1960 and current projections indicate that by the year 2015 that 70% of the population will be urban.[ii] Increasingly, military operations and or counter-insurgency operations within urban areas means that operations will increasingly include a succession of urban operations that literally will cross ethnic and cultural boundaries from one street to the next and will increase the complexity of operations. Of particular importance is the fact that Middle Eastern cities are unique and different from Western and European urban design. Despite the fact that some Middle Eastern cities are changing and may begin to resemble Western design as a result of sprawl and growth, the city center in Middle Eastern cities still has a significant religious, political and social influence and Middle Eastern urban design is also a physical reflection of tribal, clan and community separation that only the locals will know and understand, thus adding another layer of complexity to the hearts and minds campaign.

- Terry Tucker

[i] Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End, Roger J. Spiller, US Army Command and General Staff College Press; Block by Block: The Challenge of Urban Operations, William G Robertson, Lawrence A. Yates, US Army Command and General Staff College Press.
[ii] Population Resource Center; prc@prcnj.org.

A View from the Rampart: A mine clearing training session south of our camp. French and US Demolition Experts train Afghan students the art and science of mine clearance.

Urban Terrain: Every alley, door, window and crevice offers defensible advantage and can become a dangerous trap. Rubble and city composition can also add to the complexity.

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Classical or Modern Counterinsurgency

2008-10-10T00:48:00.000-07:00

Tactical Lessons, Strategic Success and Counterinsurgency Operations Classical or Modern Counterinsurgency?

Counterinsurgency has not received this much attention since the 1960’s and President Kennedy’s implementation of the US Army Special Warfare Center. Our renewed interest in the art of insurgency and counterinsurgency has sparked fierce debate over the kind of war we are fighting: terrorism, irregular warfare or an asymmetrical war. When we label a war a counterinsurgency, by definition, it means that we are fully aware of the type of insurgency we are fighting; do we really? Is terrorism a type of war or a tactic? What do we really mean when we use the term irregular warfare? And What exactly is an Asymmetrical War?

My education in military studies began with a healthy dose of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan. I studied Patton, Guderian, Rommel, and a host of other famous conventional war practitioners. As my warrior education progressed, I was taught the “classics”; T.E. Lawrence, C.E. Callwell, David Galula, and, Frank Kitson. I also became familiar with, Mao Zedong and Che Guevara.

The US Army released its new counterinsurgency manual in Dec 2007. It is heavily steeped in the theories of classical counterinsurgency (COIN). Classical counterinsurgency places a heavy emphasis on maximizing the legitimacy of the Host Government; US Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, also does the same. Yet as a trainer and practitioner of counterinsurgency attempting to implement the newest doctrine, something is amiss between the classical textbook approach and what appears to be actually happening on the ground.

Classical counterinsurgency is based on lessons learned between the 1940’s and the 1970’s. These lessons were gleaned from places like Algeria, Malaysia, Central America, and Vietnam. Most of the insurgencies during this period were based on either Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism or both. As a result, the strategies and lessons learned focused on how an already established, legitimate, yet, weak government could re-assert itself and maintain the status quo; including the minority or opposition group backed by a Western Power.

The counterinsurgency we are experiencing in Afghanistan is not nationalistic or anti-colonial. Insurgents today are following in failed States or States bordering between weak and failed. In classical counterinsurgency the insurgent takes the initiative and initiates the campaign. Some examples include: Algeria, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Columbia, and Rhodesia. Over the last couple of years Coalition forces or weak governments have initiated the campaign and the insurgent is now in a position to be strategically reactive, think Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the covert war for sanctuary and financial support in places like Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the Arab Emirates.

Today the paradox of modern counterinsurgency might be explained as: Classical insurgencies usually were started to disrupt the status quo and to overthrow existing governments. The insurgents had a strategy and a political agenda that was Nationalistic in its nature. Modern insurgents, on the other hand, are now attempting to preserve the status quo where a weak government or foreign invaders represent revolutionary change. Today’s insurgent does not always seek to gain control of the State. Think Kurds and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area of the North West Territories and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

The modern insurgent does not always want to succeed from the State but rather control portions of it; they could care less if the State collapses, as long as they are in control of their area of interest. Modern insurgents, unlike the Nationalists of yore, really have not stipulated how and what would replace the existing structure or government, or, articulated a “National” Strategy. Even bin Laden’s alleged strategy is more akin to the structure of the Pasha’s and Bey’s of the Ottoman Empire, a strategy that espouses an adherence to an ideology subject to local interpretation, refinement and enforcement, and, no real unified plan on how to implement it.Consequently, counterinsurgency becomes very dynamic and very complex, especially when the insurgent you’re fighting only cares about curing God’s favor through countless individual acts with the hope of eventually gaining paradise and ultimate victory.

The modern insurgent is fighting a “resistance” type of war and seeks to wear down the effort by constantly attacking soft targets. He thinks that we will just leave if he can continue this tactic. On the other hand, Coalition Forces collateral damage and mis-managed information operations continue to erode Coalition credibility, create a wave of new recruits and, more importantly, erode world and general public opinion of our ability to wage a successful counterinsurgency.Thus, the lessons learned here include: Understanding that cultural differences define Jus in Bello. Western Standards are not necessarily agreed to by all others. Understanding these cultural differences in “who” is defining the “just war” will help us understand the domestic and local origins of what constitutes defiance and how it might escalate. Understanding this process helps to define the political-military engagement strategy and process. Remember, diplomacy and politics first.

Other lessons include: Countermeasures designed to fight the enemy strategy and not his ideology; carefully managing the use of force and insuring that your media message is precise and attains the moral high ground in the language of the local cultural area. In essence you have to develop the media message for the local and not just your audience at home. Furthermore this message “branding” so to speak, must be precise for the regional area. Messages devised for Afghanistan might not be well received in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Information operations are complex and need to be “Targeted”. Think commercial branding here. A commercial message designed for an English speaking audience may fail miserably with your French or German speaking audience, same goes for the Middle East and Golden Crescent. Syrian and Saudi audiences are not the same as Egyptian, Afghani or Turkish audiences. One size does not fit all and the only real commonality among them all is the religion of Islam, and even that is further divided by those that adhere to a particular branch. Despite the fact that popular or unpopular domestic support will either make or break your strategy; information operations must be layered to target specific audiences.

Patrolling and raiding are still critical, but, this technique, tactic and procedure (TTP) has required adjustment and we are finding that more snipers, more observation posts and more surveillance must be increasingly incorporated into the intelligence plan to pre-empt the insurgent’s intentions.

Lastly, at risk of sounding cliché, Intelligence is critical to operations. It is especially critical in counterinsurgency because intelligence drives operations, but, intelligence preparation of the battlefield is also being modified to account for the complex dynamics of modern insurgencies

Terry Tucker

Convoy: A convoy heads towards downtown Mazer-e-Sharif. You can see the “Blue Mosque” faintly in the background

The Blue Mosque: The Blue Mosque in the heart of Mazar-e-Sharif; This is a very famous and historical landmark in Afghan History.

Rockets; After we received an evening shelling, search teams look for the point of origin and attempt to track down the guilty. Here are two rockets that were recovered that did not ignite. This is an example of how primitive, yet effective some of the enemy techniques can be

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: The Birth of Air Assault: LZ X-Ray, Ia Drang 1965

2008-10-04T05:49:00.000-07:00

Counterinsurgency and The Development of Airmobility Doctrine

The US Army defines the gestation of Airmobility as the mid 1950’s. A tactical doctrine manual, Field Manual 57-35, "Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations” was written and a provisional sky cav platoon was formed which essentially, through extensive experimentation, eventually became the nucleus of the 792d Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company (Provisional).[i] One of the first official steps to transformation occurred on 15 January 1960 with the formation of the Rodgers Board. The Rodgers board made several recommendations regarding helicopter type, design, funding and policy. One of its most important recommendations was the recommendation to “prepare an in depth study to determine whether the concept of air fighting units was practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to test its feasibility”. [ii] Although the scope of review of the Rodgers Board was limited, it provided the beginning’s of essential guidance for development and procurement and was indicative of the vision of transformation that was in its embryonic stage. [iii] As airmobility experimentation proceeded, the Howze board was officially appointed on 25 April 1962 [iv]. The board had an extremely demanding schedule and was required to submit its final report by 24 Aug 1962. General Howze, was given wide latitude in which to convene the board to include dealing directly with the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, other military services, government agencies, civilian industry and to convene the board at other installations as he saw fit[v].

The Howze Board final report was submitted on 20 August 1962, 4 days ahead of schedule, and the formation of the “air assault division was the principal tactical innovation”[vi]. Although many had recognized that change was essential, the recommendations from the Rodgers report, the interim field testing and subsequent Howze Board Report, was, that the Army would enhance combat effectiveness in both conventional and counter-guerrilla actions and could accomplish other tasks with smaller forces in shorter campaigns.[vii] The new tactical innovations, by inference and implication, were supposed to support operational and strategic objectives and were focused on combining all the elements of combat power, maneuver forces, reconnaissance, communications and service support. The formation of the air assault division and the air cavalry combat brigade was to combine the classical functions of cavalry operations with the air assault division’s role of closing with and destroying the enemy on the ground. In essence the new innovations provided the mobility to move maneuver forces quickly, provide organic and immediate fire power through aerial weapons platforms to provide and perform the traditional indirect fire role that had previously been dominated by the Artillery and Air Forces close air support roles. Additionally, the aerial weapons platforms provided enhanced standoff, and, support by fire positions from the realm of the 2nd dimension; the air. In hindsight, although these tactical innovations provided an enormous amount of mobility and inherent firepower, they also contributed to the idea that tasks and campaigns could be effectively shorter and or shortened, and again, by implication, the speed of which maneuver delivers superior firepower would be the capstone of doctrine.[viii] Although the innovation of airmobility was to enhance the counter-guerrilla operations in Vietnam, the development of doctrine proceeded along conventional thinking and the doctrine of airmobility received its baptism by fire in the Ia Drang Valley at LZ X-RAY when the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division conducted air assault operations into the area with the specific mission of Search and Destroy Operations.[ix] LTC Moore, would change his tactics, techniques and procedures slightly based on the intelligence estimate he received and directed that all units use the same landing zone instead of separate landing zones for each company. Further, the timing and synchronization of the air assault with the artillery was timed to within H -1 minute, not much room for error.

The United States Army would continue to emphasize that airmobility doctrine was nothing short of a doctrine that was a subset of conventional warfighting, albeit adapted to the Vietnam War. Additionally, US Army Capstone Doctrine essentially remained unchanged from the 1941 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations; and Airmobility doctrine helped to further reinforce the notions of short sharp campaigns of short duration that were characterized by overwhelming firepower and an increase in mobility. It is extremely hard not to draw the correlation or similarity that American Airmobility doctrine was looking at ways to emulate and exceed the “gold standard” of maneuver warfare in the integration of firepower and mobility; the German experience of WW II, or more specifically, the German campaigns in Poland, France and the Low Countries. Never the less, US Army doctrine would experience its next major change 10 years later in 1976.

- Terry Tucker -

[i] Airmobility in Vietnam, 1961-1971, pgs 3-8
[ii] Ibid page 8-9
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Ibid page 20; Secretary McNamara, much like Donald Rumsfeld of today, had serious reservations about the Army’s ability to produce a reexamination of the transformation or modernization concepts that would produce fresh, unorthodox concepts. See page 19 of Airmobility, 1961-1971
[v] Ibid
[vi] Ibid page 22
[vii] Authors Italics
[viii] Ibid, page 20-24
[ix] The source documents for this are the US Army, Center for Military History; Seven Firefights in Vietnam and Airmobile Operations. Increasingly, the US Army used helicopters in its missions and mission support. The largest airmobile operation in the early years occurred in June of 1964 with the airlift of 1300 Vietnamese Marines. In June 1965, 2000 Vietnamese marines used helicopters to Air Assault positions. The 1/7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division would conduct search and destroy mission in the Ia Drang less than 6 months later in Nov 1965. In the words of the Center for Military History;1/7 Cav was going to Air Assault in to “develop there targets” based on intelligence estimates. The new Air Assault techniques gave them a “quick strike” capability. Airmobility operation was adapting the use of conventional infantry tactics and was primarily a weapons platform and a movement platform.

A CH-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter making a sling load.

A team on board the aircraft waiting to take off, The aircraft is a UH-1H Model and was commonly called a Huey or a Slick

Captured enemy equipment: a 51 caliber MG and a two recoilless rifles, compliments of the Special Forces and 75th Ranger Battalion, Republic of Vietnam

Pictures courtesy of Earl S. Wemple III, Major, US Army Special Forces, Retired

Military History and Warfare: Counter-insurgency: Counter-insurgency Operations

2008-09-24T12:19:00.000-07:00

This week I'm very pleased to introduce a brand new series of articles written by a new guest writer, Terry Tucker. Terry is currently on the ground in Afghanisatan and will be writing on the topic of counter-insurgency operations based upon both his own experiences and the study of military history.

Tactical Lessons, Strategic Success and Counter-insurgency Operations: The Historical and Military Element

The Global War on Terror offers a glimpse of how the lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency are problematic. [i] Building the operational capacity and capabilities of a counterinsurgent security force, to include police, offer lessons in how difficult it is to develop an integrated civil-military approach to combating an insurgency.

Likewise a study of the problems associated with how insurgencies arise is also important and prudent in understanding the lessons of the past. Some might believe that the past is only intelligible from the present. This gives short shrift to the lessons of history and how the present conditions are a result of that past.

In attempting to overcome these problematic conditions, there are several components that affect the overall civil-military engagement strategy that are used to integrate this approach. Some examples of these components include training the indigenous force, and, of course, the elements of politics, diplomacy, geo-politics, global opinion and fully integrated civil-military operations under a unified command.

Lessons can be learned from any type of war, conflict or military operation but assuming that those lessons will also be similar in the next conflict is a serious mistake. Sometimes these lessons learned can constrain thinking about the future, especially when one assumes that past lessons will be similarly duplicated. In this same regard combining lessons learned with planning usually has more to do with what happened in the past rather than how one can affect the future.
With this in mind, how does one determine if the past is an adequate guide for the future?

After seven years the United States is still involved in a global counterinsurgency effort; a counterinsurgency against fundamentalists that adhere to a particularly violent strain of religious ideology. The tone and tempo of news reports from the myriad news sources would lead one to believe that 5 years is an extraordinarily long time to secure a victory. The history of insurgency indicates that 5 years is just the beginning[ii].
Likewise the global war on terror has been classified as a war against ideas, religion and ideology.

[iii] How is one to determine if there are lessons learned from the past if there is a lack of consensus on the type of conflict we are waging? This is rather problematic as diversity of the origin of the problem does not obstruct the singularity of the mission for the insurgent; for instance, look at the uneasy yet cooperative alliance of Iran/Hezbollah and Syria/Fatah Their brand of radical Islam preaches a complete intolerance and all that is antithetical to Western values; they seek to completely replace Western codes with an extreme code of Islam. There current uneasy alliance is more like a temporary marriage of convenience.

The diversity of these sects does not detract them (relatively speaking) from the singularity of their mission; to use violence and terrorism to achieve there ultimate aims. The mixture of subversion, propaganda and violent pressure coupled to an ideological strategy is there idea of a recipe to success.

The First Intifada was a great case of exploiting these principles, the 2nd Intifada was a disaster and the Aug 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict ended with both sides declaring victory, yet the general consensus seems to be that Hezbollah gained the upper hand. In both cases, as insurgent or counterinsurgent, it is the management of the narrative with moral attributes (think David vs Goliath here) tied to the strategy. In essence it requires more than just an adherence to the traditional principles of war when defining the strategy.

Increasingly, there must be complete integration of multiple military and non military agencies to the strategy and more importantly a corresponding change in mindset within these players as well.[iv] This is not easy considering that most militaries are taught that victory comes through the pursuit of aggressive offensive operations. Sometimes in a counterinsurgency it might be better to do nothing at all.

With this in mind, here is a sample of a few of the military historical lessons learned from past counterinsurgency and stability operations.

1) Politics and diplomacy must have primacy
2)Discipline, firepower and organization coupled with small unit tactics are key to military success

3) Centralized planning, decentralized execution within the commanders mission intent or end state must be tied to the political/diplomatic effort Draw distinction between bandits, rebels, thieves, and insurgents, etc, etc.
4) Creation of special units such as recon and tracking units
5) Doctrine and techniques, tactics and procedures are codified thru lessons learned; this pseudo doctrine fills emerging and existing gaps in methodology.
6) Learning to fail fast and adapt quickly.
7) Public critical of operations; so manage the information war ahead of the press and be sure that your “message” has the “moral” high ground.
8) Good deeds insufficient to counteract collateral damage, mistrust or other stupid actions by self

Watch for the continuation of this topic in the next issue as we briefly examine other critical elements such as urban operations and civil considerations critical to success.

[i] The term problematic was used in a conversation by an US Army Officer to describe the difficult conditions in accomplishing training with the Afghan National Army and Police.
[ii] Consider such examples as Vietnam, Algeria, Rhodesia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, The Arab-Israeli conflict and The Maccabees
[iii] See Countering a Global Insurgency A Strategy for the War on Terrorism, LTC (Dr.) David Kilcullen; Waging the War of Idea’s, William Rosenau, Ph.D, RAND Corp; Terrorism in the Name of Religion, Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, St Andrews University, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
[iv] My personal observations of Police and Army Mentors in the Kunduz and Northern Region area of Afghanistan confirm this when we attended a meeting at the Konduz Provincial Reconstruction Team HQ’s on Thursday morning the 3rd of April. In attendance where the German Police mentors, American Police mentors and a US State Department Representative to the PRT. The US Army Major that led the meeting was ill-equipped to lead the meeting; the meeting devolved to a finger pointing session; in one case a German police team had been on the ground more than 17 days and still had not received its orders for its training mission to train the Afghan Police.

Afghan sand storm just moments before it hits the camp. The Afghan’s call It “the wind of 120 days” the wind is roughly a constant 22 knots from May to Sept.

The airfield at Feyzabad; cargo and people are lifted in and out; for this trip it was a US Air National Guard Unit from Baltimore Maryland providing the Heavy lift.

German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Feyzabad, soldiers stop to watch a German CH-53, Heavy Lift Helicopter take off

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Terry Tucker retired from the US Army after 23 years of active duty. He has served in Long Range Reconnaissance, Infantry, Cavalry, Staff and various leadership positions. His civilian and military experience and assignments include US Fortune 50’s and the US Department of Defense. He has over 10 years experience in the Middle East and has trained soldiers and clients in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Afghanistan. He is currently in Afghanistan on a training team that is training the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. He has contributed articles in the US Army Infantry Magazine, a professional journal of the US Army Infantry School and he is the author of a book; U.S. Counterinsurgency Methods and The Global War on Terror.

Military History and Warfare: Castles: Hadrian's Wall

2008-09-22T13:10:00.000-07:00

This week, a trip to Scotland gave me the opportunity to have a look at the remnants of the mighty Hadrian’s wall. In 122AD the Emperor Hadrian visited Britain. Finding the northern border ill-defined and under almost continuous attack, he ordered a wall to be built across England from the Tyne estuary to the Solway Firth. This covered a distance of 73 miles (117km) and represents a massive feat of Roman engineering and design skill.

Although these pictures no longer convey the original size of the wall, it was built of stone 10ft (3m) wide and 15ft (5m) high with a protective ditch 4m deep in front. Garrisons across the wall would be stationed in castles set at one mile intervals and in turrets and towers in between. A further set of forts located behind the wall would reinforce and support the garrisons as and when required. The whole project involved quarrying some 27 million cubic feet of stone. Amazingly, construction was completed in just seven years. The skill and speed of the wall’s construction had much to do with its building force. Hadrian’s wall was not built by slave labour, but by legionaries of the Roman army.

However, when completed the wall was manned by auxiliary troops who garrisoned its 79 milecastles and 16 forts. The auxiliaries acted as both guard troops and frontier police. The fully-fledged legions (of which there were three stationed in Roman Britain consisting of 5000 men each) were used only in major campaigns or to repel invaders.

Birdsowald

During my visit to Hadrian’s wall, I got to survey the remains of ‘Banna’, known today as ‘Birdsowald’. The site contains a semi-excavated Roman fort positioned on the wall.

When the Roman builders arrived they had found a wooded area on a boggy piece of land. The wood had to be cleared and the bog drained before construction of the fort could begin. When completed, it would have housed 1,000 Roman soldiers. The fort was originally built from turf and timber. Soon the foundations were laid for a permanent stone fort with six gates. It is these outlines that remain today. When completed, the fort had consisted of towers, barracks, officer’s quarters and a storeroom. In the centre lay the command headquarters for the area.

A reconstruction of the fort.

The above picture shows the remains of the only known drill and exercise hall to be found in any auxiliary fort of the Roman Empire.

The Roman Empire came under increasing attack in the fourth and fifth centuries. From 155AD to 410AD, Hadrian's Wall was breached four times by invading Barbarians. Towards the beginning of the fifth century, Rome's power began to wane and troops were pulled out of Britain. With no one left to maintain it, sections of the wall began to fall into disrepair. Much of the stone from both the wall and its forts were later removed and reused in the early medieval period.

Nonetheless, enough remains of the wall for it rightly to be considered one of the great engineering projects of pre-modern Britain.

Military History and Warfare: 17th Military History Blog Carnival

2008-09-12T15:20:00.000-07:00

Welcome to September's edition of the Military History Blog Carnival.

One of the great things that I love about the military history carnival is the broad range of topics that are covered by bloggers throughout the blogosphere. This month is no exception.

Beginning with a boyhood hero of my own, Naomi Stevens' Diary from England blog tells us that Admiral Nelson has been named the greatest British military hero of all time. She also briefly outlines the background to Nelson's fame.

Staying with the nautical theme, Rich over at Chronologi Cogitatones presents an interesting article on an joint Anglo-Dutch naval battle against the Spanish in 1602. Its worth pointing out that this is the third post in a series following the career of Sir Robert Mansell. The other two articles can also be found on Rich's blog.

A very interesting and slightly unusual post can be found on Potential2success.com. Here, the Emperor Napoleon's career is analysed in the context of his leadership skills. The article is well worth a read.

Over at The Whited Sepulchre, Allen describes the French 'Maginot line'. He also manages to throw in a quick cost comparison to the US/Mexico border fence which makes the Maginot line look like a bargain!

Covering similar ground, I too have submitted a post on the Maginot line. This can be found here

Gavin at Investigations of a Dog presents us with a very interesting comparison of the careers of Cromwell and Balfour. Both where cavalry commanders who made a major impact on the English Civil War. Whilst Cromwell went on to run England as Lord Protector, Balfour faded into obscurity. Gavin argues that Balfour's career is worthy of a little more attention.

Gabriele at The Lost Fort has some great pictures and material on a medievel German castle which used the natural rocky landscape as the bulk of its structure.

Finally, Ken Reynolds gives us a collection of biographies of soldiers from the 38th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary force during the First World War. Ken has clearly spent a great deal of time researching these biographies and it is well worth having a look around the blog.

I hope you have enjoyed this month's edition of the Military History carnival.

If you are interested in hosting October's edition (or any other month), please drop an e-mail here

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The 'Vasa' Part II

2008-09-02T10:15:00.000-07:00

This week, due to popular demand, I shall be taking another look at the recovered warship 'Vasa' with more pictures of the ship and its museum. However, before that I would like to remind you about the 17th Military History Carnival being hosted on this site on the 14th September.

The handy submission form can be accessed here .

In my previous post on the Vasa, I examined some of the historical background to the ship and the events leading up to its sinking. This week, I shall be focusing on the recovery operation and some of the archaeological finds discovered in the wreckage.

In the decades that followed after the sinking of the ship in 1628, efforts were begun to salvage the valuable cannons and provisions that could still be recovered and reused. This explains why out of the original complement of sixty-four cannons, only three were recovered with the wreckage in 1961.

Knowledge of the ship's location was then lost for three hundred years. In the twentieth century, it was thanks to the determination of a Swedish marine technican, Anders Franzen that the ship was again located Using a homemade coring probe, he found a large wooden object near Beckholmen in Stockholm. After identifying the ship, the Swedish navy was brought in (along with National Heritage Board) to form the Vasa committe. Together, they made plans to raise the Vasa.

In order to even have a chance to raise the ship, divers were required to use pressure hoses to dig six tunnels underneath the wreck. This was dangerous work. There was a strong possibility that the wreck could shift as the mud was being excavated, trapping the diver. Fortunately, no one was injured in the process. Once the tunnels were complete, steel cables were run underneath and attached to a pair of lifting pontoons on the surface. The ship was then raised in a series of eighteen lifts bringing her from a depth of 33 metres to 16. Over the next year and a half, debris and mud were cleared from the ship in the hopes of lightening the load. The gunports were temporally plugged and iron bolts that had rusted away were replaced.

On the morning of April 24th 1961, the Vasa broke surface and once again floated in Stockholm harbour. She was then towed to a dry dock and works were begun. Although a museum was established for members of the public to visit whilst the ship was being excavated, it was not until 1990 that the Vasamuseet we see today was completed.

Unlike the old museum, Vasa museet has three levels of viewing galleries. This allows us to view the ship from above:

Having learnt valuable lessons from the Vasa's maiden voyage these cannon ports were sealed as the ship was raised to the surface.

Thirty to fifty men, women and children died during the sinking in 1628. Some were below decks when the ship keeled over trapping them, others may have been unable to swim. As a result, several skeletons have been recovered from the site.

Using DNA tests on the remains, scientists have been able to determine the age, sex and relative health of crew. The ability to gather this vast amount of detail, gives the historian an incredible insight into the lives of ordinary people in the seventeenth century. Look here for some recontructions of how the crew may have looked.

It is important to remember that although the Vasa has been largely reconstructed, large parts of the ship were originally painted in bright decorative colours.

The Vasa was as much a work of art as she was a warship.

I hope you have enjoyed this series of posts on the Vasa! I strongly encourage you to go to Stockholm and take a look for yourselves.

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Military History and Warfare: Castles: Uffington Castle

2008-08-26T14:56:00.000-07:00

This week I will be examining a completely different type of castle. Although described as a castle, Uffington is really an ancient hill-fort. Located two miles south of the village of Uffington in Oxfordshire, England, archaeologists have traced the earthworks to the late Bronze/early Iron age.

The castle we see today is an eight-acre double walled hillfort in roughly the shape of a pentagon. There is a north-west facing entrance protected by the curing outwards of the bank along both sides and around the ditch. The information board in the car park helpfully told me that the fort’s early use was as a religious site or meeting point. It was later occupied by the Romans and Saxons. Although we are unlikely to ever discover who originally occupied the site, the coins of the Dobunni tribe have been found in the area. Large amounts of pottery and animal bones have also been excavated, leading archaeologists to suggest that the castle was more of a spiritual centre than defensive structure. This is supported by the presence of ‘The White Horse’. A large chalk monument cut into the side of the hill. Strangely, ‘The White Horse’ can only be fully viewed from the air.

The hillfort commanded excellent views of the surrounding countryside. A perfect place to construct a castle.

Originally the steep ramparts (which would have been 3 metres deeper than they now appear) would have been bare white chalk with a surrounding timber fence.

A view of the White Horse (Click to enlarge).

Uffington castle is a good example of a defensive construction that served a purpose beyond that of providing a local stronghold in an area.

Military History and Warfare: Castles: A few thoughts on the Maginot Line

2008-08-20T14:50:00.000-07:00

In military history, the ‘Maginot line’ has become a byword for expensive and inadequate war preparations. The defences themselves are usually associated with the fortifications constructed by France along its Eastern border with Germany in the 1930s. Less well known to historians are the completely separate line of heavy fortifications that ran along the frontiers with Switzerland and Italy. In addition, the line also consisted of less extensive fortifications along the Belgium and Luxembourg borders. Collectively, these three segments of fortifications were designed to guarantee French security in the event of a German invasion. In total, they cost three billion French francs.

Historical background to the Maginot Line

The decision to construct new fortifications was not a particularly radical change in French military planning. Since the seventeenth century, French military planners had relied upon forts and defensive concentrations to secure strongholds along the nation’s vast borders. The utter failure of Plan XVII in 1914 to win the war through a great offensive had seemed to suggest that only a campaign of attrition would ensure victory in future wars. This was supported by France’s experience during the rest of the First World War. For much of the conflict, successful offensive operations were almost impossible to achieve without huge casualties. As such, French military planners in the 1920s and 30s had to take into account the lower birth-rate during the years 1914-1918. They calculated that in 1935, a numerically much inferior age group would arrive at conscription age. By contrast, Germany’s population outnumbered France by twenty million. Germany’s manpower resources would remain significantly higher than France. By constructing a system of large defensive fortifications, the French military hoped to negate the effects of future manpower shortages.

It was at the Battle of Verdun (1916) that the design of the Maginot line had its origins. During the battle, the French forts had proved their value in withstanding massive artillery bombardments. Therefore large parts of the Maginot line were based upon the use of forts which would provide and be exposed to direct fire in order to give close and medium fire support. Around these forts were lesser positions which would assist in a close combat role.

Design of the Maginot Line

The French forts of the Maginot line were designated as ouverages. There were two types: the gros ouverage and the petit ouverage. The gros ouverage was designated as an artillery fort whilst the smaller variant consisted of nothing large than an artillery mortar. The gros ouverages became the centrepiece of the Maginot line and mounted artillery pieces consisting of 75mm guns and 81mm mortars. Some also included 135mm and 95mm guns. None of these weapons had a particularly long range. It was therefore the job of these forts to provide support fire and together with other ouverages inhibit the enemy advance. Surprisingly the ouverages were not protected by minefields, since only the Germans had developed this technology and put it into large-scale use. Apart from a few booby traps and anti-tank mines, the Maginot forts were only protected by wire obstacles and anti-tank rails. The main defensive element was the firepower which could be laid down by each fort and those supporting it. Behind the Maginot line was the support line which included communications and logistical areas.

Of particular interest to the military historian was the deliberate ‘Achilles Heel’ built into the rear of the ouverages. In 1916, the French had unexpectedly lost Fort Douaumont to the Germans. The subsequent attempt to recapture the position took months and cost thousands of lives. Much of the damage seen today was caused by French heavy artillery. However, the fort was so well constructed that much of the surface damage was superficial. Realising that a fort lost to the enemy could be used to help maintain a permanent breach in the defences, the French ensured that parts of the Maginot line could not be captured and then turned against them.

In front of the line were advanced positions which were intended to provide early warning and delay the enemy. These fortified houses and positions were called avant-postes. In the Maginot line proper, these formed a useful network of advanced outposts. However, in the north (the area known as the Maginot Extension covering the frontier between Longuyon and Sedan) these lower level fortifications were the only defences covering the region. These were clearly not up to the standards of the rest of the line. Unsurprisingly, it was here that the Germans broke through in 1940.

Conclusion

Although the Maginot line has been widely criticised for failing to prevent a German invasion, it did fulfil its primary objective. The main German blow fell away from the bulk of the line. The French High Command had expected this and were able to deploy the majority of their forces on the Belgian frontier. It was the French field army that failed to keep the Germans out. By contrast, the Maginot line completely repulsed an Italian invasion in the south of France. After the war the Maginot line was reoccupied by France and remained in use until the 1960s when parts were sold off to the public. Despite its reputation, the Maginot line was a highly formidable set of defences which the German army took very seriously in 1940.

Enno Kraehe, ‘The Motives behind the Maginot Line’, Military affairs, 8 (1944)

J.E. Kaufmann, ‘Unusual aspects of a unique fortification: the Maginot Line, Military affairs, 52:2 (1988:Apr.)

Military History and Warfare: The Crusades: The Battle of Hattin 1187

2008-08-12T14:54:00.001-07:00

For nearly ninety years, the Franks had held the Holy Land for Western Christendom. The Kingdom of Jerusalem had formed the centrepiece of the Frankish settlements known collectively as ‘Outremer’. However, on the 4th July 1187 the Kingdom was shattered and its army slaughtered in the space of a few hours. The Battle of Hattin represents a decisive moment in both Islamic history and that of the Christendom. United under the banner of the Kurdish sultan Saladin, the armies of Islam dealt the Western colonies a crippling blow from which they never truly recovered.

Repeated violations of the truce made between Saladin and King Guy (in particular an especially ferocious attack upon a Muslim caravan led by Reynald of Chatillon) led Saladin to begin preparations for war in 1187. He ordered troops from throughout his empire to gather at the frontier town of Hauran and assembled the largest army that he had ever commanded. Meanwhile on the Frankish side, equally large preparations for war were also underway. By June some 1,200 fully equipped knights along with ten thousand infantry had been assembled at Acre. Saladin’s forces are believed to have been slightly larger.

Invasion

On the 1st July, Saladin’s forces crossed the River Jordan into Frankish territory and lay siege to the city of Tiberias. When news came of the invasion, King Guy held counsel with the leading figures of the land. He was advised By Raymond of Tripoli that in the heat of summer, the attacking force would be at a major disadvantage. Therefore the best strategy would be for the Christian army to remain purely on the defensive. This was good sound advice and most of the knights were inclined to accept this strategy. However, King Guy was not a wise man. His ascent to the throne had been opposed by many of the leading barons of the kingdom. His only supporters had been Reynald of Chatillon and Grand Master Gerard of the Knights Templar. They advised that the army should seek out and attack Saladin.

Therefore on the morning of the 3rd July, the Christian army left its comfortable well-supplied camp at Sephoria and marched into the hills. The Bishop of Acre accompanied them bearing pieces of the ‘True Cross’, upon which Jesus was said to have been crucified. Had the army remained at Sephoria, Saladin would probably not have risked an attack. The air was hot and dry with no water supplies along the road. Soon both men and horses were suffering from thirst and exhaustion. Muslim skirmishers were also continuously attacking both the rearguard and vanguard with ‘hit and run’ archers on horseback. By the afternoon, the Franks had reached the plateau immediately above Hattin. Ahead of the Franks lay a rocky hill with two summits known as the Horns of Hattin. Beyond this lay a village and lake. By the afternoon the army could go no further and made camp on the slopes of the hill. The site was supposed to have a well. Unfortunately for the Franks, this well was dried up.

The Battle

That night Saladin’s men surrounded the Christian army and set fire to the dry scrub that covered the hill. The Franks, already suffering from thirst were further tormented by the hot smoke now pouring over their camp. The Muslim attack began soon after daybreak on the 4th July. They had successfully formed a cordon around the entire Christian army. Desperate for water, the Frankish infantry surged forward down the slope towards the lake. Many were slaughtered or taken prisoner by Saladin’s massed forces. Only the Christian cavalry could hope to turn the tide against the Muslim forces. Saladin ordered his cavalry to assault the hill where King Guy’s red tent remained clearly visible. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Frankish horseman on the hill beat back wave after wave of Muslim cavalry. Raymond of Tripoli led his knights in a desperate attempt to break through the surrounding Muslim army. When his men charged, the forces opposing them opened up their ranks to allow them to pass harmlessly. Unable to rejoin the battle, Raymond and his knights withdrew to Tripoli.

With the infantry now largely out of the battle and both horses and men suffering from thirst and heat exhaustion, the remaining Franks fought on. The King’s tent was moved to the summit and his knights gathered around him for a last stand. It was soon over. The Bishop of Acre had been killed and the Holy Cross was in the hands of a Muslim. The surviving Franks were exhausted. Then King Guy and the surviving leading men of the Kingdom were presented before Saladin.

Saladin’s tent had been erected on the battlefield and in it he received King Guy and Reynald. He greeted them graciously and offered the King a goblet of rose-water, cooled with ice brought from Mount Hermon. Guy drank it and passed it to Reynald. By the laws of Arab hospitality to give food or drink to a captive ensured that his life would be safe. Saladin had made no such gesture towards Reynald. Saladin reminded Reynald of his crimes and truce violations. When Reynald replied with insolence, Saladin took a sword and struck off his head. He then reassured Guy that ‘A king does not kill a king’.

Aftermath

Whilst Saladin spared the lives of the Barons of the kingdom, the Templar and Hospitaller prisoners were considered too dangerous to live. Fanatical Muslim ‘sufis’ carried out the executions of the surviving members of the Military Orders. Shortly afterwards, Saladin’s forces began the systematic conquest of the now heavily depleted castles across the Holy Land. After a five-day siege, Jerusalem itself fell to Saladin’s army. The damage was almost complete. If not for the fortunate arrival of groups of Westerners on pilgrimage, all the Crusaders lands would have been conquered. Although King Richard’s Crusade allowed a smaller reconstituted Kingdom to continue, the position of the Franks in the Holy Land was more precarious than ever. Saladin had managed to wipe out the bulk of the Kingdom’s defences in a matter of hours. Despite repeated attempts to rebuild the Christian position in the East, the Battle of Hattin proved to be a blow from which the Kingdom of Jerusalem never recovered.

If you are interested in reading more about the Battle of Hattin have a look at these books;

Malcolm Barber, ‘The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London and New York, 1993)

Jean Richard, ‘The Crusades c.1071-c.1291 (Cambridge, 1999)

Carole Hillenbrand, ‘The Crusades: Islamic perspectives’ (Edinburgh, 1999)

P.M. Holt, ‘The Age of the Crusades: The near east from the eleventh century to 1517’ (London, 1986)

Alan V. Murray, The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic history 1097-1125 (Oxford, 2000)

Jonathan Philips, The Crusades (Harlow, 2002)

Sir Steven Runciman, ‘A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187’ (Cambridge, 2002)

Hans Eberhard Meyer, ‘The Crusades’ (Oxford, 1988)

Military History and Warfare: Castles: Läckö castle

2008-08-05T14:30:00.000-07:00

This is the first in a new series of articles which I will be writing over the coming months, dealing exclusively with the subject of castles.

The first of these articles begins with a look at Läckö Castle in south-west Sweden. Läckö Castle was originally built in 1298 by the of Bishop of Skara, Brynolf Algotsson. Strategically located in the centre of his diocese, the position was ideal for command and control of the area. Läckö was situated on a peninsula in Lake Vänern (a major source of commerce and trade in the area in one of Europe’s largest freshwater lakes). The position gave the occupants a complete overview of the lake for many miles The original medieval foundations of the castle were fortified. Defences were especially important given that the region was surrounded by powerful threatening kingdoms such as Denmark.

After the reformation in 1527, the Swedish Crown took possession of the property. It then passed through the hands of various nobles until 1615, when Field Marshal Jacob Pontusson de la Gardie was granted Läckö as a reward for services to the crown. Although the military element of the castle continued with a permanent guard detachment stationed, the Field Marshal also embarked on major improvements to the existing structure. Interestingly thou, none of these improvements were military in nature. They included adding a portal to the main courtyard and constructing a third story above the keep.

Note the privy sticking out of the wall!

However, these improvement works were minimal in comparison to those made by the next occupant. Magnus Gabriel de la Garde was only thirty when he took over the castle. He had already had a highly successful career as a diplomat. Sweden’s success in the Thirty Years War had propelled the country from the fringes of European politics to ‘Great Power’ status. Sweden was now dealing with countries such as France and the Habsburg dominions as equals. This new era, known as the ‘Age of Greatness’ was an age of prosperity and growth for Sweden. Nobles such as Magnus Gabriel were now regularly travelling into the heart of Europe and bringing back new ideas and wealth to the country. In 1654, he constructed new rooms for the staff, a kitchen wing, a chapel and a fourth floor for the keep. The castle you see in these pictures are the final product of Magnus Gabriel’s building work.

In four centuries, the castle had changed from being a semi-militarised settlement, into a grand stately home. Looking at the castle now, it is clear that the military functions of the original structure have long receded into the background of the architecture. Two seventeenth century cannons and a handful of arrow slits in the castle turrets hint that Läckö could once also have had military purpose.

Nevertheless, the structure itself is an excellent example of how the purpose of buildings can gradually change as security and prosperity start to replace disorder and fear. In the age of gunpowder, a castle served its owner better as a stately residence, rather than as fortified military base. The wealth generated by Magnus Gabriel whilst travelling abroad, gave him the money necessary to decorate the interior with the latest baroque furniture and paintings.

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Military History and Warfare: Medieval: English rebellions after the Norman Conquest 1067-1075

2008-07-28T14:40:00.000-07:00

Victory over King Harold at the Battle of Hastings in 1066 should be considered as the beginning of a lengthy process of Norman conquest rather than viewed as an isolated event, followed by a complete takeover of England.

Initially, the surviving English nobles hesitated to submit to William. It was only after reinforcements arrived from overseas that William was able to advance to London. The surviving nobles either submitted to William or went into exile. For the next few years, the Normans found themselves in the position of an occupying army in the south of England. In the north they faced uneasy co-operation with powerful English earls who retained a strong sense of identity and Englishness. The western borders were vulnerable to attack from Welsh princes. In addition, the coastlines were vulnerable to raiding from Danes and renegade English.

As a first step, the newly crowed King William consolidated the land around the south-east of England. This was particularly important as it was the easiest route for reinforcements to arrive from Normandy. Edwin, Morcar and Waltheof retained their positions as earls of Mercia, Northumbria and the southern-midland shires respectively.

However, it was not long before the first rebellion broke out. In 1067, a major uprising occurred in Kent, largely in response to the harshness of William’s brother Odo’s oppressive rule. The revolt was supported by a noble from France called Eustace of Boulogne who had grown dissatisfied with William. Eustace sent troops to assist the rebels in attempting to seize Dover Castle. However, the rebellion failed and Eustace’s lands were forfeited by William.

Much more serious was a revolt in Exeter in 1068 led by the former King Harold’s mother, Gytha. This rebellion was co-ordinated with a raid on the south-west launched by three of Harold’s sons from their base in Ireland. Harold’s sons were then defeated by the local Norman forces in the area. Exeter continued to resist through an 18 day siege. Gytha eventually fled to Flanders with a large store of wealth. In 1069, the sons of Harold returned with sixty ships and attacked Devonshire. However, their forces were only sufficient for raiding rather than invasion purposes.

The rebellions/invasions of 1068/69 were all led by members of Harold’s own family. They attempted to co-ordinate resistance across the region but failed to gain universal support. William consolidated his victories by building and garrisoning castles in vulnerable places. This enabled him to retain a core base in each region for command and control of an area.

In 1068, Norman rule over England faced its most serious challenge yet. Realising that in the long-term their positions were threatened by the increasingly aggressive acquisitions of the Normans, earls Edwin and Morcar rose in revolt. They formed an alliance with Bleddyn of Gwynedd and Malcolm, King of the Scots (of ‘Macbeth’ fame). William struck quickly and advanced northwards building castles at Warwick and Nottingham intimidating the Mercians into submission. Both Edwin and Morcar surrendered and Malcolm was forced to sign a peace treaty and return to Scotland.

However, the revolt of 1068 was merely a prequel to a much larger northern rebellion the following year. In 1069, the new commander at Durham, Robert of Comines and the Castellan of York were massacred alongside a large force of Norman knights. This time the rebels included the native Northumbrian aristocracy, King Malcolm of Scotland and King Swegn of Denmark. The coalition focused around Edgar Aetheling, the last male member of the West Saxon house of Cerdic. Edgar had a legitimacy over the throne of England which William had only been able gain through force. The arrival of a Danish fleet in support of the revolt allowed the northern rebels to besiege and devastate the city of York. Unfortunately for the rebels, the Danes were more interested in plundering the countryside. Their army dispersed, allowing William to reoccupy York and destroy the English rebels. Edgar went into exile abroad and another treaty was agreed between Malcolm and William.

The Danes were allowed to plunder the coastal regions in exchange for peace and eventual withdrawal from England. The plunder and devastation wrought by the Normans afterwards became known as the ‘Harrying of the North’. The economic infrastructure of the north of England was shattered for generations. The extent of the damage can be shown through the low geld yields of the area as recorded by the Doomsday Book, twenty years later.

By 1070 William had seen off the most serious threats to his rule. The Danes had been bought off, Edwin had been betrayed by his own men and killed in an ambush and Morcar was imprisoned. However, the final rebellion of 1075 involved some of William’s own most trusted men. Ralph of de Gael, Earl of Norfolk, Roger de Breteuil, earl of Hereford and Waltheof, earl of Northumbria (Norman, Breton and English malcontents) made a secret alliance against William. Yet they too found that they were unable to achieve much more than limited local support and as a result the rebellion failed. William then had Waltheof executed for his role in the revolt.

Waltheof was the last of the significant English leaders who was potentially strong enough to lead a rebellion against the Normans. By 1076, William no longer faced any major potential rivals. The past decade of resistance had been unable to dislodge William. The revolts had been ill-co-ordinated and failed to unify the majority of the population. Throughout the period of rebellions, there were minor English nobles who were prepared to stay loyal to the new regime. The foreign powers that intervened often had a completely different agenda than merely restoring the House of Wessex to the throne. For these reasons, William was able to recover even when the situation had initially turned against him.

William’s rapid responses to rebellions over 1067-1075 resembled a fire fighting exercise followed by a period of consolidation through castle-building. Over the years that followed until his death in 1087, William continued the process of pacifying the Scots and Welsh. By the time his son William Rufus took over, the Norman conquest of England was complete.

If you are interested in finding out more about the Norman Conquest of England, have a look at these books;

Majorie Chibnall, Anglo-Saxon England 1066-1166 (Oxford, 1986)

Brian Golding, Conquest and Colonization: The Normans in Britain, 1066-1100 (London, 1994)

H.R. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest (London, 1962)

David Bates, William the Conqueror (London, 1989)

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The Warship 'Vasa'

2008-07-23T13:55:00.000-07:00

A recent trip to Sweden gave me the opportunity to revisit one of my favourite museums, 'Vasamuseet'. The museum is unique in that it contains the world's only completely intact surviving seventeenth century warship. Designed for the Swedish navy by the Dutch ship builder Henrik Hybertsson, ships like the 'Vasa' were essential in Sweden's attempts to dominate the Baltic area prior to its involvement in the Thirty Years War in Germany. The Vasa museum in the picture was purpose built in the twentieth century.

The 'Vasa' was launched in 1628 and designed to be one of the most powerful warships afloat. Equipped with 64 guns and carrying a complement of 300 sailors and marines, the Vasa represents a link between ships designed for traditional naval tactics of boarding and capturing enemy warships and those designed for tactics employed later in the seventeenth century and throughout the age of sail. Improvements in cannon design allowed later ships to fight in line formation and exchange shots with the enemy at a distance rather than engage in close combat. The Vasa's large crew complement and array of heavy twenty-four pounder guns seems to suggest a vessel designed to both fight at close quarters and at a distance.

Unlike many other vessels launched by Sweden, the Vasa's career as a fighting ship lasted barely a few hours. On Sunday August 10th, 1628 the ship had its official launch ceremony. The launch of such a powerful vessel was a major propaganda opportunity for King Gustavus Adolphus. Therefore foreign diplomats were brought to watch (along with hundreds of other spectators) as the ship began its maiden voyage from Stockholm. The 'Vasa' drew anchor, set sail and fired a salute. A few minutes later a gust of wind blew across the harbour causing the ship to begin to keel over. The 'Vasa' corrected itself for a moment and then began to keel over again towards its sides. The crew had failed to close the gunports, thus water began to pour in and fill the ship. A few minutes later the ship had toppled over and sunk. 30-50 people were trapped and drowned in the vessel. Gustavus Adolphus, away campaigning in Poland, had been awaiting the arrival of his new ship. Instead he received a message reporting the disaster. An immediate inquiry was begun into the cause of the sinking.

In the seventeenth century, application of mathematics to ship building still remained somewhat haphazard. Ship builders worked on the basis of recorded ship measurements that had been tried and tested on previous ships. Unlike merchant ships, warships had a large amount of weight placed higher up on their decks (the guns). This made them much more vulnerable to tipping over and sinking. Previous ship designs worked on the assumption of having the heavy guns on the lower decks and the lighter guns on top. Gustavus Adolphus had insisted that his new ship have both decks filled with heavy guns. The design of the 'Vasa' did not take into account this extra weight. As a result the ballast at the bottom of the ship counter balancing the weight of the guns was not sufficient for the new design.

These beautiful carvings on the back of the 'Vasa' would have been exquisitely painted.

For three hundred years, the ship lay at the bottom of the harbour in Stockholm. In 1956 a determined ship-wreck specialist, Anders Franzén found the ship and began lobbying for an expedition to recover it. In 1961 the 'Vasa' was pulled off the sea bed and brought to the surface. Unlike the Tudor warship, 'Mary Rose' in England, the 'Vasa' was discovered almost completely intact. Thanks to a lucky combination of fresh and salt water found in the area, the ship had not suffered the kind of disintegration that normally occurs in the wood of sunken ships.

As the ship began to dry, a substance called polyethylenglycol was used to replace the water in the wood and preserve it from destruction. Thus, a tragic accident three-hundred years ago has brought us this fine example of seventeenth century ship design. Anyone visiting Stockholm would be well-advised to visit this museum.

Military History and Warfare: The American War of Independence: Saratoga 1777

2008-07-03T13:46:00.000-07:00

The American victory at Saratoga was arguably the most important battle of the American Revolution. It simultaneously reduced the British presence to the north of the thirteen colonies and gave the American rebels a much needed victory in a set piece battle. Most importantly, it triggered the French government to recognize the United States as an independent country. This would have important political ramifications in later ensuring French military support.

During the early days of the war, the British hoped for a climatic battle that would dishearten the revolutionaries and crush the rebellion. General John Burgoyne (popularly known as ‘Gentleman Johnny’) led an army of six thousand regulars from the British base in Montreal. He planned to march south and join up with the New York garrison and disrupt rebel communications between New England and Pennsylvania – the very heart of the Revolution. Success would depend upon a high level of co-ordination between Burgoyne’s forces striking from Canada and the main British army attacking from New York under General Sir William Howe and Henry Clinton. Burgoyne was a popular general and had several notable sub-ordinates commanders in his army. These included Major-General Phillips of the Royal Artillery, Brigadier-General Simon Fraser and Major-General Riedesel, commanding the German contingent. The army itself was a mixed force of 8000 men consisting of British regulars, Canadian militia and German mercenaries.

Little did Burgoyne realise that whilst he had been preparing his campaign to attack southwards, events were being decided in London by the Secretary of State for America, Lord George Germain. Howe had requested permission to move his forces towards Philadelphia. Incredibly, Germain approved Howe’s plan within a week of giving precise orders to Burgoyne to carry out a separate plan to attack in the opposite direction. Although Burgoyne was not to realise this until later, the decision to divert troops to Philadelphia allowed Washington to redeploy thousands of troops to stop him.

The start of the campaign went well, with Burgoyne’s troops capturing Fort Ticonderoga on the 6th July. However, this also meant that he had to leave troops behind to hold the newly captured fort. Hoping to reach Albany and link up with Henry Clinton’s troops from New York, the British found themselves under constant fire from American snipers. Using the terrain to their advantage, American troops blocked roads with fallen trees and flooded the trails upon which the British advance depended. It did not help that the British were also carrying a large baggage train. Burgoyne’s alone filled thirty carts, including his library, wardrobe and liquor. The Americans also adopted scorched earth tactics leaving little in the way of supplies for the lumbering British.

By July, Burgoyne’s force found itself at Saratoga short on supplies. Hearing of an American depot of horses and cattle twenty miles away at Bennington, Burgoyne dispatched a force of four-hundred men to seize it. Learning of Americans forces operating in the area, he dispatched another five-hundred men in support. Both forces were surrounded and destroyed by American militia reinforced by Colonel Seth Warner’s ‘Green Mountain Boys’. More bad news followed in August as a separate British divisionary force also (striking from Canada) was soundly beaten by Benedict Arnold and forced to retreat.

By the 13th September, Burgoyne marched his army out of Saratoga with the aim of linking up with General’s Howe’s forces. Burgoyne’s own force was by now reduced to only 5000 men. Against him, the American rebels had assembled 14,000 Continentals under Horatio Gates. Gates drew up his force at a position called Bemis Heights, overlooking the Hudson River. This enabled him to control the road upon which the British would have to pass. Burgoyne was quick to note the terrain. On the 19th September he divided his army into three columns in an attempt to turn the American position by its left. On the American side, Benedict Arnold saw the danger of the flanking movement and sent forward the light infantry along with Colonel Daniel Morgan’s corps of rifleman. Arnold’s troops then proceeded to fight the British to a standstill in the centre.

By nightfall the British had lost 600 men. The Americans had lost 300, but still had 9,000 in reserve. That night Burgoyne’s men camped on the field, whilst the Americans prepared themselves for more British attacks. However, Burgoyne had found out that Clinton had at last set out to support him. He therefore ordered his men to dig in and await the arrival of reinforcements. Although Clinton’s army made some progress working its way on the lower Hudson, his forces were not sufficient to fight their way to Burgoyne. Burgoyne therefore waited for weeks unable to advance. Supplies of flour and salt pork began to run out. Forage for the horses was all but gone and the General began to suspect he and his men had been deliberately sacrificed.

On the 7th October, Burgoyne attempted to advance again. However, this time he was only able to put some 1,500 men into the field. With the odds so heavily stacked against the British, the battle was a foregone conclusion. American troops led by Arnold drove the British back to their camp with heavy losses. A week later, with nowhere left to go, Burgoyne decided to abandon his guns and attempt an escape. It was already too late. On the 17th October, Burgoyne surrendered 5,721 troops, seven generals and twenty-seven guns. However, such was the repute of the British force and its commander that they were allowed to surrender on the understanding that they would be given parole and passage back to Great Britain. Later the U.S. Congress repudiated the Saratoga Convention. Burgoyne’s men were not repatriated and many died in captivity in miserable conditions.

The Battle of Saratoga was a crucial turning point for the American rebellion. Their victory over one of Britain’s top commanders encouraged France to recognise the infant ‘United States’ as an independent country. France, Spain and Holland all joined the war on the side of the Americans, turning what had been a rebellion in the American colonies, into a world war. By 1780, almost 12,000 French soldiers and sailors had arrived in America to support the Revolution. Therefore arguably, Saratoga was not only the most significant battle of the War of Independence, but probably in the history of the United States.

If you are interested in reading more about the Battle of Saratoga, have a look at these books;

Philip J. Haythornwaite, ‘Invincible Generals’ (Poole, 1991)

Holger Herwig, Christian Archer, Timothy Travers, John Ferris, ‘Cassell’s World History of Warfare’ (London, 2003)

Richard Worth, ‘Saratoga (Battles that changed the world)’ (2002)

Rupert Furneaux, ‘Saratoga: the Decisive Battle’ (1971)

Military History and Warfare: The Crusades: How were the Crusaders able to get to conquer, and establish themselves in the East?

2008-06-23T14:04:00.000-07:00

I was very fortunate to sit through Christopher Tyerman’s lecture series on the Crusades as a undergraduate. Although I greatly enjoyed his lectures, one particular remark has always stuck with me above everything else. At the beginning of the first week, there were some fifty students in the lecture theatre. As the weeks continued (and it being the summer term with exams on the way) numbers began to dwindle. Eight weeks later, at the start of the final lecture, few of us remained of the original fifty. Dr. Tyerman surveyed the rows of empty chairs and counted eight of us left. “Well” he said. “I suppose this is about the right proportion who would have survived a crusade.” We burst into laughter.

Given the incredible hazards of the journey to the Holy Land and the low survival rate of the average Crusader, it is interesting to consider how exactly westerners were able to establish themselves and even thrive in Palestine in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The likelihood of an expedition succeeding was not very high. This is supported when one looks at the failures of the other Crusades to the East. In comparison to the First Crusade, the Second Crusade in 1147 was almost a total failure.

Byzantine support

Despite attempts by Latin Chroniclers such as Fulcher of Chartres to discredit the Byzantines, the First Crusade owed much to the active co-operation of Alexius Comnenus. The Crusaders rendezvoused at Constantinople before embarking on their quest. They would have had little knowledge of the ‘lay of the land’ in the territories to which they would be crossing. Even Fulcher highlights the necessity of securing Greek counsel and assistance. It was they who controlled communications and would have to keep supply lines open for the main crusading army. Proof of the necessity of Byzantine support can be offered through looking at the results of the Second Crusade. The First Crusaders had the knowledge and experience of Tactikus, an old soldier with long familiarity of warfare in Anatolia. The Second Crusaders did not receive the level of assistance that Alexius I had provided to their predecessors because Manuel had made long-term truce arrangements with the Seljuk Turks. Consequently, the expedition was largely conducted without any real knowledge of the dangers ahead. The First Crusaders may have felt abandoned after reaching Antioch, but that had been supplied and escorted on their journey by experienced troops provided by Byzantium.

Weaknesses in the Islamic world

The work of Carole Hillenbrand has done much to open up the Islamic perspective to western scholars concerning the arrival of the first crusaders. She argues that the Islamic world went through a series of catastrophic events during the last decades of the eleventh century, and as a result, the Crusaders were able to force their way into the East and establish states in hostile lands. In the space of less than two years, beginning in the 1092 there was a total sweep of all the major political pieces in the Islamic world. Nizam al-Mulk, the ruler of the Seljuks was murdered leading to a spiral of fratricide and power struggles. This diverted resources away from fighting western invaders. The disparate nature of the Seljuk army (consisting of standing troops, nomadic Turcomans, and groups of soldiers under provincial commanders) made strong military leadership under a Sultan essential for victory. This had been the case at Manzikert when the Turks had been led to victory under Alp-Arslan. In 1094, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Mutansir died. This succession of deaths in both the key power centres of the Islamic world led to disorientation and anarchy. This made the First Crusade all the more likely to succeed.

More significantly, to the survival of the Crusader states was the religious schism that had developed within the Islamic word. The Fatimid Ismaili shi’ites of Egypt shared a political enmity with the Seljuk Sunnis in Anatolia. Indeed the Crusaders would be able to play these groups off one another. In addition to this, the Fatimid Egyptians suffered further religious schism after the death of al-Mutansir in 1094 with the breakaway group known as ‘Assassins’. The concept of ‘Jihad’ had also become a rhetorical term and was not revived until later in the Middle Ages. Jerusalem in 1095 was not yet considered as important in the Muslim world as it would become in the build up to 1187 (the Fall of Jerusalem to Saladin). Economically in the period of the First Crusade, Egypt was suffering from famine and plague. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Muslim world was unable to offer serious concerted opposition to the arrival of Western armies.

Strong political leadership of the Crusader states

The establishment of the Crusader territories was vitally dependent upon the implementation of strong political leadership. Crucially, the first issue that had to be dealt with was the question of the political status of the territory surrounding the Holy places. Was it to be a state of the church governed by a papal legate, or simply a Christian kingdom in the Holy Land? The death of Adhemer of Le Puy had removed the legitimate channel of papal authority. Godfrey of Bouillon decided to take the title of ‘advocatus’, meaning a layman who protected and administered Church estates. This situation changed after Godfrey’s death in 1100 and the new ruler was able to assert his strength and become Baldwin I. The papal legate, Daimbert was slowly undermined until 1102, when he was sent into exile. The establishment of a king gave the opportunity for the practice of feudal forms of government already in operation in Europe at this time. The other three territories acknowledged the leadership of the kingdom of Jerusalem as shown by the high degree of co-operation between the Frankish states.

Co-operation of the Crusader kingdoms

In 1118, the forces of Jerusalem, Antioch and Tripoli combined to meet an army from Egypt and Damascus that was threatening the kingdom of Jerusalem. Roger of Antioch campaigned for three months with the king and gave the king three hundred of his own soldiers to strengthen the royal army. In addition, the traditional marriage alliances also helped to strengthen the solidarity of the Crusader states. At first the Crusaders were ill-equipped for the task of establishing themselves and securing territory. They lacked manpower and had suffered huge losses during the First Crusade. This was made worse by the departure of some of the most important magnates and their companies after Jerusalem had been taken (such as the Counts of Flanders and Normandy). The historian Malcolm Barber has gone so far to say that the major reason for the success of the kingdom was that the Muslims were in an even worse condition that the Crusaders, disunited and lacking a sense of unity.

Control of the coast

Control of the coast was essential in sustaining Crusader power. The ports gave the merchants a trading post and opened up the supply route to the west. Therefore the co-operation of the Italian city-states of Venice, Pisa and Genoa was crucial in maintaining operations in the Levant. In 1104 a fleet of Genoese ships had enabled Baldwin to capture the important port city of Acre and Genoa had received extensive trading privileges in return. Later the Venetians assisted with the blockade and capture of Tyre in 1124. The terms of their support gave the Venetians 1/3 of the city and made them almost entirely exempt from the payment of customs. The consequences of this and other grants was the establishment of autonomous Italian settlements in the trading cities of the Frankish states. They formed enclaves, under their own jurisdiction and administered by officials appointed by their mother-cities in Italy. The Italian fleets were essential in securing the Eastern Mediterranean from Muslim counter-attack, as well as successfully besieging coastal cities.

Contribution of the military orders

The chronic shortages of manpower would have proved fatal, if not for the establishment of the religious military orders. I have explored their contribution to defence of the Crusader States in more detail in earlier posts on this blog, but to summarise, the military orders provided much needed manpower to the Christian armies. The orders were an elite fighting force, dedicated to the defence of the Christian holy places in the Crusader states. Their network of financial resources in Europe enabled them to build castles and garrison strategic frontier areas on the borders of Muslim kingdoms and princedoms.

The disunity of the Muslim world was arguably the single largest factor in maintaining the western presence in the Levant. Although it took nearly ninety years for the Muslim world to organise itself effectively, they could afford to squabble during that time. For the westerners trying to establish themselves, disunity would have been disastrous.

If you are interested in reading more about the Crusader kingdoms, have a look at these books;

Malcolm Barber, ‘The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London and New York, 1993)

Jean Richard, ‘The Crusades c.1071-c.1291 (Cambridge, 1999)

Carole Hillenbrand, ‘The Crusades: Islamic perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999)

P.M. Holt, ‘The Age of the Crusades: The near east from the eleventh century to 1517 (London, 1986)

Alan V. Murray, The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic history 1097-1125 (Oxford, 2000)

Military History and Warfare: The American War of Independence: Bunker Hill

2008-06-16T13:44:00.000-07:00

By the spring of 1775, tensions between the British government and the American colonists had reached boiling point. For months, provincial militias had been drilling on village greens and hoarding stocks of gunpowder. The first clash had occurred when British General Thomas Gage had sent a military force to the villages of Lexington and Concord on the 18th April to seize local munitions and supplies. Whilst negotiations continued between the British government and colonists, Gage gathered what reinforcements he could into Boston. By the end of May it was becoming increasingly clear that further conflict was inevitable. As such, the British government dispatched three additional generals to support Gage. Generals William Howe, Henry Clinton and John Burgoyne had all been hand picked for their experience.

The Plan

It seemed intolerable to the British commanders that an army of regulars should be bottled up in Boston by mere militia. They therefore conceived an elaborate plan to occupy the Charlestown promontory to the north and the Dorchester Heights to the south-east with token forces and draw the American flanks. In the meantime, the main British force would storm through the narrow Boston neck and across the Charles River to attack the main American concentration centred around Cambridge.

Opposing the British was Artemas Ward, the American Commander-in-Chief. Although his troops outnumbered the British, they were ill-equipped, ill-disciplined and lacking in coherent leadership. Command of the American regiments was exercised by competing Colonels, Israel Putnam, Colonel William Prescott, and Dr. Joseph Warren. They decided that a challenge must be made to disrupt British preparations. Three regiments were therefore marched onto the Charlestown Peninsula during the night of the 16th June. Digging with shovels, the Americans threw up fortifications on Bunker Hill. Four hours after arriving, the militiamen had constructed a shoulder-high earthen fort which offered protection from both musket fire and long-range cannon. This gave the Americans control of the heights overlooking Boston and therefore the potential to bombard the city with cannon. The British decided that the threat of bombardment must be dealt with before their own plan could be put into action. Crucially, however, they choose to wait until the next morning before taking any action. This gave the Americans further time to organise reinforcements and improve the fort.

The British landing

General Howe decided that the best means of dealing with the earthen fort would be by landing at the Charlestown neck and cutting them off. At 1:30 p.m. the first British assault barges set off loaded with ten light infantry and ten grenadier companies. Their landing was completely unopposed. Howe was so confident of success that he had his men pile arms and eat lunch whilst the landing barges went back for the second wave of troops. In the meantime, the Americans in the fort had been joined by another thousand militiamen. Further reinforcements also arrived in the form of John Starks’ New Hampshire regiment. These men were probably the best marksmen in the American army. Two hundred of them were sent into Charlestown to provide harassing fire on any passing British troops.

Howe had by now, assembled his forces at the bottom of Bunker Hill. However, they could not have been worse dressed for the ordeal that would follow. Their brilliant red coats made them ideal targets. Furthermore, each British grenadier carried a heavy load of 125 pounds with their muskets weighing an additional 10 pounds.

The Assault

Slowly three red lines of British soldiers began to move up the hill. The advance soon ran into difficulties caused by the terrain. The British line became badly broken up as the soldiers hacked away at the waist high grass and low stone walls and fences. By contrast, on the northern side of the hill, British light infantry quickly advanced up the hill. The militiamen were ready for them. The American commander had hammered a stake into the earth 40 yards from the stonewall his men were defending. He ordered his men to hold their fire until the British and passed the post. The first volley thundered down the hill and completely halted the advancing wave of infantry. As more troops passed over their bodies, two further volleys inflicted the same results. Howe’s infantry at the centre took the fire of 1,500 men firing in unison. All across the line, the British were suffering heavy losses. There was nothing to do except for them to retreat and reform for another attempt.

The British advance up the hill under heavy fire

Howe led his men for a second assault. Three times, he found himself entirely alone, with everybody around him killed or wounded. A third attack was then organised. By now many of the British units were down to just a quarter, or even a tenth of their original strength. Fortunately for the attackers, General Clinton had been watching the events from afar and arrived with further reinforcements. Howe’s artillery had also now been brought up with the forward troops. He quickly devised a new plan of leaving the surviving light infantry to act as a skirmishing force whilst the rest of his men took the breastwork in the flank. At this moment American supplies of ammunition and gunpowder also ran out. Howe’s plan succeeded and British bayonets were suddenly amongst the Americans manning the earthen works. It was at this stage that the Americans suffered most of their casualties as they began to retreat.

Conclusion and Aftermath

Although the British had taken the hill, their losses were staggering at nearly fifty percent. 226 were killed with 828 wounded. Casualties were particularly high amongst the officers, with 27 killed and 828 wounded. By contrast, the Americans lost 450 men. However, their relatively untrained forces had stood up to professionals and inflicted massive losses. It was a sign of things to come and was arguably a turning point in the morale of the American revolutionaries. Although the Americans had technically lost the battle, their actions helped to serve as a recruiting agent amongst other colonists still undecided as to the chances of success against the British army.

Taking Bunker Hill brought no long term advantage to the British. It had almost been a pyrrhic victory. The loss of so many men made any future actions untenable for the time being. The following March, the Americans seized the Dorchester Heights and constructed an even larger fort. The entire British force and a thousand American loyalists boarded the ships in the harbour for Halifax and left Boston.

If you are interested in finding out more about the Battle of Bunker Hill, have a look at these books;

Mary Englar, ‘The Battle of Bunker Hill (We the People: Revolution and the New Nation)’ (2007)

William Weir, ‘Fatal Victories: From the Crusades to Bunker Hill to the Vietnam War: History's Most Tragic Military Triumphs and the High Cost of Victory’ (2006)

Richard M. Ketchum, ‘Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill’ (1999)

Victor Brooks, ‘The Boston Campaign: April 1775-March 1776 (Great Campaigns): April 1775-March 1776 (Great Campaigns)’ (1999)

Military History and Warfare: World War II: Arnhem Bridge ‘A Bridge too Far’

2008-06-11T13:56:00.000-07:00

The Allied land and airborne operation of September 1944, codenamed ‘Market Garden’ was an ambitious plan to end the war quickly by dropping 30,000 paratroopers into Holland. The paratroopers would seize and hold a series of bridges whilst the British XXX Corps would follow behind and advance into Germany. The battle at Arnhem bridge was only one battle in a series of engagements on the sixty-four mile road from the Meuse-Escaut Canal to the Neder Rijn. However, since the success of the whole operation depended upon seizing this bridge, it was also the most important.

I do not intend to dwell too much upon the entire operation, or indeed the entire British 1st Airborne Division, who quickly found themselves scattered around Arnhem and fighting for their lives. Instead I intend to focus on the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Frost. This was the sole battalion to reach its objective. Alone and cut-off they held the bridge for four days awaiting reinforcements that never came.

Seven hours after landing on the 17th September, Frost and his men got within sight of Arnhem bridge. A whole Brigade had initially been dispatched, but when Frost counted the number of troops with him that evening, he had just over 700. The battalion were able to seize one end of the bridge almost immediately. However, the other end was held by the Germans. That evening Frost’s men made two attempts to get across the bridge. Both attacks were beaten back by heavy fire from a German pillbox in the centre and an armoured car at the southern end. German trucks that tried to cross the bridge were destroyed, thus discouraging further attempts by the enemy to cross the bridge under the cover of darkness. Unable to contact Brigade HQ, Frost ordered his men to deploy in defensive positions in houses at the north end of the bridge and await reinforcements. However, the Germans reacted quickly and brought in nearby SS infantry and tank units to reinforce their end of the bridge. The only good news for Frost during the night of the 17-18th September was the arrival of most of the Brigade HQ along with a captured German truck loaded with ammunition from the original drop zone.

Frost and his men did not realise that the rest of the division were by now pinned down in desperate little battles all across Arnhem. By the early hours of the 18th September, the 1st Airborne division were fragmented all over Arnhem. Just a few hours after the landing, individual groups of paratroopers were engaged in private battles with whatever local forces they encountered. The breakdown in communications added to the general confusion and chaos. The Germans were well aware of the importance of the bridge. Thanks to the capture of Allied plans carelessly left in a glider, German Field Marshal Model was fully aware of the intention of Operation Market Garden. Whilst the British fought at Arnhem, the American 82nd and 101st were fighting to take the bridges at Nijmegan and Eindhoven. As long as Frost as his men held the North end of Arnhem Bridge, German armoured reinforcements to Nijmegan would be delayed.

British paratroopers landing at Arnhem

German counterattacks began as soon as sufficient forces were assembled on the German side of the bridge early in the morning of the 18th. These attacks continued throughout the day and were beaten back by the British without great loss. Despite these early successes, the growing number of casualties and shortages in ammunition made it imperative that additional units from 1st Airborne or XXX Corps broke through as soon as possible. By early afternoon of Tuesday the 18th, ammunition supplies were so low that it was necessary to stop any sniping and only open fire when an attack was actually in progress. The units of 9th SS Panzer facing them made full use of the lull in shooting to find better positions from which to fire onto the battalion. Half-tracks from 10th SS Panzer soon joined them and were deployed on the south bank. The balance of firepower and armour was rapidly turning against the paratroopers as the Germans launched intermittent assualts on the bridge. Every German fighting vehicle capable of withstanding small-arms fire became a threat to the beleaguered paratroopers. The British forces on the bridge had only hand-held PIATs with which to counter German armour. This spring loaded weapon was the British equivalent of the American bazooka or German Panzerfaust. Unfortunately it was considerably inferior to its counterparts in those armies. Despite this, Frost's men were able to repel multiple attacks, leaving a trail of wrecked German vehicles on the bridge.

Later on the 18th, a captured British paratrooper was sent back to the British side to convey a German request for the British to surrender. With the radio now picking up signals from the British spearheads further down at Nijmegan, Frost still had every reason to believe that XXX Corps would be arriving at any moment. The messenger did not bother to convey Frost’s decline of the German offer and instead took his place back in the line with the rest of his unit.

By Wednesday morning, the Germans were demolishing British defences one building at a time. German tanks fired phosphorus shells to force the paratroopers out of each shelter. Movement between buildings was also fraught with danger as the Germans had now covered the area with machine gun positions and snipers. Casualties were starting to fill the cellars underneath the buildings. Worse still, Frost himself was injured when a mortar exploded next to him. He handed over command to Major Gough of the Reconnaissance squadron, but insisted on being consulted on all major decisions.

With their ammunition almost gone, Frost's men found themselves fixing bayonets and engaging in hand to hand combat. Groups of two or three paratroopers would leave the shelter of the houses they were hiding in to attack Tiger tanks with their PIATs. In the midst of all the fighting, the battalion medical officers convinced Frost to ask the Germans for a two hour truce, during which the wounded would be taken into German hospitals. Following the resumption of fighting, the Germans launched a concentrated mortar barrage on the remaining British positions. Refusing to surrender, groups of paratroopers were simply overrun by superior German manpower backed up with fire support. Despite horrendous conditions, the battalion had managed to hold on to the bridge for three days and four nights. By the fourth day at 9:00, 21st September, all resistance on the bridge had ceased. Eight-one paratroopers had been killed, with many of the others wounded. Frost and the remnants of the battalion were marched off into captivity. They had held a difficult position against overwhelming odds with minimal resources. Their tenacity denied German forces in Nijmegan reinforcements that could have helped stem the Allied advance. Whilst Market Garden ultimately failed to achieve its objectives, the actions of the 2nd Battalion at Arnhem Bridge became legendary.

If you interested in reading more about Operation Market Garden, have a look at these books;

David Bennett, Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of the Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944 (2008)

Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 (London, 2005)

John Keegan, The Second World War (London, 1997)

Max Hastings, Armageddon: the Battle for Germany 1944-45 (London, 2004)

Military History and Warfare: The Thirty Years War: The military reforms of Gustavus Adolphus

2008-06-04T14:03:00.000-07:00

By 1630 the Thirty Years War was in its twelfth year. Fearful of the creeping Habsburg encroachment into the Baltic, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden landed a small Swedish army of thirteen thousand men on the shores of Germany. For the next eighteen years, Swedish forces would play a key role in maintaining the Protestant cause. They were fortunate to be led by a man that would come to be known as the father of modern warfare.

Gustavus Adolphus

Gustavus Adolphus ascended to the throne of Sweden in 1611. In an age of religious extremism, he grew into a powerful advocate of the Protestant cause. As a child he had been well-tutored in military classics, as well as the works of Caesar and Vegetius. Crucially, he understood the organisational reforms introduced by Maurice of Nassau into the Dutch army early in the seventeenth century. Unlike many other rulers of the age, Gustavus had a firsthand understanding of the battlefield and of weapons. Early campaigns against the Poles and Russians in the 1620s gave him invaluable military experience. When he succeeded to the throne, Swedish forces were understrength, poorly organised and generally unprofessional. His reforms turned Sweden and the Swedish army into a first rate force that would later help determine the future of Europe.

Creation of a national army

In the early seventeenth century, most armies were heterogeneous compositions of various mercenary groups of different nationalities and ethnic groups. Maurice of Nassau had been one of the first to recognise that a truly professional army needed to be homogeneous. Gustavus decided to create an army that would remain Swedish at its core, but retain mercenaries in order to supplement numbers. To ensure that the mercenaries would be of high quality, he tried to retain forces that already had a proven track record of success. One of the best infantry regiments in the Swedish army was the Green Brigade, made up almost entirely of Scots.

To create the national army, he regulated the conscription process which had been gradually introduced in Sweden during the previous half-century. Drafts to supply men to the army were taken from existing militia units. He also made gifts of land for soldiers who had served for twenty years and set up administrative systems to ensure they were paid regularly whilst on active service. In order to support these military reforms, the king had to implement economic reforms at the same time. Gustavus expanded Swedish commerce, developing existing industries and natural resources. This allowed the state to operate on a regular annual budget and pay for its army.

Infantry tactics

Like Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus employed linear formations against the infantry tercios used by the Habsburg forces. He increased the number of musketeers and reduced the combat line to six ranks rather than the usual ten used by other armies. In addition, Swedish troops were equipped with the new, more reliable matchlock muskets. Gustavus also introduced packaged paper cartridges containing gunpowder and a ball. The system saved each musketeer considerable time in no longer having to worry about pouring the correct amount of powder under battlefield conditions.

The King’s reforms centred on working out effective tactics for attacking enemy infantry squares and heavy lines presenting a solid front of musket and pike. Swedish musketeers were trained to fire by volley of ranks so that continuous fire could be maintained. In preparing to receive an enemy charge, the musketeers formed up with the frontline kneeling so that they could fire a simultaneous volley. Once the enemy attack had been broken, pikeman and cavalry would advance.

Whilst pikeman were originally solely for defence (protecting the musketeers while they were reloading), Gustavus transformed them from being a purely defensive force into a means of offence. By removing most of their armour, pikeman were now able to charge across the battlefield. This aggressive use of the pike was innovative in an era where gunpowder was starting to dominate.

Reorganisation of cavalry

Gustavus made important contributions to the use of cavalry on the battlefield. His objective was to enable the cavalry to utilise its speed and impetus through a well-disciplined charge. Squadrons were eventually arrayed three ranks deep, fighting in the style of the Poles. Instead of merely harassing the enemy with pistol-fire, Swedish cavalry would now charge with swords at full speed. Only the first one or two ranks would fire their pistols, and only then before immediately attacking with their swords. Gustavus also equipped the dragoons with shorter versions of muskets, thus enabling them to fire from the saddle.

Artillery

The King’s early experiences of war in the 1620s had given him valuable insights into the science of artillery. Gustavus understood that the expert use of artillery on the battlefield would enable him to pierce enemy lines, rather than simply bombard them. Therefore the calibre of guns in the Swedish artillery train were reduced to just three varieties, the 24-pounder, the 12-pounder and the 3-pounder. Each would have a specific role. Gustavus used the 3-pound guns as light field pieces for use directly as support for the infantry and cavalry units. Each infantry regiment was assigned two of these light guns. To make these guns more mobile, lighter gun carriages were employed along with shortened gun barrels and a reduction in the thickness of metal used in the artillery tubes. This resulted in fewer wagons and horses being required to pull the artillery. In 1625 the army’s 36-gun train needed over 1000 horses and 220 wagons. By 1630, the Swedish artillery-train of 80 guns required only 1000 horses and 100 wagons.

These changes required radical technological improvements in the areas of design, casting and metallurgy. Sweden’s vast natural mineral resources made the creation of a large artillery force a realistic possibility. Through experimentation and the employment of foreign experts, Sweden artillery became the finest in Europe. Accuracy was insisted upon and gunners were given regular practice. At the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, Swedish gunners were able to fire three shots to every one of the enemy.

Conclusion

Arguably King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was the first great modern military commander. His battlefield innovations were copied, but never bettered, by his opponents in the Thirty Years War. He took three distinctive units of the battlefield and moulded them into a force of combined arms. Arguable these tactics had not been seen in Europe since the Roman army. His contribution to military thinking and strategy dominated the age of gunpowder and pike and beyond.

Gary Dean Peterson, ‘The rise of an Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: warrior Kings of Sweden’ (Jefferson, 2007)

Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstet, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, Gunnar Asellius, Svenska Slagfält (Värname, 2004)

Philip J. Haythornwaite, ‘Invincible Generals’ (Poole, 1991)

Herman Lindqvist, ‘A History of Sweden’ (Värnamo, 2006)

Holger Herwig, Christian Archer, Timothy Travers, John Ferris, ‘Cassell’s World History of Warfare’ (London, 2003)

Military History and Warfare: The Texan War of Independence: Musings on the Alamo

2008-05-29T14:29:00.000-07:00

Last year I had the opportunity to re-visit the Alamo in San Antonio. I had been there once before as a child and the visit helped to spark a lifelong love of history. Situated in the heart of heavily built-up San Antonio, the interior of the Alamo is an island of calm. This seems remarkable given that for thirteen days between February 23rd - March 6th 1836 it was subject to a siege followed by a bloody massacre. The Alamo itself has existed since the 1700s. It was originally established as a missionary post by Spanish monks. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spanish troops occupied it and used it as their base for operations in the area. After the Mexican revolution, Mexican troops took over garrison duties. It was therefore not surprising that the Texan colonists chose to fortify the Alamo in 1835/36 as a key part of the defences of the settlements further north.

Surveying the Alamo now, there is little to suggest that it would have made a good defensive position. Nonetheless, there were good arguments in 1835 for attempting to hold it against the Mexican army. There were two roads that led into the Texan interior from Mexico. The first was the Atascosito Road, stretching northward from Matamoros on the Rio Grande through Goliad and leading straight into the Texan settlements. The second was the Old San Antonio Road and wound north-eastward through San Antonio. Guarding both these roads and simultaneously acting as an early warning system for the colonies, there were forts at Goliad and San Antonio. Initially, General Sam Houston had ordered that the Alamo be razed to the ground and the position abandoned. This was rejected and Colonel James Neil (initially commanding the troops at the Alamo) instructed his engineers to begin constructing fortifications. By February, twenty-one pieces of captured Mexican artillery had been mounted on the walls and concentrated into batteries and a palisade wall had been constructed. Neil is often forgotten in retellings of the story of the Alamo, but it was thanks to his efforts that the Alamo was reconstituted into a defensible fortress.

Plans of the Alamo in 1836

Today the Alamo is garrisoned by an army of tourists and tour guides. And rightly so, the old mission station is well worth a visit by anyone with the any interest in military history or Texas history in general. The site was used again for military purposes during the American Civil War, but was abandoned shortly afterwards. Fortunately, an organisation calling itself 'the daughters of the Republic of Texas' formed and took it upon themselves to maintain and safeguard the Alamo as an historic site for future generations. International visitors to the site might be surprised to learn that the garrison of the Alamo did not consist entirely of Americans led by John Wayne Indeed, the Alamo Museum within the compound shows how diverse the settler population was in Texas during the early nineteenth century. Apart from settlers from across the United States, the defenders of the Alamo consisted of Hispanic 'Texicans', Englishmen, Irishman, Scotsman and Germans.

Surrounded by seven thousand Mexican soldiers, the one-hundred and eighty-seven defenders of the Alamo stayed at their posts. This is not to say that they were suicidal. Indeed, the commanding officer, Colonel Travis sent repeated messages requesting reinforcements throughout the siege. Unfortunately, none were available in time to come to the relief of the Alamo. On the thirteenth day, the Mexican army stormed the bastion and killed every last defender. The women and children were spared and set on their way to report what they had seen as a warning to other potential rebels against Mexico.

Other items of interest on display in the Alamo museum, include a bible owned by Jim Bowie and a rifle said to have belonged to Davy Crockett. The bible is particularly indicative of the kind of life Jim Bowie led prior to his death at the Alamo. Its sole distinguishing feature is the large gash running through its centre. This was apparently the result of an attempted murder by an Indian that Bowie had upset. The Bible sat in Bowie's pocket and took the impact of the knife, thus allowing him to escape and fight another day. Apart from the displays within the surviving buildings of the Alamo compound, there is an excellent film telling the story of the Alamo and the thirteen day siege. To its great credit, the museum emphasis both perspectives from the conflict. The Mexican government had encouraged immigration into Texas from the United States in order to increase the population of the state. The white settlers were primarily interested in Texas because of the land opportunities it offered. However, the large influx of white settlers began to cause the Mexican government concern. They feared that this far-flung Mexican province would become culturally and politically dominated by the settlers. When the Mexican government introduced legislation to limit the numbers of immigrants, tensions began to rise which would eventually culminate in the Texan revolution of 1835.

The centrepiece of any visit to the Alamo is the lecture tour conducted by one of the museum's enthusiastic guides. It is clear how important the Alamo is to many Texans and indeed Americans as a whole. Setting aside historical bias for a moment, the Alamo is far more than an old church-turned-fort. It is considered by many as a shrine to Texas independence. The heroic behaviour of the defenders in refusing to give in epitomizes the Texan ideals of self-determination and love of freedom. As such there is a statue outside the walls to commemorate all those who lost their lives defending the Alamo. The guides and museum are excellent and make the Alamo a ‘must see’ destination for anyone visiting the lone star state.

Military History and Warfare: The French and Indian War: Massacre at Fort William Henry?

2008-05-27T01:42:00.000-07:00

As a schoolboy I remember watching 'Last of the Mohicans' with great enthusiasm. The 1992 film was a remake of an older film version based upon the original novel by James Fenimore Cooper. Both the film and book are set in 1757 against the backdrop of the French and Indian war. The film portrays the historical siege of Fort William Henry defended by the British. The British are forced to surrender and agree honourable surrender terms. As they march away from the fort, the Anglo-American soldiers and colonists are subjected to a horrendous ambush by hundreds of tomahawk welding homicidal Indians. The British regulars form up and fire volleys into the forest, only to find themselves on the receiving end of a scalping. And so it goes on.

Sixteen years later I decided to try and find out how much of this was actually based upon reality. Fort William Henry was indeed a real place and still exists as a reconstruction on the shore of Lake George. In 1757 it guarded the main approach to the upper Hudson valley at the south end of the lake. It was therefore an important strategic position for both the British and the French.

A plan of Fort William Henry

In the spring of 1757, Lieutenant Colonel George Monro brought five companies of the 35th Foot to the Fort in order to relieve the winter garrison. Together with two New York independent companies and nearly eight-hundred provincial troops from New Jersey and New Hampshire, Monro commanded a force of 1500 men. In late June, two escaped English former prisoners of war reached the Fort warning that the French General Montcalm was preparing an invasion force at Fort Carrillon on the other side of the Lake. By the end of July, Montcalm had been able to supplement his army of 6000 regulars with an additional 2000 Indian allies. He intended to take the Fort and use it as a platform for an invasion of British North America.

On the 23rd July, Monro cautiously dispatched several ranger patrols on reconnaissance missions to obtain more information about the French assault force. When these patrols failed to return, he ordered Colonel John Parker to led five companies of New Jersey provincials in a raid to destroy the sawmills at the foot of the lake and seize as many enemy prisoners as possible. Three-quarters of the expedition were killed or captured. Five-hundred Ottawas, Ojibwis, Potawatomis, Menominees and Canadians had been waiting for them. General Webb had been visiting Fort William Henry when survivors of Parker's force returned. He promised to send urgent reinforcements. Despite these promises, Webb was afraid of stripping the defences of his own post, Fort Edward. As such he sent only two hundred regulars of the Royal American 60th regiment and eight-hundred provincials under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Frye. They arrived just in time for the start of the siege on August 2nd.

The Siege

Despite being massively outnumbered, Colonel Monro commanded a well-equipped post. The Fort's artillery batteries consisted of eighteen heavy cannon, thirteen light swivels, two mortars and a howitzer. The Fort's magazines also held an adequate supply of ammunition and provisions. Once Monro had ordered all flammable roof shingle to be thrown into the lake, the most serious threat to the Fort was that of the wall collapsing under sustained bombardment. If the wall did collapse, the attacking French would be able to overwhelm the British through sheer force of numbers. Alternatively, even if the wall held up, provisions would not last indefinitely. Over the long term the garrison could be starved into submission.

Monro quickly deduced that the only chance of saving the Fort would be if Webb dispatched a relief expedition before Montcalm had the chance to organise his own camp's defences. By the 7th August, Monro had received word from Webb that reinforcements would not arrive at Fort William Henry until he himself had been reinforced by militia from New England and New York. By the evening of the 8th, the relentless French bombardment had seriously reduced the morale of the British garrison. With the constant firing of artillery, as well as the stress of shrapnel raining down upon the defenders, many had not slept for five nights in a row. With no reinforcements coming, Monro ordered his engineers to survey the Fort and assess its continued ability to resist. The top three feet of the bastions most exposed to French guns had been completely shot away. Only five of the Fort's cannon were still operational and stocks of ammunition had dwindled to almost nothing. The next morning, Monro agreed to discuss terms of surrender.

The Surrender

By one o'clock in the afternoon on the 9th August, the terms of surrender had been agreed. They were extremely generous given the predicament in which the British and Colonials found themselves. In return for agreeing to remain non-combatants for eighteen months, the entire garrison would be granted safe passage to Fort Edward under French escort. They would be allowed to keep their small arms, colours and a symbolic brass field piece. The sick and wounded would be cared for by the French and then repatriated when they had recovered. In return, Montcalm asked only that all French military and civilian prisoners be repatriated and returned to Fort Carillion by November and that the cannon and supplies within the Fort be surrendered. Unfortunately, Montcalm had not bothered to consult his Indian allies before agreeing to these terms. The idea of honourable surrender with the terms granted by Montcalm were totally alien to his Indian allies. They had expected greater rewards for their participation. To have defeated their enemy and then return home without prisoners, loot or scalps left them feeling betrayed and confused as to the purpose of fighting in the first place. Therefore, after Montcalm explained the surrender terms to them, many of the warriors decided they would simply take what they came for and then leave.

The 'Massacre'

After the official surrender, the British made their way to an entrenched camp where the soldiers and civilians were to remain until they marched to Fort Edward the following day. As the last British detachments left, Indians entered the fort in search of booty. They found only seventy sick and wounded who had been left to be cared for by the French. Fortunately the prompt intervention of French guards and missionaries saved the lives of many of the the wounded. Through the rest of the afternoon, Indians roamed the entrenched camp plundering its inhabitants. When French guards managed to clear them out of the camp they continued to hang about its perimeter menacingly. At dawn, as the regulars prepared to lead the column to Fort Edward, hundreds of Indian warriors armed with knives, tomahawks and muskets began to crowd around demanding that they they surrender arms, equipment and clothing. The Indians were clearly not satisfied. At 5 am the column set off with French guards escorting the British regulars at the front. The regulars were thus spared the worst of the violence which was to follow. By contrast, the rear of the column consisted entirely of militia and civilians. Suddenly the rear of the column found itself beset on every side. Within minutes, Indians had seized, killed and scalped the wounded from the provincial companies and robbed others of their clothing and possessions. As confusion mounted, all discipline broke down. A whoop was heard from the direction of the Indians (this was later assumed to be a signal) and dozens of warriors began to tomahawk the most exposed groups. Although the killing lasted only a few minutes, panic had set in. Frye's provincial regiment disappeared in every direction. When Montcalm and his officers realised what was happening, they ran up to try and halt the killing. Unfortunately they found that in many instances, the warriors preferred to kill their captives and take a scalping rather than surrender them. By the time the French had manage to restore order, some 185 soldiers and camp followers had been killed and between 300-500 taken captive. The rest of the column had either fled down the road or escaped into the woods and eventually made their way to Fort Edward.

Aftermath

Refugees continued to straggle in to Fort Edward from the woods for more than a week. On the 15th August, Colonel Monro arrived with a contingent of five-hundred survivors and the the brass six-pounder that they had been allowed to bring with them. Monro and his men had been brought under French escort to Half-way brook and handed over to a British guard. Montcalm assured the British that the rest of the garrison would be returned as soon as its members had been retrieved from the Indians. Thanks to the combined efforts of Montcalm and the French Governor-General Vaudreuill, at least two-hundred prisoners were recovered by the end of August. The prisoners were returned at an average cost to the French crown of 130 livres and thirty bottles of brandy each. Only about two-hundred captives would fail to return to the British colonies by 1763. The Indians themselves also adopted forty of the captives into their tribes. However, the events at Fort William Henry were a disaster for future French recruitment efforts of Indians to the war effort. The capture of prisoners at the Fort exposed the Indians to a small pox epidemic which made them extremely unwilling to join any future French expeditions.

Describing the events at Fort William Henry following the surrender as a 'massacre' is perhaps too extreme. Nevertheless, many people were killed or taken prisoner and it was no doubt extremely traumatic for those that lived through it.

If you are interested in reading more about Fort William Henry and the French and Indian war, have a look at these books below;

Fred Anderson, 'Crucible of War' (London, 2000)

Ian K.Steele, 'Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre" (New York, 1990)

'Empire Collide: The French and Indian War 1754-63', ed. Ruth Sheppard (Oxford, 2006)

David R. Starbuck, 'Massacre at Fort William Henry' (Hanover, 2002)

Military History and Warfare: World War II: Leningrad’s ‘Road of Life’ 1941

2008-05-22T13:50:00.000-07:00

The siege of Leningrad was a deliberate attempt by the German army to eradicate the city’s population by starving the people to death. In early September 1941, German forces cut the last roads leading into the city. For the next 872 days (8th September to 27th January 1944) the people of Leningrad were subjected to a blockade designed to slowly strangle the city. With a pre-war population of 2.5 million to feed, mass starvation became a very real possibility during the siege. For five weeks during the winter of 1941, many Leningrader’s daily ration of bread had been reduced to a mere 125 grams. Even this was adulterated with cottonseed, flax cake and mouldy grain. For those fighting on the front line and involved in vital war work, rations were slightly higher, but never beyond the most bare subsistence.

Despite appalling conditions, the city survived the winter of 1941 and continued to resist for the next three years before the Germans were finally pushed back. This would not have been possible without the determined efforts of the Russians to keep Leningrad supplied with basic food and fuel necessities needed to keep the city alive. The supply route that was hacked out over the snow and ice became a symbol for Russia’s determination to survive.

The two supply roads became known as route 101 and route 102. Since Leningrad had been cut off from land supply routes, the Russians were forced to construct a route over the ice. The plan for the ice road had begun to take shape in October of 1941. On the 29th October, Soviet ships had laid an underwater signals cable at the bottom of the Lake Ladoga to link with the encircled area. From the 8th November, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft began to fly over the lake looking for signs of ice formation. The northern part of the lake had frozen over nicely, but the middle was still unsafe. However, on the 15th November a north wind started the big freeze and the ice rapidly reached the thickness required to carry vehicles. By early December some sixty ice roads were formed across the frozen lake.

Constructing the ice road was a large and dangerous undertaking. It was built under terrible conditions, over cracks and fissures on the lake’s surface and through frequent snow storms. Workers were under constant German artillery fire and air attack from the Luftwaffe. Once completed, the road ran from the rail and loading depots on the Soviet shore of the lake, across a twenty-mile stretch of ice which ran parallel to the German siege positions. The ice road led to the small port of Osinovets on the western shore of Lake Ladoga. Here the cargo was unloaded and transported by rail and truck into the city. The road became Leningrad’s only link to the rest of mainland Russia. It therefore held a powerful symbolic importance to the Russian defenders and was later given the name, the ‘Road of Life’.

Lorries transporting food and supplies across the ice.

Indeed it was the ‘Road of Life’. Leningrad needed an absolute minimum of 100 tonnes a day to keep the city alive. The first large-scale scheduled convoy of sixty trucks set off on the 22nd November carrying 33 tonnes of flour. Driving all night through a snowstorm, the convoy reached the city on the 23rd November. Despite this success, the ice road was extremely dangerous. One-hundred and fifty-seven trucks were lost during the first crossing. Many divers kept their doors open to enable them to jump to safety, should a crack in the ice suddenly appear in front of their vehicle. Throughout the winter of 1941, the enemy put the supply route under heavy air and artillery attack, but were unable to halt the flow of traffic. Soviet fighter pilots flew overhead to protect the convoys from German air attack. By December 1941 over 4000 trucks and transport vehicles were bringing more than 700 tons of supplies into Leningrad on a daily basis.

As the road network developed, a support infrastructure had to be rapidly constituted. Tents were set up on the ice where people could warm up. In order to maintain traffic, twenty control points were also set up between 300 and 400 metres apart. By January 1942, there were seventy-five such points.

In response to the massive Soviet effort, the Germans dispatched ski patrols to try and ambush the Soviet supply columns. The Russians soon developed an effective remedy in the form of pillboxes made from ice, which they turned rock-hard by pouring water on them. With no protective cover, the ski patrols were shot down without difficulty. In addition to these defences, the Russians established 350 anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, supported by 200 searchlights to deter the Luftwaffe from strafing convoys. The crews were accommodated in igloos also on the ice.

Despite these supply routes, thousands of people in Leningrad starved over the winter. In December 1941, the city’s population was estimated at 2,280,000. By April 1942, it had fallen to 1,100,000. Whilst 440,000 of these people can be accounted for as having been evacuated, this still meant that over half a million people had starved by spring. Yet the city continued to withstand the siege. The lessons learnt in the winter of 1941 enabled the Russians to construct even better ice-roads in the winter of 1942. Without these ice roads, it is likely that the entire city would have starved to death. Their construction and maintenance was a powerful reminder of the Russian ability to innovate and use the hostile climate to their advantage over the German invader.

If you are interested in finding out more about the siege of Leningrad, have at look at these books;

Michael Jones, ‘Leningrad: State of Siege’ (London, 2008)

Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (London, 2007)

Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: a new history (London, 2001)

Martin Gilbert, The Second World War (Phoenix, 2000)

Military History and Warfare: The French and Indian War: Wolfe’s capture of Quebec 1759

2008-05-19T13:42:00.000-07:00

In 1759 thirty-two year English General James Wolfe successfully defeated the French General Montcalm. Quebec, France’s chief city in Canada was taken, radically altering the balance of power in North America. With the Seven Year’s war raging in Europe (known as the French and Indian war in the American colonies) and British command of the oceans, French possessions were vulnerable to British attack. Quebec itself sits on a rocky headland that rises hundreds of feet above the confluence of the St.Lawrence and St.Charles rivers. These formidable natural defences combined with a French garrison of 14,000 troops and 106 guns made the city one of the strongest fortified positions on the entire continent.

In February 1759, Wolfe returned from sick leave in England to command the attack on Quebec and St. Lawrence. He assembled his army at Louisburg, Nova Scotia. By May the British had collected a fleet of twenty-two ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates and an expeditionary army of 14,000 troops. It was crucial that the British complete the conquest before the freezing up of the St.Lawrence River. The French unleashed fire ships down the river into the advancing British fleet, but ignited them early so they were easily fended off. By July, Wolfe had occupied the Ile d’Orleans with 8,500 on the south of the river opposite Quebec. Montcalm believed that any attack would have to come from the east because the French navy maintained that the St.Lawrence river was not navigable beyond Quebec. He therefore constructed the majority of his defences in the east, digging trenches and building gun emplacements.

On the 31st July Wolfe attempted a direct assault across the river. This was repulsed with 500 casualties. Montcalm now feared the British would attempt a landing to the west of the city. He therefore despatched on of his commanders Bougainville, to patrol the area. In the meantime, Wolfe decided that his best chance of defeating the French and avoiding a lengthy siege, would be by drawing them out of the city and defeating them on an open battlefield. He decided to attempt a surprise night attack from the rear or upstream from the French defences. In the darkness of the night of 12th September Wolfe’s troops were carried by long boat past the besieged city. A French sentry noticed the dark shapes of the boats moving up the river and cried out:
“Que vive?” One Captain Donald Macdonald answered in faultless French, ‘La France’. Further bluffing by using the name of one of the French regiments stationed at Quebec, the sentry allowed the British boats to continue upstream.

The landing above Quebec, 13th September 1759

The British boats landed in a small bay called Anse de Foulon. This was the sole point at which the British could have gained access to the path that led to the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec. Montcalm had been aware of this Achilles heal and had stationed forty troops to protect the bay. Unfortunately, their commander had been so confident that the British would not land, that he had sent the men to help collect the harvest. By 4:00 am on September 13, the British had scaled the 175 foot cliffs, overcome minor resistance and assembled 4,500 British and American troops on the cliff top.

Upon seeing the enemy battalions, Montcalm decided to strike before the British had time to land additional troops and artillery needed to begin a formal siege. He marched 5000 men out of Quebec to give battle. Fearful of weakening the city’s defences, the governor of Quebec only allowed Montcalm to take three of the guns from the city’s ramparts. The British themselves had only been able to drag a light cannon up the cliffs. This battle would be decided purely by infantry. It was in this regard, that the British had a huge superiority in quality over the available French forces. Wolfe’s army consisted entirely of professionals. The redcoats were tough, disciplined and drilled to perfection. By contrast, Montcalm’s army was a mixture of regular troops and brigades of militiamen and Indian warriors. Although the core of Montcalm’s army at Quebec was a force of eight regular infantry battalions they had been badly worn down by constant campaigning and through being milked of men to serve in various garrisons.

Yet even the regular battalions available were diverse in quality. Before the start of the campaign, 600 French Canadian militiaman had been drafted into regular units in an attempt to bolster numbers and forge links between the French metropolitan troops and the Canadians. The Canadians had spent just three months with their units. This was inadequate time in which to master the parade ground drill and discipline required to stand steady amidst the close-quarter chaos of a infantry fire fight. Worse still, the best soldiers of the battalions – the grenadiers (who traditionally spearheaded attacks) were still off with Bougainville.

The battle began on the British left flank with a sharp shooting contest between the French skirmishers and British light infantry. The three French guns opened fire on the British centre and the French battalions began to advance. However, Montcalm’s regulars soon began to lose cohesion. The confusion increased as groups of skirmishers, who had been firing at Wolfe’s army for hours, attempted to fall back through the advancing units. More seriously, the Canadians recently incorporated into the regulars swiftly lost discipline. After firing, instead of maintaining formation and reloading their muskets, they threw themselves on the ground and refused to advance. The British withheld their fire until the French were within thirty-five yards. Then they fired one murderous volley, downing the first line of French. A second volley destroyed the French line and the British began to advance. The volleys continued as the British battalions moved steadily forward over the battlefield. Sustained musket fire had only lasted for six or seven minutes. When the fog began to clear, the French regulars could be seen retreating in panic. The redcoats fixed their bayonets and advanced.

Montcalm’s attack had been broken in a matter of minutes. Although the French regulars were shattered beyond rallying, the Canadian militia continued to fight. They staged a stubborn rearguard action, fighting with enough determination to halt the advance of the redcoats until reinforcements from the 58th Foot and Royal Americans forced them to withdraw. On the rightwing, Wolfe had led the Louisburg Grenadiers and 28th Foot. This was dangerously close to the Canadian marksman crouching in the bushes above the St.Lawrence. Early on in the action, Wolfe had been shot through the right wrist. He bound it up and continued. Soon afterwards he was struck again by a musket ball that the skinned the rim of his belly. He ignored the wound and continued to lead his men. The third wound was much more serious. Wolfe was struck simultaneously by two balls into his left breast. He fell out of the line and was carried back, dying shortly afterwards in the knowledge that he had won the battle. His opponent, Montcalm suffered a similar fate. He too was wounded and taken back to Quebec where he soon died. He was buried the next day in a hole in the earth dug by British shelling.

A highly dramatised portrait of Wolfe's death.

(Benjamin West)

After Wolfe was killed, his deputy Brigadier Townsend took command. He defeated an attack by Bougainville to his rear and by the afternoon of the 17th the Union Jack flew over Quebec. The remaining French forces surrendered the next day. In total, the British had lost 630 men to the French 830. The conquest of Canada assured British domination over the French in North America and brought British victory in sight in the French and Indian war. The battle on the Plains of Abraham demonstrated the importance of drill and parade ground discipline in contributing to victory on an eighteenth century battlefield.

If you are interested in reading further about the conquest of Canada, have a look at the books below.

Nigel Cawthorne, ‘History’s Greatest Battles’ (London, 2005)

Holger Herwig, Christian Archer, Timothy Travers, John Ferris, ‘Cassell’s World History of Warfare’ (London, 2003)

Stephen Brumwell, ‘Paths of Glory: the life and death of General James Wolfe (London, 2006)

‘Empires Collide: The French and Indian War 1754-63’ ed. Ruth Shepperd (Oxford, 2006)

Brendan Simms, ‘Three Victories and a Defeat: the rise and fall of the British Empire 1714-1783’ (London, 2007)

Military History and Warfare: The Zulu War 1879: The Battle of Isandlwana

2008-05-12T13:15:00.000-07:00

“I can’t understand it, I left a thousand men here” Lord Chelmsford, returning to Isandlwana following the battle.

The battle of Isandlwana is remembered as a classic example of the consequences of a well-armed European army underestimating its non-European opponents. In 1879, British Imperial forces under Lord Chelmsford crossed the border of the British colony at Natal into Zululand. Chelmsford’s advance did not proceed as quickly as he had hoped. Heavy rain had turned dirt tracks into mud and slowed down the advance of his columns. It was not until the 20th January, that he reached the forward slopes of the rocky outcrop known as Isandlwana. Immediately, patrols were sent out looking for the next viable campground. The British did not intend to stay long in the area and no attempts had been made to fortify any of the British camps. The absence of any serious opposition so far in the campaign encouraged a complacency amongst senior officers and soldiers alike.

By the time Chelmsford reached Isandlwana, he was anticipating a confrontation, but the prospect did not concern him. His greatest fear was that the Zulus would refuse to give battle directly, slip round his flank and attack Natal. Chelmsford therefore decided to seek out the enemy. He sent a strong patrol into the hills towards oNdini on 21st January. Part of the force ran into a group of Zulus, who fell back using the terrain and bush to prevent the British getting a good impression of their strength. Believing this to be the main Zulu army, Chelmsford ordered roughly half his force to march out from Isandlwana before dawn the next day to confront them. He left approximately 1,700 British troops and their African allies to guard the camp. Little did he realise that the force he had encountered were only stragglers. The main Zulu army had already moved across Chelmsford’s front, using the hills to avoid detection. While he spent the morning of 22nd January 12 miles away searching for the enemy, scouts from the Isandlwana camp stumbled across the main Zulu army of 20,000 concealed in a valley only five miles from the British camp. The encounter provoked the Zulus, who rose up and advanced rapidly towards the British position. The battle of Isandlwana had begun.

The Zulu kingdom had been built upon the conquests of their great King Shaka early in the nineteenth century. The army used sophisticated tactics and an advanced command system. Moving barefoot across country without the burden of supplies, Zulu forces were trained to forage for food. Their army was usually preceded by scouts and skirmishers who provided intelligence and masked their movements. Their traditional attack formation consisted of an encircling movement from both flanks, ‘the horns of the bull’. The ‘chest’ directly confronted the enemy centre, and a reserve force was kept in the rear. Warriors advanced towards the enemy at a steady pace, using any cover they could find. Once within range, they would loose their throwing spears or volley from their firearms and then charge the enemy position using their stabbing spears and shields. The Zulus did not take prisoners.

King Cetshwayo of the Zulus. Cetshwayo led his people through the British invasion and ruled from 1873-1879.

It was this highly trained force of Zulu 'impis' that the British encountered on the 22nd January 1879. Once again, misjudging the situation, the British believed they were facing nothing more than a local force and deployed their men in open order some distance from the camp. It was not until the entire Zulu army cam into view, cresting the entire range of the hills overlooking the camp, that the British realised how badly they had underestimated their opponent. Chelmsford had left Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine of the 1/24th in command of the camp. In addition to the 1700 men armed with the new Martini-Henry rifle, the British also had two 7-pound artillery cannons and reserves of one million rounds of rifle ammunition.

At the early stage of the battle the three Zulu regiments making up the main body, suffered from serious losses from the defenders’ sustained rifle fire. The officers and NCOs in the centre of the British front line controlled their men’s volley fire to the extent that the main Zulu attack faltered. However, on the left flank troops and artillery were being overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Commanding the left flank, Colonel Dunford realised that his men were running out of ammunition and sent several riders back to the camp with urgent requests for supplies. They were unable to locate their allocated supplies and returned empty handed. As ammunition was not forthcoming, Dunford requested a volunteer to warn Pulleine of the situation. With no volunteers forthcoming, Dunford had not choice but to withdraw back to the main camp. As Dunford ordered his men to retreat, G company’s position was left exposed. The company was swiftly overwhelmed by several thousand Zulus.

Right across the British line the defenders were beginning to run low on ammunition. Each infantryman at the start of the battle had been equipped with four packets of ten bullets each and a further thirty rounds loose in their canvas expense bags. Although supply commissars had been attempting to maintain sufficient supplies, after half an hour many soldiers began to yell for more ammunition. The ammunition boxes had a sliding lid that was secured by a single two inch screw. As screw-drivers were in short supply, lids were smashed open with rifle butt and rocks. However, this trickle of ammunition was not sufficient to meet the ever increasing demands that were now flooding in from all sections of the British line.

Meanwhile the Zulu attack in front of the camp had faltered. The Zulu commanders dispatched Chief Mkosona of the Ukhandempemuu regiment. His intervention got the attack moving again before he too was shot dead. Encouraged by his example, the entire Zulu centre suddenly rushed the thin line of British infantry. Even sustained volley fire could not stop such numbers of charging men. The Zulu left and right horns now joined up behind the British causing the column’s terrified cattle to rush through the wagon park and into the rear of the camp. British survivors from the centre fought their way back through to the wagon camp where they tried to form a defensive square. Very quickly, the camp transformed itself from a scene of peaceful activity to one of noise, gunfire, terror and confusion. The chaos was made worse by the lack of visibility. Isandlwana sits in a wide bowl surrounded by hills. Volley-fire would have created a thick hanging smokescreen between the British and the advancing Zulus.

Several groups of red-coated British soldiers fought their way out of the camp, but were soon caught and overwhelmed. Lieutenants Coghill and Melville of 1/24th are credited with the attempt to save the regimental colours. Both tried to cross the river at the same point, but Melville was thrown off his horse. Coghill went back to help him. They were then caught and killed by Zulus. Both men were honoured with posthumous VCs 28 years later in 1907.

In less than one hour, the battle of Isandlwana was over. The number of Zulu killed are unknown, but probably in the region of 3000. The Zulu plan had been brilliantly executed through rugged and harsh terrain. The British had seriously underestimated the Zulu ability to plan and coordinate a major attack. As a result they were annihilated. Beneath Isandlwana lay 52 officers, 810 white troops and 500 black troops of the British column. Less than 60 white troops escaped the slaughter. The failure to prepare adequate defences and overstretched and inadequate supply lines had all contributed to the British defeat. Although the British army was able to redeem itself shortly afterwards at Rorke’s Drift, the final invasion of Zululand was delayed for several months.

Saul David, Zulu: the Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879 (London, 2004)

David Rattray’s Guidebook to the Anglo-Zulu War Battlefields, ed. Dr. Adrian Greaves (Barnsley, 2003)

Ian Knight, Rorke’s Drift 1879 (Oxford, 1996)

Adrian Greaves, Crossing the Buffalo: the Zulu war of 1879 (London, 2005)

Adrian Greaves, Rorke’s Drift (London 2002)

Military History and Warfare: Byzantium: The Varangian Guard of Constantinople

2008-05-05T15:05:00.000-07:00

The Byzantine Empire employed mercenaries throughout its long history. Perhaps the most famous of these mercenary units were the elite Varangian Guard. Armed with double edged swords and battleaxes, these fearsome Nordic warriors served as the Emperor’s personal bodyguard from the tenth century onwards. Many different ethnic groups sought temporary employment in the empire and worked for the imperial administration or court in particular capacities. As the Empire’s reach expanded from the tenth century onwards, a larger orbit of regions and cultures became linked to it. Eventually, this would come to include Scandinavia and reach as far as Iceland.

The term ‘Varangian’ comes from an old Norse word meaning ‘plighted faith’ and was given to those Russianised Vikings whose forefathers had sailed across the Baltic and up the rivers of northern Russia, dominating the slav tribes of the interior as they advanced. They first appeared in Constantinople as a fighting unit sometime in 989 AD. The emperor Basil II was at war with the pretender Bardas Phocas. After inflicting a series of military defeats upon Basil, Bardas’ rebellion was seriously threatening Basil’s future as ruler. By 988, the rebel army lay encamped on the coast of the Bosphorous opposite Constantinople. Only constant active patrolling by the Imperial navy prevented Bardas from crossing the straits and finishing off the remnants of Basil’s army. Desperate for any kind of military assistance, Basil turned to Vladimir, Prince of Kiev. Vladimir agreed to dispatch a force of six thousand fully-equipped Varangian Vikings to assist Basil. In exchange he asked only for the hand of Emperor’s sister. Basil had no choice but to agree. This incident marked a major turning point both in Byzantine and Russian history. Never before had a full princess of the blood been sent off to marry a ‘barbarian’. Even more significantly, Anna’s arrival in Kiev marked the beginning of the conversion of Russia to Christianity.

In early 989 AD a Viking fleet arrived with the promised 6000 Norseman. A few weeks later they crossed the straits of the Golden Horn under the cover of darkness and took up positions a few hundred yards from the rebel camp. At first light they attacked, while a squadron of imperial flame-throwers sprayed the shore with Greek fire. Phocas’s men awoke to the terrifying sight of the Varangians swinging their swords and battleaxes. The result was a massacre. Basil with the aid of the Varangians soon crushed the rebellion entirely.

After the rebellion, the Varangians were immediately established as the emperor’s personal bodyguards. Anna Komnena writing in ‘the Alexiad’ claimed that the Guard were far more reliable and trustworthy as bodyguards than native Byzantine troops.

“They regard loyalty to the Emperors and the protection of their persons as a family tradition, a kind of sacred trust and inheritance handed down from generation to generation; this allegiance they preserve inviolate and never brook the slightest hint of betrayal”

Anna Komnena, a princess of their blood herself, knew the workings of the imperial household intimately. It is clear that she held the Guard in particularly high esteem.

Nevertheless, the Varangians were not always so infallible in their duties. In 1079, a drunken band of guardsman on duty in the palace attacked the Emperor Nikephoros III Botaniates. In 1204, when the armies of the Fourth Crusade were besieging the city, the Varangians agreed to fight for the new Emperor only on the condition that he paid them at an exorbitant rate.

The salary of the Varangians was in fact considerably higher than that of other mercenary troops. They seem to have received as much as ten to fifteen nomismata per month (one and two-thirds to two and a half pounds of gold per annum) as well as special gratuities and a large share of the booty taken on campaigns. These privileges reflect the importance that the emperors placed in having a reliable body of troops that he could always rely upon to guard his person. On many occasions it was the Varangians who proved the most reliable in battle.

an illumination of the Varangian Guard from the Chronicle of John Skylitzis in the eleventh century

At Manzikert in 1071, even after the left and right flanks of the Byzantine army had broken in disorder, the centre remained firm with the Varangians crowded around the emperor. In 1081, Alexius I used the Varangians as the core of his newly reconstituted Byzantine army. Finally in 1204, it was the axe-swinging Englishmen and Danes of the Varangian guards (rather than native troops) who beat back the first few waves of attacking crusaders, before being overwhelmed themselves.

One of the most famous Varangians was Harold Sigurthorson (also known as Hardrada). After leaving Norway in 1030 following the Battle of Sticklestand, where his brother King Olaf was killed, Harold found himself wondering in Russia. He eventually headed for Constantinople and enlisted with his followers in the Varangian guard. Harold took part in Byzantine campaigns in the Aegean, in Bulgaria and in Sicily. In recognition of his achievements, he was made a senior commander in the guard and invested by the emperor with the title of ‘Spathorokandidates’. By the time he left Constantinople in 1044, he had become a wealthy man. He eventually reclaimed his throne in Norway and died in 1066 Stanford Bridge leading an invasion of England.

The commander of the Guard was sometimes called the ‘the leader of the axe-bearing Guard’, but his official title was ‘Akolouthos’ or the Acolyte. This clearly illustrates the high regard and level of responsibility that the emperor placed in his senior Guards officers. After completing their period of service as guardsman, most went home with Byzantine arms, silks, weapons and distinctive clothing. According to the Laxdaela Saga, Bolli Bollason came back dressed in a gold embroidered costume with a purple cloak. As a result of these cross-cultural exchanges, Byzantine influence in Church architecture, manuscript illumination and ivory carving became widespread throughout Scandinavia. Runic stones were raised in memory of those who had travelled to Byzantium as merchants, pilgrims or mercenaries and their exploits are commemorated in Icelandic and Scandinavia sagas.

Towards the end of the eleventh century, the composition of the Guard began to change. In the first few decades following the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, a steady stream of Anglo-Saxon émigrés began to take service under the emperors of Constantinople. By 1204, it appears that many of the Guardsman were from England and Denmark. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the Varangian Guard unit continued after the first fall of Constantinople in 1204. For over two-hundred years, this unique and well-trained battle unit had served the Byzantine emperors and the Empire well. The recruitment of the Varangians, who often travelled great distances to join, is proof of the cosmopolitan nature of Constantinople during the early to mid medieval period.

John Jules Norwich, Byzantium: The Apogee (London, 2003)

John Jules Norwich, Byzantium: the Decline and Fall (London, 1996)

Ian Heath, Byzantine Armies 886-1118 (Oxford, 1979)

Jonathan Harris, Constantinople: Capital of Byzantium (London, 2007)

Judith Herrin, Byzantium: the surprising life of a medieval empire (London, 2007)

Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society (Stanford, 1997)

Anna Komnena, The Alexiad (available from Penguin Publishers)

Military History and Warfare: The Great Northern War: Swedish military organisation and victory at Narva 1700

2008-04-28T13:30:00.000-07:00

In the Spring of 1700, Sweden faced a war on two fronts. In 1699, Denmark, Saxony and Russia had signed a secret military alliance. Their goal was to attack the Swedish Empire, break her dominance of the Baltic and carve up her territories. The victories against Denmark and Russia in 1700 allowed Sweden to regain the initiative and take to the offensive against her enemies. The Battle of Narva on the 20th November 1700 was a stunning success for the Swedish army and clearly demonstrated what a well organised state could achieve despite limited resources. Swedish forces, outnumbered four to one, fought and defeated a Russian force besieging the town of Narva. Revisionist historians have tried to explain the Russian defeat as that of a smaller modern force against a much larger, ill-trained backward rabble. They argue that the Russian army was almost medieval in equipment and organisation in comparison to the Swedes. Recent studies of the Russian military reforms of Peter the Great have now made this position untenable. The Russian troops facing Karl XII of Sweden were largely veterans of Russia’s recent campaign against the Turks. In addition, the Russian government employed no fewer than 560 foreign officers as instructors in modern military doctrine. Arguably, the Russian defeat was not so much the fault of an inadequate Russian military as it was the superior Swedish army fielded by Karl XII. Whilst there were a number of factors involved in the Swedish army’s victory, the crucial factors were its superior tactics, organisation and the development of the Caroline military system upon which Sweden based its defences.

Portrait of Karl XII in 1700. He wore the simple uniform of a soldier for the rest of his life.

Sweden’s role as a great power in Europe occurred almost by accident. Having intervened in the Thirty Years War, Sweden found itself as the principal arbitrator in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Having already expanded into the Baltic region in the 1620s, Sweden acquired yet more land through its participation in the war and was afterwards expected to maintain the balance of power in Central and Northern Europe. Unfortunately, her newly acquired territories put her into contact with hostile neighbours who saw Sweden as an obstacle to their own expansion. With only a small population of 1.5 million and few natural resources (apart from timber and iron ore) the country was not well suited to the role thrust upon it at Westphalia. Wars against Denmark and Saxony in the latter half of the seventeenth century soon made it apparent that reform would be needed if Sweden were to survive as a major power in Europe.

These reforms were pushed through in 1680 when Karl XII’s father, Karl XI organised a ‘reduction’ of the total land held by the nobles of Sweden. Karl was able to reclaim a third of the lands held by the aristocracy for the crown and thus bring in an addition 4 million riksdaler to the treasury. By 1697, the national debt had been reduced from 40 million riksdaler to 10 million. These savings and additional revenue freed up resources for the state to construct a standing army and adequate civil service. Karl XI and his advisors organised a system known as the ‘indelningsverk’. Each province in the Swedish Empire would now be responsible for maintaining a certain number of regiments fixed size. Farms were grouped together in parts called ‘rota’. Each rota was required to provide and equip one soldier. Maintenance of cavalry units was organised on a similar basis. One or more prosperous farms made up a ‘rusthåll’ which supplied one or more cavalrymen. The system also provided incentives for farmers to enter the agreement by granted special tax privileges. Soldiers supported by these farms were obliged to work as farm hands when not at war or in training.

By 1697 this system provided 11 cavalry regiments and 23 infantry. This meant Sweden could rely upon a trained force of 11,000 horse and 30,000 infantry. Money saved by the system paid for an additional 25,000 mercenaries to be hired for overseas garrison duty. The navy was also increased to a total of 53,000 tons. A new naval base was constructed at Karlskrona in the south of Sweden, thus providing the fleet with an ice-free port earlier in the year than would otherwise be possible in Stockholm. The system therefore allowed for a trained standing army to be available at relatively little cost to the state. The indelningsverk was so successful that it remained in place until 1901.

When war erupted in 1700 there were therefore a clear organised system in place for rapidly mobilising Sweden’s defences. When Karl XII gave orders to mobilise the army, troops marched to clearly designated assembly points throughout the Empire. This allowed Karl to react quickly against multiple enemies. The Russians besieging Narva had expected Karl to be preoccupied with dealing with Denmark. By July 1700, the Danes had already been defeated and a Swedish army was being organised to relieve Narva. By the 19th November, Karl had successfully managed to transport an army of 10,000 men across the Baltic, march overland and engage the Russian army. This in itself was a great achievement given the logistical and administration difficulties which faced most armies in the late seventeenth-early eighteenth centuries.

Approaching the Russian encampment outside the besieged Narva, Karl could see that that the Russians had built a fortified camp. They had constructed earthern walls nine feet high behind six foot wide ditches. One hundred and forty cannon were mounted along the walls, supported by 26,000 infantry. The Russians also fielded another two infantry regiments, two regiments of dragoons and some 5000 assorted cavalry. There were also reports of Russian reinforcements approaching the area. Outnumbered nearly four to one, the situation was critical. Having been on the march for nearly a month, the Swedish army was also desperately low on supplies. The last of the bread rations had been given out four days before.

On the 20th November, Karl decided to attack. He had been raised with the Swedish style of aggressive warfare. The infantry were equipped with the best flintlock muskets in Europe. Their bayonets had a superior mount system to the majority of versions and each infantryman carried a sword which Karl had personally designed. Swedish tactics could be summarised by the phrase ‘Gå på!’. Loosely translated, this means ‘Up and at ‘em’. Swedish infantry were trained to charge across a battlefield and bring their opponent into hand to hand combat as quickly as possible. Once they had reached to within thirty yards of the enemy, they would fire a devastating musket volley before finally settling the matter with bayonets and swords. These tactics were employed at the Battle of Narva.

With over a hundred cannon facing them, as well as thousands of infantry, the potential for failure for the Swedes was high. However, just as the Swedish infantry were approaching the Russian lines, a blizzard broke out and began to blow into the faces of the Russians, blinding them. Within fifteen minutes the infantry were inside the entrenchments and the Swedish cavalry had seen off the Russian horse. Many of the Russians attempted to flee across the bridge over the River Narva. Unfortunately for them, the bridge collapsed under the combined weight of thousands of men and horses. The surviving Russians retreated to their supply camp where hundreds of wagons were parked. By dawn they too had surrendered and Karl found himself with more prisoners than he had troops. Disarming them, he kept the officers and sent the rest of the defeated Russians home.

Portrait of the defeated Russian prisoners surrendering their arms with heads bowed to Karl XII

The logistical success in mobilising the Swedish army was the direct result of the well-organised plan and administration established by Karl XI. The success of the Swedish army at Narva should be put down to the aggressive tactics and discipline of its troops as well as exemplary leadership from their King, Karl XII. It was these factors, combined with a degree of luck that made Sweden’s victory at Narva possible.

If you are interested in reading more about Swedish military history have a look at these books.

Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdstet, Per Iko, Ingvar Sjöblom, Gunnar Asellius, Svenska Slagfält (Värname, 2004)

Gary Dean Peterson, The rise of an Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: warrior Kings of Sweden (Jefferson, 2007)

Paul Douglas Lockhart, Sweden in the seventeenth century (Hampshire, 2004)

Michael Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718 (Cambridge, 1979)

Herman Lindqvist, A History of Sweden (Värnamo, 2006)

Military History and Warfare: World War II: The Soviet counter-offensive of December 1941

2008-04-20T15:04:00.000-07:00

The German invasion of the USSR in the summer of 1941 shattered the Red Army and drove deep into the Russian heartland. By October, the Wehrmacht had taken 2 million prisoners and destroyed thousands of enemy tanks and guns. Only 5% of the pre-invasion strength of Red army aviation in western Europe remained intact. On the 30th September the German high command launched Operation Typhoon, designed to take German forces all the way to Moscow. With winter approaching, it was crucial that the Wehrmacht capture Moscow and complete its campaign objectives. Field Marshal von Bock was given one and half million men to command as part of the offensive. He set the 7th November (the anniversary of the Russian revolution) as the date for the final surrounding of Moscow. Despite this apparently overwhelming strength, the sudden onset of winter and increased Russian resistance left the German army stranded 40 kilometres from the city. The Red army then launched a series of surprise counterattacks pushing the Germans back a hundred miles and saving Moscow. The traditional view of these events is that the sudden arrival of large numbers of reinforcements from Siberia turned the tide in favour of the Soviets. The reality was somewhat more complicated and involved a good deal more planning from the Soviet Stavka at this early stage of the Russian campaign than historians generally give credit for.

At first the Soviet leadership refused to acknowledge the scale of the German offensive in October 1941. On the 5th October, a fighter pilot reported a column of German panzers a dozen miles in length not more than a hundred miles from Moscow. Two more pilots were sent on reconnaissance flights before the Stavka decided to take action. With Moscow itself now under threat a quarter of a million civilians marched out to dig anti-tank trenches (these scenes would be repeated in Berlin three and half years later as the Red Army approached). On the night of the 15th October, foreign embassies were told to prepare to leave for Kuybyshev on the Volga. A state of siege was declared on the 19th October and foot rioting, looting and drunkardness soon followed. Fear that the capital was about to be abandoned provoked thousands to try and get out, flooding the train stations. Stalin’s security chief Beria was forced to bring in several regiments of NKVD troops into the city to restore order. By late November, a force of 65,000 troops had been assembled to defend the city of Moscow proper. These units included people’s militia, destroyer detachments and two NKVD divisions. The city’s defences consisted of three defence lines. Within the city centre a complex system of barricades and defence belts were manned by internal security forces.

Operation Typhoon began well for the German army with its usual combination of rapid movement and encirclement of Russian troops. German forces had been advancing continuously for nearly four months. Many of the troops were exhausted and much of their equipment needed to be repaired or replaced. The resistance of the Red Army was also stiffening. Groups of Russian soldiers continued to fight despite being cut off and surrounded in pockets. However, it was the weather that played the crucial role in slowing down the German advance. By the middle of October the rain had turned dirt roads into mud and made progress in vehicles extremely slow in certain areas. German ration trucks could not get through in some places, so farm carts had to be commandeered from local agricultural communities. Despite these setbacks German troops managed to reach the outskirts of Moscow by the end of November. To the north of the city, they were close enough to be able to see the muzzle flashes through their binoculars of the anti-aircraft batteries protecting the Kremlin. This was to be the limit of their advance. Russian resistance as well as sheer exhaustion of the Wehrmacht had ground German forces to a halt. Many units were reduced to half strength. In a last ditch effort at the end of November, Field Marshal von Kluge sent a force up the road to Moscow. The incredible cold and furious resistance of Russian troops ended the German assault. German forces were pulled back slightly and fighting seemed to draw to a standstill. By the beginning of December, Field Marshal von Bock had to admit that the window of opportunity for taking Moscow had been and gone for 1941.

During October and November the Soviet high command (the ‘Stavka’), had thrown forces into new defensive lines in the hope of wearing down the German army. At the beginning of November, the Stavka began contemplating a major strategic counter-offensive operation. Its objectives would be threefold. Firstly to eliminate the exposed German salients on both sides of Moscow, secondly to force the front line back and thirdly to encircle and defeat the German army decisively. Intelligence reports from the Soviet agent Richard Sorge in Tokyo had confirmed that the Japanese would be attacking America in the Pacific, rather than join in the German attack on the USSR from the far east. This allowed Stalin to redeploy those divisions based in Siberia.

The Siberian divisions are often regarded as being the primary ‘reserve’ forces of the Red army available at this time. It is important not to over exaggerate the contribution of these forces in comparison to the overall numbers of new divisions the Soviets had managed to raise since the initial invasion in June. The Germans had calculated that the USSR could raise another 300 divisions. This was based on the assumption that two divisions could be made up per million people of the total population. This calculation proved disastrously incorrect. By December, twice that number had been raised. There were 285 rifle divisions, twelve reformed tank divisions, 88 cavalry divisions, 174 rifle and 193 tank brigades available to the Red Army by the 31st December 1941. After the disasters of the summer, the Soviets had moved 70 divisions from the interior Military Districts and raised an additional 194 divisions and 94 brigades. The total number of forces brought from the Far East was therefore only a relatively small force of only 27 divisions. Crucially however, the Siberian units were of far greater quality than the majority of the newly raised divisions of the Red army. The Siberian forces consisted of ski-troop battalions and were natural hunters and skilled shots (much like the Finns in the Winter war of 1940). With temperatures falling to –20C (-4F), their ability to fight in the snow and use it as tactical advantage would prove crucial in defeating the Germans.

Russian ski-troops during the counter-offensive

In addition, German forces were not prepared for a winter campaign. Their equipment began to freeze, jamming weapons and forcing troops to light fires underneath tanks and aircraft in order to defrost them for use. Their supply lines were now thousands of miles into Russia. For the first time since June, the Soviets had the advantage in men and equipment. 1,700 new T-34s were brought up by the Red army for the counter-offensive. The T-34 tanks had broad enough tanks to cope with the snow and ice and were more mobile compared to the German Panzer mark IV. Soviet Infantry were equipped with padded jackets and white camouflage suits. Unlike their German counterparts, Soviet infantry had been given cases to protect the metal parts of their machine guns and rifles from freezing in the cold.

On the 5th December, General Koniev attacked the outer edge of the German north salient. Four armies commanded by Zhukov and Rokossovsky were hurled against the inner side of the salient. To the south of Moscow, German forces were attacked from different directions. The offensive centred on a sector from Kalin, 170 kilometres north of Moscow to Yelets, 350 kilometres in the south. The total frontage extended to 1,000 kilometres. Red army cavalry divisions ranged deep behind German lines, attacking supply depots. German forces were driven back as far as a hundred miles in some places. For the first time, Wehrmacht forces found themselves trapped in pockets as Hitler refused to order a retreat. By mid December, Soviet forces had recaptured Tula, Ryazan, Rostov, Kalin and Smolensk, Orlov and Kursk. Moscow had been saved and the Germans had suffered their first land defeat since the war had begun in 1939. Although the Germans managed to re-establish a stable line and the Soviets had failed to capitalise on their success, it was the first signs that the Red army would become the first class fighting force that would go on to take Berlin in 1945.

Ian Kershaw, Fateful choices: ten choices that changed the world 1940-1941 (London, 2007)

Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (London, 2007)

Antony Beever, Stalingrad (London, 1998)

Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: a new history (London, 2001)

Martin Gilbert, The Second World War (Phoenix, 2000)

Military History and Warfare: 55 days at Peking: the Seige of the Foreign Legations

2008-04-14T13:26:00.000-07:00

During the summer of 1900 full-scale warfare erupted in China triggered by the emergence of the Boxer movement as a force of popular resistance against the encroaching foreign powers. The ‘Boxers United in Righteousness’, as they called themselves, began to emerge in the northwest Shandong province in 1898. They drew their name and their martial rites from a variety of secret society and self-defence units that had spread from the southern Shandong during the previous years. Some Boxers believed they were invulnerable to swords and bullets in combat and they drew upon spirits and protectors from popular myths and folk beliefs. They aimed to rid China of all foreign influence and as such were responsible for the murder of Christian missionaries, Chinese converts as well as the destruction of Western owned property.

By May 1900, groups of Boxers were appearing on the streets of Peking. On the last day of the month an international force of 365 marines reached Peking with troops from the United States, Britain, Russia, Italy, France and Japan. Two weeks later the Boxers entered the city, destroying most of the foreign-owned buildings that were not within the protective zone of the foreign legations. The city’s Roman Catholic Church was burnt to the ground and Chinese Christians living near it were murdered. By June the threat to foreigners was so series that Britain sent a force of 2000 men under Admiral Seymour to protect the legations in Peking. However, the Boxers cut the Tianjin-Peking railway line and forced Seymour to withdraw. In retaliation the Western powers seized the coastal Degu forts.

Intent on frightening the representatives of the foreign powers in Peking into submission, the Chinese government sent word that a Boxer force of 80,000 men would attack the legations on the 27th June. The legation ministers were informed on the 19th that all foreigners were to leave to leave the city by 4:00 pm the next day as their safety could no longer be guaranteed. On the 20th June the German minister, Baron von Kettler was assassinated in the street. His murder convinced the other ministers that staying in the capital was safer than heading south in open country with limited protection. At 4:00 pm the Chinese opened fire on the Legation Quarter marking the opening shots of a siege that was to last for the next 55 days.

Despite being heavy outnumbered, the foreign nationals in the legations quickly drew up plans for the defence of their compound. 8000 bushels of new wheat recently brought from Human were found in a shop on the corner of legation street. The ministers elected the British Minister to take overall command of the available legation forces. Sir Claude Macdonald had started his career as a solder serving in Khartoum before eventually becoming a diplomat. His military background made him the natural choice for leadership of the legations. However, the forces available to him were limited. From the end of May 1900 until the 14th August, the garrison consisted of little more than 400 marine guards. There were 82 officers and men from Britain, 81 from Russia, 35 from Austria-Hungary, 48 Frenchman, 51 Germans, 53 Americans, 29 Italians and 25 Japanese. In addition, the North Cathedral (the ‘Peitang’) was protected by small force of 42 French and Italian marines along with 13 French fathers, 20 sisters and 3,200 Chinese converts. A group of civilian volunteers, calling themselves ‘Thornhill’s Roughs’ also served on the barricades.

Apart from rifles and personal firearms, the only major weaponry available was an Austrian Maxim gun, a British Nordenfelt gun, a 1-pdr quick-firing gun supplied by the Italian contingent and an American colt machine gun. On the 7th July an 1860 vintage British 3 inch calibre smoothbore gun was discovered in an old junk shop. The Italians provided a 1-pdr mount and the Russians supplied some shrapnel and common shell for ammunition that had initially been discarded down a well. The shells were recovered, dried and used as ammunition throughout the battle. Two American marines volunteered to fire the gun.

From the outset of the battle, a major consideration was the difficulty of defending the large perimeter of the foreign compounds with the limited resources available. It was therefore decided to move all civilians (apart from the defenders of the Peitang Cathedral) into the British Legation, which was the largest and commanded a good field of fire for the defenders. The British compound consisted of 3 acres and normally housed around 60 people. It became the central redoubt of the defence with loopholes, sandbagged emplacements on the walls and a barricade at the gateway with space for 900 combatants and civilians, along with sheep, horses and other animals that were gradually slaughtered as the food supply began to shrink. To improve the field of fire, Chinese houses around the Legation were burnt, along with the Belgian, Austrian, Dutch and Italian Legations which were deemed indefensible. For the first ten days following the start of the siege the Foreign Legation compound and Peitang Cathedral faced constant attacks from Boxer fanatics, whilst the Chinese government and its army stood on the sidelines.

The walls of the Tarter City presented a constant problem for the besieged as it directly overlooked the Legation quarter and offered the Chinese an excellent sniping position. On June 23rd, American marines charged along part of the wall clearing the enemy almost as far as the burnt-out Ch’ien Men gate. The next day, the Americans started to construct a barricade but were forced to retreat. German defenders were also pushed back on the 1st July, but a precarious position on the wall was held. The defenders managed to maintain their positions between the Chien Men and Hatu Men gates throughout the siege.

As the fighting continued it quickly became clear that the Imperial Army had now been committed to support the Boxers. A heavy bombardment continuously rained down on the Legation quarter, where living conditions began to grow steadily worse. ‘Bomb proofs’ were constructed as shelter from the incoming shelling. However, on the 14th July, the Chinese attached a sheet of paper to a bridge announcing in large letters by telescope that they had received orders to protect the foreign ministers. The Chinese had called a truce at the very moment that they could have taken the Legation Quarter. The garrison was losing men and ammunition at an alarming rate. It is likely that the Chinese were aware of the increasingly difficult situation inside in the foreign compound. Aware of the recent success of the allied relief forces on the coast, the Chinese decided to make friendly overtures. A small supply of melons, vegetables and other food was sent into the allied quarter. The truce allowed the besieged to replenish their food supplies and husband their remaining strength. More fruit was sent in on the 25th July by order of the Empress Dowager.

During the truce period the Chinese continued to build fortifications, including a six-foot barricade over a bridge at the foot of the Imperial City wall just north of the British Legation. The Chinese also continued mining operations in an attempt to undermine the foreign defences. On the 29th July fighting re-erupted as the Chinese attempted a final effort to break the morale of the defenders. Fortunately for the besieged, a letter arrived on the 2nd August from Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Mallory of the 41st US infantry stating that a combined allied relief column of 10,000 men was on its way to Peking.

During the latter part of the siege, the intensity of the fighting varied depending upon different parts of the perimeter. Those manning the Fu and opposite the Mongol Market, or on the West part of the wall held by the French were subject to steady Chinese rifle and artillery fire. By contrast, the German sector on the eastern part of the seemed to be much quieter. It was only during the final days of the siege that Chinese attacks became as intense as they had been in early July. On the 13th August the Chinese launched six separate attacks on the western part of the compound. The attacks were repulsed with the help of the Nordenfelt and Maxim guns. On the 14th August, Indian troops from the British army finally entered Peking. They were the first units of the allied relief expedition to arrive. American, Russian, Japanese and Italians troops all arrived on the 14th lifting the siege. The French were delayed by a day as a result of increased Chinese resistance.

The besieged in the Legation quarter had sustained a robust defence during the 55 days since July. Thanks in part to the well constructed barricades and defences, casualties had been surprisingly low. The civilian volunteers had lost 67 killed or died from wounds and 167 wounded. The eight nation marine force had lost four officers and 40 men killed with nine officers and 136 men wounded. This represents roughly a third of the serviceman available at the beginning of the siege. Of the 42 Italian and French sailors who had helped to defend the Cathedral, six Italians and four Frenchman (along with their officer) were killed as well as a one officer and 11 men wounded.

Martin Gilbert, History of the Twentieth Century (London, 2001)

Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York, 1999)

J.A.G. Roberts, A History of China (Harvard, 1999)

Peter Harrington, Peking 1900: Boxer Rebellion (Oxford, 2001)

Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution 1895 – 1949 (Abingdon, 2005)

Military History and Warfare: The Mongol Invasion of Europe: the battles of Liegnitz and the Sajo River

2008-04-07T13:59:00.000-07:00

In the late 1230s Mongolian forces began a series of invasions which extended their empire to the frontiers of Christendom. In December 1237, an army led by Genghis Khan’s grandson Batu Khan attacked the city of Rizan, storming it after only a five-day siege. Having subdued much of western Russia by 1241, Batu Khan prepared a three-pronged attack against Poland, Hungary and Romania.

By the mid-thirteenth century the Mongol Empire covered a landmass stretching from China to the outskirts of Poland. Mongol military success had been a combination of mobility, tactics and the high quality of the Mongol warrior and mount. Mongol armies were based around a core group of light and heavy cavalry organised on the decimal system. The largest tactical formation was the ‘tuman’ consisting of 10,000 warriors. Three tumans usually constituted a Mongol army. The tuman was made up of ten regiments (‘minghans’) of 1,000 men. Each regiment contained ten squadrons ‘jagun’. The jagun was subdivided into ten troops called arbans. In comparison to western forces available at this time, the Mongol army was an extremely well organised fighting force. By dividing the army into smaller units, the Mongols gained tactical flexibility which allowed them to take full advantage of the speed of their horses, inflict devastating attacks and then disappear quickly into the grasslands. Time and time again, the Mongol system of warfare proved itself superior to that of its opponents.

The typical Mongol army was largely cavalry based, consisting of about 60 percent light cavalry and 40 percent heavy cavalry. Both units were crucial to Mongol strategy. Mongol light cavalry performed reconnaissance roles and acted as a screen for the heavy cavalry. These light horseman were armed with two composite bows, (one for long distance, the other for short), two or three javelins and a lasso. The heavy cavalry were equipped with a 12ft lance along with sabre for hand to hand combat.

It was this highly organised fighting force that prepared to conquer Europe in 1241. In Poland, the northern army under Batu’s lieutenants Baider and Kedan sacked and burned Krakow on Palm Sunday 1241. Ignoring Breslau, they converged on Liegtnitz, where Henry, duke of Silesia had assembled an impressive force to bar the way into the Holy Roman Empire. Henry’s forces consisted of military order contingents of Teutonic, Templar and Hospitaler knights. They were supported by Polish and German lay knights and thousands of infantry.

When the Mongols approached Henry’s forces at Liegnitz on the morning of the 9th April 1241 with a screen of light cavalry. Henry ordered his heavy cavalry to charge, only to have it beaten back by successive waves of Mongol arrows. Henry pushed forward the attack and ordered all his remaining cavalry forward. However, this time the Mongol light cavalry turned and took flight. The Europeans pursed them only to find that the Mongols had wheeled their far more agile horses round and resumed their arrow bombardment. The Christian knights lost their cohesion and began to be picked off by Mongol archery. In the meantime, other Mongol troops had started a fire, setting up a smoke screen between Henry’s infantry and the now-trapped cavalry. The Mongol heavy cavalry and horse archers emerged from the smoke and completely routed Henry’s infantry. Henry himself was killed trying to flee the battlefield.

After the battle, the Mongols cut off an ear from every fallen Christian warrior to make an accurate body count. Nine bags of ears were eventually sent to Batu as tribute.

Whilst the northern Mongol force pillaged Poland, Batu Khan’s central army moved across the Carpathian Mountains and into the Hungarian plain. The Hungarian king Bela IV had prepared for the invasion by collecting a huge army (by medieval standards) of 80,000 men. On the morning of the 10th April, the Mongols rode over the heath and crossed the only stone bridge over the Sajo River. The next day, Bela’s forces arrived and searched through the woods for signs of the Mongolian army. Finding nothing, they returned to guard the bridge whilst the remainder of the Hungarian army made its camp on the heath to the rear. During the night, Batu ordered Subutai to take 30,000 cavalry through the hills and quickly construct a wooden bridge across the Sajo beyond the sight of Bela’s forces. Batu intended to engage the Hungarian front, whilst Subutai secretly moved into position and attacked in the rear.

The battle itself began just before dawn on the 11th April when Batu ordered cavalry attacks against the stone bridge held by Bela’s men. The bottleneck of the bridge gave the Hungarians the strategic advantage and the Mongols were unable to break through. It was at that crucial moment that the Mongol flair for military innovation revealed itself. Batu solved the problem by bringing up seven light catapults and bombarded the far side of the bridge with incendiaries and grenades. Confused and stunned by the tactical use of artillery, the Hungarian forces panicked and withdrew from the bridge. Batu then used the catapults to lay down a form of ‘rolling barrage’ to screen his troops as they crossed the bridge. In desperation, Bela launched wave after wave of his heavy cavalry in a concerted attempt to break through the Mongol lines.

Just as it appeared that the Hungarians might succeed, Batu ordered his troops to stretch out into a half circle as if to surround the Christian troops. Suddenly Subotai arrived on the battlefield with his 30,000 fresh cavalry in a matching half-circle behind the defenders. Hungarian morale plummeted as they found themselves trapped on all sides. Those that managed to flee the battlefield were cut down by Mongol cavalry as they ran. By the evening, Christian dead littered thirty miles of road leading out of the battlefield. Conservative estimates place the number of Hungarian dead at 60,000.

Both the battles of Liegnitz and Sajo River illustrated the Mongol use of combined arms tactics, along with stealth, speed and surprise. Mongol discipline and the ability of commanders to manoeuvre large units during an engagement, contrasted deeply with the highly individualistic mode of warfare practised by western knights.

Over the months that followed the Mongols ravaged most of the lowland parts of the Hungary, reaching as far as the Dalmatian coast. The probable population loss has been estimated at 15-20%. Had the Mongols pressed on westwards beyond Hungary and Poland, it is unlikely that they would have encountered co-ordinated opposition. Contemporary annalists report panic as far away as Spain and the Netherlands. Given the relative ease with which the Mongols had smashed their way into Europe, it was almost miraculous that they did not continue their campaign of conquest into the rest of Europe.

There are of course possible explanations for the Mongol retreat. In December 1241 the Great Khan Ogodai died, prompting a succession crisis in the Mongol empire. By the summer of 1242, Mongol forces had withdrawn from Poland and Hungary. Batu’s attention now shifted eastwards to enable him to keep a watchful eye should one of his enemies be elected qaghan (Khan) of the Mongols. There were also sound logistical reasons for withdrawal. Mongol armies required a great deal of land for their large numbers of horses to graze upon. The Dalmatian coastlands were ill-adapted to Mongol cavalry operations. The chronicler Thomas of Spalato confirms this by expressly mentioning that the Mongol general Quadan took with him only a fraction of his contingent in view of the fact that the region afforded little grass in early March. Logistically, the Hungarian plain would have been inadequate to sustain the large occupying Mongol armies. They accordingly pulled back to the more spacious grasslands of the Pontic steppe.

Although the Mongols returned several times over the years that followed, Europe was largely spared the fate of Central Asia. Nevertheless, it is clear from the battles of Liegnitz and Sajo River that the Mongols possessed one of the finest fighting forces in the history of the world. It was therefore very fortunate for Christendom that the Mongols never again came so close to annihilating medieval Europe.

Brian Todd Carey, Joshua B Allfree, John Cairns Warfare in the Medieval World (Barnsley, 2007)

Malcolm Barber, The Two Cities: Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (London, 2007)

Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Edinburgh, 2005)

Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War (Barnsley, 2007)

John H. Mundy, The High Middle Ages 1150-1309 (London 1998)

Military History and Warfare: World War I: Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck: Germany’s colonial guerrilla warrior?

2008-03-31T14:22:00.000-07:00

On 2nd March 1919 the Germans who had returned from East Africa marched through the Brandenburg gate to be greeted by members of Germany’s new post war government. A victory parade was held in their honour and their commander, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was awarded the ‘pour le merite’. Unlike the rest of the German army, von Lettow and his ‘Schutztruppen’ had avoided defeat and only surrendered when news of the armistice finally arrived from Europe on the 25th November 1918. When the First World War broke out in 1914, the German army in East Africa numbered only 218 Europeans and 2,542 askaris, divided into fourteen field companies. Cut off from Germany, von Lettow was almost entirely reliant on what he could get from within the colony. The German commander never had more than 15,000 soldiers whereas the Allies eventually fielded a force of 160,000 men in an effort to pin down and destroy the German presence in East Africa. Beyond his own country, von Lettow came to be venerated as a master of guerrilla warfare. The origins of this interpretation lie with the South Africans who had fought him in 1916. The Boers among them, sensitive to their own performance in the Boer war fifteen years earlier, were happy to accept the notion that they had influenced von Lettow’s strategic outlook. As a result of these ideas as well as the protracted length of the campaign, East Africa has received more attention than the other sub-Saharan theatres of World War I.

Von Lettow surveying British troop movements on the Kilomanjaro front, March 1916.

From the outset, the British had the military advantage with control of the sea and larger military forces. However, they received a severe blow when a British and Indian force failed to capture the port of Tanga in November 1914. There was serious fighting in the Kilomanjaro region and German flying columns damaged the Uganda railway. However, by early 1916, the Germans had been forced to retreat south towards the central railway line. Von Lettow managed to stage a tactical retreat into southern Tanganyika, always one step ahead of Allied attempts to trap his forces. Although outright victory was never a possibility for the dwindling German forces, von Lettow hoped to force the British to commit disproportionate forces to pursue him and thereby keep those forces away from other fronts in the war.

Despite how he is remembered, arguably von Lettow was never really a practitioner of guerrilla warfare in mindset nor tactics. Had he truly adopted the tactics of the guerrilla, considerably more could have been achieved in disrupting the Allied colonies in East Africa. From the outset of war, von Lettow’s own operational priorities remained those of the classic German military doctrine in which he had been trained. Professor Hew Strachan argues that von Lettow’s memoirs contain no theory relevant to the guerrilla. Instead they illustrate his desire for ‘envelopment, encirclement and the decisive battle’. His own instinct was to give battle rather than shy away from it. This he did on several occasions. However, it should be remembered that fighting for fighting’s sake both depleted his ammunition and endangered the lives of the irreplaceable European officer and non-commissioned officers that formed the core of von Lettow’s army.

Von Lettow himself was critical of those subordinate commanders who did exercise a form of guerrilla warfare. In January 1917, Max Wintgens led his column across the Allied lines of communications, and up to the central railway near Tabora. Wintgens sick with typhus, surrendered on 21 May, but Heinrich Naumann, his successor, held out until 2nd September. This was a classic guerrilla operation. Naumann’s men marched 3,200km between February and September. They had operated behind Allied line and drawn up to 6000 men away from the main battle. Von Lettow criticised the operation for undermining the principle of concentration of forces. Such independence smacked of insubordination rather than initiative.

It was only with von Lettow’s entry into Portuguese territory that his style of operations began to conform with that that of a guerrilla leader. His supply position had forced him onto the defensive. He fought to feed his troops and subsequently, the war in East Africa became one of movement as the Germans searched for fresh sources of supply with the British in hot pursuit. At Ngomano on 25th November 1917, the Germans surprised 1,200 Portuguese troops and captured 600 rifles and 250,000 rounds of ammunition. Three more forts were taken in December, and the Schutztruppen were able to keep themselves supplied. Von-Lettow and his column were successfully able to exploit the weakness of Portugal’s colonial administration and poor military organisation.

Nevertheless, this incursion into Portuguese territory could be viewed as a lost opportunity to wage a much larger war against the Allies than von Lettow and his forces could have waged on their own with the limited resources available. Portugal’s major concern was with the internal order of its colony. The northern regions had never properly been pacified, and in the south the Makombe in Zambezia rose in revolt in March 1917. The Portuguese turned Ngoni auxiliaries onto the Makombe and suppressed the rising by the end of 1917. The Portuguese condoned inter-tribal fighting and slavery as a means to retain control of the region. However, von Lettow did not fan these flames for his own ends. Whilst marching through the area he paid for goods with worthless paper currency and German doctors attended to the sick. But he continued to regard Africa and Africans as neutral bystanders in a wider conflict.

Von Lettow justified his entire campaign in terms of the number of Entente soldiers committed to the East Africa theatre. Almost 160,000 British and Belgian troops, including naval forces were engaged during the course of the war against the Schutztruppen. However, few of these if any would have been available for the western front. British policy was that by and large, Africans should take the burden for fighting the land campaign in the African colonies. Von Lettow’s real diversionary achievement was to be measured in the maritime, rather than land effects. In 1917/18, with U-boat warfare at its height, the length of the voyage round the Cape to Dar es Salaam tied up merchant vessels on long-haul voyages where they were desperately needed elsewhere. The need for more ships, rather than to defeat von Lettow, underpinned British war policy against the remaining the remaining German African colonies.

When von Lettow and his men finally surrendered at Abercorn at the end of November 1918, he still had a fighting force of 155 Europeans and 1,156 African askaris armed with thirty-seven machine guns, 1,071 British and Portuguese rifles and 208,000 rounds. The real restraint on what could have been achieved by those forces lay not in the possible efforts of the Allies, but in von Lettow’s own reluctance to embrace a more revolutionary strategy. Had von Lettow considered using local political difficulties to his advantage than perhaps the war in East Africa might have been a much larger headache for the Allies. Instead it turned into a case of chasing the Germans across the continent after the German colony itself was overrun in November 1917. Nonetheless, Von Lettow was without doubt an officer of resource and determination. His Schutztruppen were the embodiment of the German army’s own notion of invincibility, leadership and determination against all the odds. However, he remained an old-school soldier trained in the manner of the German General staff. His attitude and tactics clearly demonstrate that von Lettow was no guerrilla fighter.

Hew Strachan, The First World War’ (London, 2003)

Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford, 2004)

Edward Paige, Tip and Run’ (London, 2007)

Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global history (Harvard, 2006)

David Killingray, ‘The War in Africa’ in the Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War ed. Hew Strachan (Oxford, 1998)

Military History and Warfare: 'Kolberg' - A Nazi Epic

2008-03-24T06:27:00.000-07:00

On 30 January 1945 ‘Kolberg’ premiered simultaneously in bomb ravaged Berlin as well as to the besieged sailors and soldiers surrounded at La Rochelle in western France. ‘Kolberg’ was the last major film of the Third Reich and told the story of siege the East Prussian town by Napoleon’s forces in 1807. Involving entire army units as extras and with a budget of eight and half million Reichsmarks, it was also the most expensive film the Nazi regime ever produced.

As a result of policies brought into force in February 1942, the entire German film industry was put under the ownership of a government holding company. Film distribution was centralised and ownership of theatres was severely restricted. At the same time, the Ministry of Propaganda took complete control of film content whilst film critics were given clear instructions as to how films should be reviewed.

On 1 June 1943 Goebbel’s wrote to the leading film director Veit Harlan as follows:

“I hereby instruct you to produce a major film ‘Kolberg’. The aim of the film is to demonstrate on the basis of the example of the town which give the film its title that a nation which is united at home and at the front can overcome any enemy”

At the beginning of the war, Goebbels had insisted upon the production of documentaries that chronicled German military successes. However, by 1942 the reversals on the Eastern Front and the entry of the Americans into the war meant that these kinds of films were no longer possible. Goebbels resigned himself to the production of entertainment films arguing that occasional escapes from the realities of the home front would prepare the German people for a war of attrition that lay ahead.

The story of the heroic decisions of the town of Kolberg to resist the French invasion despite the surrender of the local government authorities, appealed to the Reich propaganda minister who saw it as useful in rallying the German people should the German army be forced onto the defensive.

‘Kolberg’ falls into the category of propaganda film which was direct and involved historic individuals and events designed to carry a message about the current situation. Goebbels had previously commissioned ‘The Great King’ (Der Grosse Konig) about Frederick the Great of Prussia triumphing against all the odds through raw determination during the Seven Years war.

A small sample of the dialogue between the mayor of Kolberg and the garrison commander Gneisenau reveals the running theme of the film;

“No we’re not going to give up now. And even if we have to dig our nails into the grounds of our town, we’re not going to give up…I’d rather be buried…than surrender. Gneisenau, Gneisenau, I have never bent my knee before to anybody. But I’m doing it now, Gneisenau. Kolberg must not be surrendered, Gneisenau!”

It is especially fascinating to consider the sheer amount of effort that went in to making the film at a time when resources were growing increasingly scarce. Goebbels made it clear from the start of the production that the unconditional support of the Wehrmacht was expected. As such, 180,000 soldiers were diverted from the front at a time when Soviet forces were about, or towards the end of the shooting had already crossed into East Prussia. Despite a shortage of ammunition on the Eastern front, factories worked overtime to produce blank bullets for the film. Goebbels clearly saw this film as a work that future generations of Germans would go to see and regard as an expression of the resilience and success of the Nazi regime.

In spite of logistical difficulties, shooting started in the actual location of the city in East Prussia. The film was shot in expensive Agfacolour film with more than 3000 metres and 110 metres length. By the end of the shooting, ninety hours of unedited footage had been collected. Putting the film together was a painstaking process at the UFA studios of Neudabelsberg in Berlin. Editing of the film took place at a time when the city had been paralysed by air-raids and resources of any kind were difficult to obtain. Despite these problems, the film appeared in UFA’s progress report of autumn 1944 as having entered the last stages of production and would be ready for release by November 1944. Goebbels postponed the film’s release until he had had a chance to personally review the material. He asked for a shortening of the battle sequences in favour of more character development. As a result the film was only ready for release in January of 1945 when few German cities still actually possessed functioning cinemas. Ironically by this stage, the town of Kolberg itself was about to fall into the hands of the Soviets.

The production and release of ‘Kolberg’ summarise the total loss of contact with reality which became the most prominent feature of the Nazi leadership and Hitler and Goebbels in particular during the final months of the war. Director Viet Harlan later summarised his own views on the motivation of the regime in releasing such a film so near the end;

“Hitler as well as Goebbels must have been obsessed with the idea that a film like this could be more useful to them than even a victory in Russia. Maybe they too were now just waiting for a miracle. And what better way to make miracles than to utilise the ‘dream factory’ that is film.”

Nazism 1919-1945, vol.4 ‘The German Home Front’ in World War II, ed. Jeremy Noakes (Exeter, 1998)

Aristole A. Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War (New York, 2005)

Scott Spector ‘Was the Third Reich Movie-Made?’ Interdisciplinority and the Reframing of Ideology” in The American Historical Review vol. 106, No.2 (April 2001)

David Weinberg, ‘Film in the Third Reich’ in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.19, No.1 in Historians and Movies: The State of the Art Part 2 (Jan. 1984)

Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London, 2001)

Military History and Warfare: World War II: Why did the German Ardennes offensive of 1944 fail to achieve its goals?

2008-03-17T14:05:00.000-07:00

The Ardennes offensive of December 1944 is often regarded as Hitler’s last throw of the dice. In a final effort to turn the tide of the war on the western front, Germany launched a surprise offensive designed to catch the Allies off guard and retake the vital strategic port of Antwerp. Initially, the offensive went well and succeeded in advancing sixty miles into Belgium, taking thousands of US prisoners in the process as well as shattering Allied myths regarding the continued fighting capabilities of the Wehrmacht. However, by Christmas day of 1944 it was clear that the German offensive had run out of steam. Allied forces began a series of counterattacks that eventually drove the Germans back to their start line by the middle of January 1945. Devastating German losses destroyed any future hopes of Germany retaking the strategic initiative. By March 1945, the Allies had crossed the Rhine and annihilated the remnants of the Wehrmacht in Western Europe. However, had the Ardennes offensive succeeded in achieving its goals the situation might have been very different. The attack followed the same route as that of the 1940 German invasion four years earlier. The potential consequences of the offensive succeeding would have seriously undermined the Allied strategy for ending the war by 1945. Given the large scale German preparations for the offensive and the initial success of the attack, it is important to examine what exactly the goals of the German Army were and why they failed to break through and achieve their objectives.

The battles in Normandy and the rest of France following D-Day had seriously depleted the Wehrmacht’s fighting strength. However, the shortcomings of Allied supply logistics as well as the failure of Operation Market Garden in September 1944 gave the German army much needed breathing space to reorganise and rebuild. From September Hitler began to gradually assemble a strong force of panzer divisions. On 22nd October 1944, the German commander in the West, Gerd von Rundstedt and the commander of Army Group B, Field Marshall Model, were informed of the Fuhrer’s plans. These called for a major offensive from the Eifel and across the Ardennes by three re-equipped armies. Sixth SS Panzer under Sepp Dietrich, Fifth Panzer under von Manteuffel and General Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, all supported by some 1,400 aircraft of the Luftwaffe. The plan was to strike a heavy blow against the Allies in the West, splitting their forces in two, inflicting heavy losses and capturing their main supply base, the port of Antwerp. The attack would smash through the US First Army in the southern Ardennes and drive north-west towards Antwerp, crossing the River Meuse between Liege and Namur.

Each of the armies involved had a definite task. In the north, Dietrich’s SS Panzer Army was to capture Monschau and Bugenbach and then pass three infantry divisions though to hold the northern flank of the attack east of Liege. The 1st and 12th SS would then thrust west for Malmedy and Stavelot, whilst an advanced striking force commanded by SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, disguised with captured American uniforms and equipment would rush west and seize the Meuse bridges. In the south, Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army would thrust for the key road junctions at St.Vith and Bastogne, cross the River Our and drive on for the Meuse. To protect these advances, Brandenberger’s Seventh Army would provide a flank guard from Arlon to Luxembourg.

In theory, the plan held some merit. The thick forest and natural valleys of the Ardennes forest were almost impenetrable to Allied aerial surveillance. This would allow the Germans to build up large forces and supplies without arousing the suspicions of Allied intelligence and gain the advantage of surprise. To ensure absolute secrecy, Hitler forbade the use of wireless traffic in the area during the weeks before the attack. To give the impression that any forces detected were for defensive purposes only, the plan was codenamed ‘Wacht am Rhein’, later changed to ‘Herbstnebel’ (‘Autumn Smoke’). On the 16th December 1944, the Germans managed to throw eight panzer divisions, twenty infantry divisions and two mechanized brigades into the offensive. This totalled 200,000 men, initially supported by 500 tanks and 1,900 guns and mortars. Despite these preparations, Rundstedt and Model thought the plan for a thrust on Antwerp was ill-advised and too ambitious. They proposed an alternative plan aimed at damaging the forces opposite the Ardennes rather than trying to destroy them. Hitler refused to accept anything other than an all-out offensive and their plans were rejected.

Hitler hoped that a major defeat in the West would impel the Allies to the conference table. Even if the attack failed, Hitler considered that it might give Germany some useful time to produce more of its new technologically sophisticated weaponry and turn the tide of the war. German industry was finally starting to produce large numbers of jet-fighters that might yet curb the bomber offensive. The German navy could also renew its U-boat offensive on Allied convoys with the newly developed schnorkel submarine. In addition new V-weapons could be used in increasingly large number on British and continental cities inflicting casualties and sapping enemy morale.

Facing the Germans on the Ardennes front on the 16th December were 83,000 men with 242 Sherman medium tanks, 182 M-10 tank destroyers and 394 guns of various calibre. These forces had a long front to cover of some 104 miles. The 28th Division alone held a front of some thirty miles. In addition to being spread thinly the 4th and 28th Divisions had recently lost some 9,000 men in the Huertgen battles and the survivors were exhausted. The 106th Division had only been in the area for four days and the 9th armoured division lacked battle experience. These forces were woefully inadequate for the German onslaught.

The attack came as a complete surprise to the Allied forces in the area. Thousands of US prisoners were taken and the 106th Division ceased to exist as a fighting formation. By 21-23rd December the German advance had got to within four miles of Dinont on the Meuse. However, the US divisions encountered were still intact and the Meuse bridges were now securely held by the British. Crucially, the key road network at Bastogne was still held by the now besieged American forces. By Christmas Eve, the offensive had reached its highwater mark and Allied forces began counterattacking, ending German hopes of crossing the Meuse, let alone seizing Antwerp.

There were many factors involved in the failure of the German offensive. Although the US forces initially facing the Germans were overrun and destroyed, they had still managed to delay and inflict significant casualties on their attackers. The 28th and 106th US divisions had worn down the impetus of the German Panzer Divisions on the first day of the attack. The success of the German attack depended upon reaching the Meuse bridges and seizing them intact. Every moment of delay was critical for the Germans. Individual groups of US troops who held their ground contributed merely by slowing the German forces down for a few hours at a time and thereby allowing a counterattack to be assembled by US forces outside the ‘Bulge’. The successful deployment of the US 101st airborne division who arrived almost literally at the last moment in Bastogne, denied the Germans the use of the vital cross-roads and transport network that would have allowed them to deploy reinforcements with ease. US resistance at Bastogne tied up vital German resources at a time when they were desperately needed to support the forward elements of the advance. German difficulties at the start of the attack had been also increased by the fact that, in the interests of security, some units had been forbidden to carry out reconnaissance. Colonel Wilhelm Osterhold of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division claimed afterwards that ‘I never took part in an attack which was worse prepared’.

Throughout the battle, there was a large gulf between the performance of German armoured and infantry formations. The panzers and SS attacked with their usual energy and aggression. However, the supporting infantry displayed a shocking lack of enthusiasm, skill and training which made a significant contribution to German failure. Newly reconstructed German infantry divisions were not of the same quality as those that had been destroyed in Russia in 1942/3 and during the Normandy battles of late summer 1944. The 62nd Volksgrenadier Division contained many Czech and Polish conscripts from regions annexed to the Reich who spoke no German at all and belonged in sympathy to the Allies. The 352nd Volksgrenadier Division was rebuilt from airman and sailors and the 79th Volksgrenadier Division had been formed out of soldiers ‘combed out’ of rear headquarters.

By Christmas day, most of the lead Panzer units had ran out of fuel and had had to abandon their vehicles. The fuel reserves required had originally been calculated by the German High Command as being at 17,000 cubic metres. However, by the start of the attack only 50 per cent of the required fuel had been delivered. Therefore several armoured divisions only had fuel reserves for a distance of 60-80 km when they started because fuel consumption had been abnormally high during deployment. The success of the German offensive depended upon its lead elements capturing American fuel supplies as they advanced. German reinforcements simply could not reach the battle and make the required impact because of poor road conditions and above all, the lack of fuel. It is arguable that the fuel shortage contributed as much as Allied resistance to stopping the Panzers.

Tactically, the Germans made several errors which hindered their ability to exploit local successes and continue the advance. By the evening of the 17th December, Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army had become bogged down by US resistance. The Americans still held St.Vith and Butgenbach, so Model suggested to von Rundstedt that the weight of the attack and the available reinforcements, amounting to five divisions should be put towards Manteuffel’s attack in the south. Manteuffel’s Fifth Army was making good progress in the centre and requesting both support and fuel. Instead, Hitler insisted on trying to force a breakthrough on the southern flank with Dietrich’s Army. He decreed that the SS divisions should be sent to Dietrich in the north, whilst the remaining three armoured divisions would go Manteuffel. This division of reinforcements meant neither army received adequate support. On the evening of the 21st December, Manteuffel’s fuel supplies ran out stranding the 2nd Panzer Division at Teneville. Had Hitler agreed to switch his assets from the Sixth Panzer Army to the Fifth Army, it might have been very different. By contrast, the Allied commanders, having initially been taken by surprise, quickly worked out an effective strategy for blunting the offensive.

On the 20th December, Eisenhower had confided command of operations against Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army on the northern part of the Bulge to Field Marshall Montgomery. In the south, Patton had already began to move his armoured divisions to counterattack the German southern flank. The Allies were by now fully aware of German intentions since the Germans had broken radio silence and their intelligence codes had been broken. Montgomery brought British troops down from northern Belgium and secured the Meuse bridges. Having shored up the defensive line, American armoured divisions were by now in place to launch counterattacks. After Christmas Day the weather improved significantly enough for the Allied tactical airforces to begin bombing German positions. The Luftwaffe were unable to provide adequate support to German ground forces. Instead, Goring wasted his remaining assets and the fuel reserves of his air force by launching an all-out attack on Allied air fields on New Year’s Day 1945. It was clear by now that the German offensive had run out of steam.

The fighting in the ‘Battle of the Bulge’ continued for much of January. By the end of the battle the offensive had cost the Germans between 80,000 and 100,000 casualties as well as hundreds of tanks, armoured cars and artillery. US casualties were 80,987 men, making the Bulge the most costly battle the Americans fought in North-west Europe. The Allied advance into Germany was only delayed by seven weeks and the Germans had lost irreplaceable forces. These resources would have been better spent preparing for the Russian offensive on the eastern front which eventually took the Russians all the way to Berlin.

From the outset it was difficult to envisage the Germans succeeding. The forces assembled for the offensive lacked the power to sustain such an ambitious operation in the face of overwhelming superior Allied forces. The Allies were able to move forces around the battlefield with their huge fleet of logistical vehicles and almost unlimited fuel. For the German army to succeed in its aims would have required a combination of extremely favourable circumstances. Foggy weather hindering Allied airpower, usable roads and the absence of any tactical mistakes would all have been necessary for the offensive to succeed in reaching Antwerp and surrounding some thirty enemy divisions. The objectives of the operation were hugely ambitious for the limited resources available to the Germans in late 1944.

Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 (London, 2005)

John Keegan, The Second World War (London, 1997)

Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler’s War (London, 1998)

Max Hastings, Armageddon: the Battle for Germany 1944-45 (London, 2004)

Richard Holmes, Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History (Oxford, 2006)

Military History and Warfare: The Crusades: The role of the Military Orders in the defence of the Crusader States

2008-03-10T15:04:00.000-07:00

The success of the First Crusade in 1098/99 led to the establishment of the Crusader states centred around the kingdom of Jerusalem. Once Palestine had been conquered the majority of the crusaders made their way back to Europe. Fulcher of Chartres, a chronicler who recorded the events of the First Crusade and the events that followed, wrote that in 1099 only three hundred knights and the same number of infantry remained to guard Jerusalem, Jaffa, Ramle and Haife. However, these newly acquired territories on the frontiers of Christendom remained surrounded by hostile Muslim neighbours and needed far more troops to guard them than were usually available. Despite the seasonal influxes of armed pilgrims arriving in Outremer (the Frankish name for the region) each year, the core foundations of the new states rested on slender pillars. The annual arrival of knights on pilgrimage provided a constant trickle of much needed reinforcements, yet many of these visitors departed within a few months leaving only a limited pool of defenders for the states to drawn upon. Even at their height in the 1180s, the Latin settlements never numbered more than an estimated 250,000 Europeans. War and disease in the early years of the twelfth century had helped to prevent the emergence of a stable knightly class. It is in this context that the contribution of the military orders to the defence of the Holy Land must be examined.

The first military orders had their foundations as charitable organisations. The Templars were founded in 1118 to provide protection for travelling pilgrims. Their headquarters were based in the building identified by the crusaders as the Temple of Solomon. Within a few years of their establishment, the Templars had begun to go beyond merely protecting pilgrims and started to provide military forces against the Muslims. The Templars were formally approved by the Church at the Council of Troyes in January 1129 and their numbers and duties increased rapidly. Further privileges issued between 1139 and 1145 reinforced the papacy’s endorsement of the Templars. The order secured the right to elect its own master, the exemption from taxes payable to the local church and the right to collect revenues from their own lands.

The Hospitallers’ founding predates the First Crusade starting with the establishment of a hospice run by Italian traders from Amalfi who had arrived in Jerusalem around the mid eleventh century. The group followed a quasi-religious communal life and cared for sick pilgrims visiting the holy sites. In 1113 it became an independent order through a papal bull issued by Pope Paschall II. Finally in 1154, further papal privileges ensured that the Hospitallers would be free from the jurisdiction of local church authorities and received similar rights already granted to the Templars.
Other military orders such as the Teutonic knights and the Order of St.Lazarus would later join the Hospitallers and Templars in defending the Holy Land, but throughout the twelfth century it was the latter two who provided the most contributions in defending the Latin States.

The concept of the military order was a relatively new innovation to Christendom. It combined the concept of the physical prowess of the warrior knight with the spiritual discipline of the Cistercian monk. They were considered more effective as fighters because of this discipline and their monastic values. Like ordinary Cistercian monks, the brothers took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Unlike regular knights, the new breed of warrior monks were unfettered by civic duties such as the dispensing of justice and therefore had more time to train and perfect their combat skills. There were strict regulations for conduct in camp reinforced by the threat of severe penalties for disobeying orders in the field. In all leading orders the punishment for disobeying commands in battles was expulsion. Templars who launched an attack without permission lost their habit for a period.

Nonetheless, the idea of a warrior monk needed to be justified to those who believed that the very idea was a contradiction in terms. St. Bernard of Clairvaux helped to establish the concept into the mainstream of medieval religious and intellectual thought. The De Laude novae militae explained argued that the Templars were a new kind of knight who fought evil in the world and, through their faith and physical efforts would preserve the Holy Land for Latin Christendom. He set out the errors of secular knights in contrast to the ‘Knights of Christ’. In comparison to the worldly knights lust for glory and greed for material possessions, the Templars were ideologically pure.

Their significance to the defence of the Holy Land continued to grow throughout the twelfth century. In turn, the orders were given control of key frontier castles and defences. These castles were either given to them or sold by rulers and nobles who lacked the manpower or resources to defend them adequately. Local lords often had to depend upon local resources and in many cases could neither spare the troops nor money to garrison vital defence strongholds. In 1144, Raymond of Tripoli gave the Hospitallers a group of strongholds including the famous ‘Crac des Chevaliers’ located on the eastern borders of the county. By 1180, the Hospitallers were responsible for the defence of twenty-five castles in the East. The Templars controlled roughly the same number. Unlike the majority of secular rulers who had handed them over, the Military Orders could afford to keep these castles defended. There were few institutions in Medieval Europe that could match the financial resources of the Templars and Hospitallers. In the decades that followed their founding, the military orders were able to build up institutions in both the Latin east and in Western Europe. The scale of endowments, donations and exemptions from ecclesiastical taxation meant that the both the Hospitallers and Templars had access to substantial resources across the West. The Hospitallers alone possessed 18,000 manors in Europe. In essence the military orders were able to exploit the resources of the West for the benefit of defence of the East.

The importance of the military orders to the overall political and defensive structure of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was ascertained by the presence of the Grand Masters of the Orders who held privileged seats in the High Courts of the Latin states. It is estimated that by 1180, the knightly orders provided 50% of the Kingdom’s defences. Together the Hospitallers could field six-hundred ideologically committed mounted knights. This gave the Grand Masters a huge influence over policy and personal access to the leadership of the Latin states. By 1187, the military orders were the chief landowners in Outremer. Such was their influence that princes acknowledged that their treaties with local Muslim rulers would not be valid without the approval of the Grand Masters.

However, the growing influence of the Orders was not well received by all. Papal bulls granted by the church combined with the large military and financial resources available to them meant they were under no obligations to follow the commands of the secular leadership of the kings of Jerusalem. The historian Stephen Runciman has argued that the independence of the Orders can be characterised as uncontrollable states within the state and therefore a contributing factor towards the weakening process that eventually led to the loss of the Crusader settlements. In 1159, the orders refused to contribute their resources towards a proposed attack against Egypt. As a result the attack had to be called off. On numerous other occasions, the rivalry between the Templars and Hospitaller disrupted military plans. William of Tyre also records several incidents of the Templars refusing to follow instructions from the secular authorities. In 1173 Templar knights killed Assassin envoys travelling under a royal safe conduct after negotiating a truce with King Amalric of Jerusalem. It seems that the Templars did not approve of such dealings with a Muslim power. The king was extremely angry and demanded that the perpetrators be handed over to him for justice. In this instance, King Amalric was able to use his authority to seize and imprison the ringleader. William of Tyre goes on to say that had the king lived longer he would probably have challenged the independence of the Order. He also describes an incident at the siege of Ascalon when a group of Templars breached the walls ahead of the main army and allegedly refused to let the rest of the army join them for fear of having to share the booty. The Templars were soon trapped in the town and eventually massacred for their efforts.

John of Salisbury, writing in the twelfth century was even more critical of the Templars rebutting Bernard of Clairvaux’s assertions and arguing that knightly and clerical functions were incompatible. He suggested that the Templars’ privileges encouraged pride and avarice. The monk, Issac of L’Etoile, expressed similar ideologically concerns of what non-Catholics might think of the Christian Church encouraging violence rather than gentleness. By engaging in military activities, the participants made themselves vulnerable to evil and sin.

Despite these criticisms it is clear that the Military Orders were widely feared and respected by the enemies of the Crusader states. The Arabic chronicler Ibn al-Athir described the Hospitaller castle of Crac des Chevaliers as ‘as a bone in the gullet of the Muslims’. Their strict training and vocation to fight Islam made them highly formidable battle-field opponents. It was therefore customary to kill Templars and Hospitaller captured after a battle. Saladin’s secretary Imad ad-Din described an incident after the Battle of Hattin in 1187 where the Sultan sought out knights captured from the both orders. ‘I shall purify the land of these two impure races’. He offered fifty dinars to every man who had taken one of them of them prisoner and immediately the army brought forward some one hundred captives. All were then beheaded. Saladin clearly viewed the Templars and Hospitallers as dangerous enemies to Islam and saw it as a crucial to kill as many of them as possible.

The orders were generally praised for their work in defending the frontiers of Christendom against the resurgence of Muslim strength in the latter half of the twelfth century. They took on the burden of defending numerous castles at no additional cost to the kingdom and often provided determined and stout resistance when attacked. The Hospitaller castle of Belvoir held out for more than a year after the Battle of Hattin and Saladin was also unable to take either the Crac de Chevaliers or Margot. William of Tyre also had to acknowledge the crucial role which the orders played in the defence of the kingdom. Even if the Templars and Hospitallers were determined to pursue their own policies, the purpose of their entire existence was tied up within the defence of Latin Christendom within Outremer. Practical necessity dictated that they be given large tracts of land that they were willing and able to defend. The combination of monastic lifestyle and warrior training gave them a formidable reputation. There was no doubt in the minds of both Islamic and Christian contemporaries that the orders fielded better soldiers than the average Western knight. Given the limited resources and manpower available to the Frankish settlers there can be little doubt that the military orders were crucial in maintaining and defending the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its successor states in the Latin east.

Alan Forey, ‘The Military Orders 1120-1312’ in The Oxford History of the Crusades ed.

Jonathan Riley-Smith (Oxford, 2002)

Jonathan Philips, The Crusades (Harlow, 2002)

Sir Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187 (Cambridge, 2002)

Hans Eberhard Meyer, The Crusades (Oxford, 1988)

Jean Richard, The Crusades, c.1071-c.1291 (Cambridge, 1999)

Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999)